Economics

This article is addressing the problem of river sharing between two agents along a river in the presence of negative externalities. Where, each agent claims river water based on the hydrological characteristics of the territories. The claims can be characterized by some international framework (principles) of entitlement. These international principles are appears to be inequitable by the other agents in the presence of negative externalities. The negotiated treaties address sharing water along with the issue of negative externalities imposed by the upstream agent on the downstream agents. The market based bargaining mechanism is used for modeling and for characterization of agreement points.

We prove that a random choice rule satisfies Luce's Choice Axiom if and only if its support is a choice correspondence that satisfies the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference, thus it consists of alternatives that are optimal according to some preference, and random choice then occurs according to a tie breaking among such alternatives that satisfies Renyi's Conditioning Axiom. Our result shows that the Choice Axiom is, in a precise formal sense, a probabilistic version of the Weak Axiom. It thus supports Luce's view of his own axiom as a "canon of probabilistic rationality."

In various situations, decision makers face experts that may provide conflicting advice. This advice may be in the form of probabilistic forecasts over critical future events. We consider a setting where the two forecasters provide their advice repeatedly and ask whether the decision maker can learn to compare and rank the two forecasters based on past performance. We take an axiomatic approach and propose three natural axioms that a comparison test should comply with. We propose a test that complies with our axioms. Perhaps, not surprisingly, this test is closely related to the likelihood ratio of the two forecasts over the realized sequence of events. More surprisingly, this test is essentially unique. Furthermore, using results on the rate of convergence of supermartingales, we show that whenever the two experts\textquoteright{} advice are sufficiently distinct, the proposed test will detect the informed expert in any desired degree of precision in some fixed finite time.

Under very general conditions, we construct a micro-macro model for closed economy with a large number of heterogeneous agents. By introducing both financial capital (i.e. valued capital---- equities of firms) and physical capital (i.e. capital goods), our framework gives a logically consistent, complete factor income distribution theory with micro-foundation. The model shows factor incomes obey different distribution rules at the micro and macro levels, while marginal distribution theory and no-arbitrage princi-ple are unified into a common framework. Our efforts solve the main problems of Cambridge capital controversy, and reasonably explain the equity premium puzzle. Strong empirical evidences support our results.

Assortment optimization is an important problem that arises in many industries such as retailing and online advertising where the goal is to find a subset of products from a universe of substitutable products which maximize seller's expected revenue. One of the key challenges in this problem is to model the customer substitution behavior. Many parametric random utility maximization (RUM) based choice models have been considered in the literature. However, in all these models, probability of purchase increases as we include more products to an assortment. This is not true in general and in many settings more choices hurt sales. This is commonly referred to as the choice overload. In this paper we attempt to address this limitation in RUM through a generalization of the Markov chain based choice model considered in Blanchet et al. (2016). As a special case, we show that our model reduces to a generalization of MNL with no-purchase attractions dependent on the assortment S and strictly increasing with the size of assortment S. While we show that the assortment optimization under this model is NP-hard, we present fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) under reasonable assumptions.

We extend Berge's Maximum Theorem to allow for incomplete preferences (i.e., reflexive and transitive binary relations which fail to be complete). We first provide a simple version of the Maximum Theorem for convex feasible sets and a fixed preference. Then, we show that if, in addition to the traditional continuity assumptions, a new continuity property for the domains of comparability holds, the limits of maximal elements along a sequence of decision problems are maximal elements in the limit problem. While this new continuity property for the domains of comparability is sufficient, it is not generally necessary. However, we provide conditions under which it is necessary and sufficient for maximality and minimality to be preserved by limits.

I formulate and characterize the following two-stage choice behavior. The decision maker is endowed with two preferences. She shortlists all maximal alternatives according to the first preference. If the first preference is decisive, in the sense that it shortlists a unique alternative, then that alternative is the choice. If multiple alternatives are shortlisted, then, in a second stage, the second preference vetoes its minimal alternative in the shortlist, and the remaining members of the shortlist form the choice set. Only the final choice set is observable. I assume that the first preference is a weak order and the second is a linear order. Hence the shortlist is fully rationalizable but one of its members can drop out in the second stage, leading to bounded rational behavior. Given the asymmetric roles played by the underlying binary relations, the consequent behavior exhibits a minimal compromise between two preferences. To our knowledge it is the first Choice function that satisfies Sen's β axiom of choice,but not α .

We formalize the argument that political disagreements can be traced to a "clash of narratives". Drawing on the "Bayesian Networks" literature, we model a narrative as a causal model that maps actions into consequences, weaving a selection of other random variables into the story. An equilibrium is defined as a probability distribution over narrative-policy pairs that maximizes a representative agent's anticipatory utility, capturing the idea that public opinion favors hopeful narratives. Our equilibrium analysis sheds light on the structure of prevailing narratives, the variables they involve, the policies they sustain and their contribution to political polarization.

I consider decision-making constrained by considerations of morality, rationality, or other virtues. The decision maker (DM) has a true preference over outcomes, but feels compelled to choose among outcomes that are top-ranked by some preference that he considers "justifiable." This model unites a broad class of empirical work on distributional preferences, charitable donations, prejudice/discrimination, and corruption/bribery. I provide a behavioral characterization of the model. I also show that the set of justifications can be identified from choice behavior when the true preference is known, and that choice behavior substantially restricts both the true preference and justifications when neither is known. I argue that the justifiability model represents an advancement over existing models of rationalization because the structure it places on possible "rationales" improves tractability, interpretation and identification.

We analyze a macroeconomic model with intergenerational equity considerations and spatial spillovers, which gives rise to a multicriteria optimization problem. Intergenerational equity requires to add in the definition of social welfare a long run sustainability criterion to the traditional discounted utilitarian criterion. The spatial structure allows for the possibility of heterogeneiity and spatial diffusion implies that all locations within the spatial domain are interconnected via spatial spillovers. We rely on different techniques (scalarization, ϵ -constraint method and goal programming) to analyze such a spatial multicriteria problem, relying on numerical approaches to illustrate the nature of the trade-off between the discounted utilitarian and the sustainability criteria.