PPereira,VitorM.D.(2015),Analogy,MindandLife.Tran,Q-N.andArabnia,H.R.(eds.).EmergingTrendsinComputationalBiology,Bioinformatics,andSystemsBiology.Elsevier/MorganKaufmann.DOI:10.1016/b978-0-12-802508-6.00020-xThismanuscriptversionismadeavailableundertheCC-BY-NC-ND4.0licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Analogy,mindandlife
VitorManuelDinisPereiraLanguage,MindandCognitionResearchGroup(LanCog).PhilosophyCentre(CFUL).FacultyofLetters,UniversityofLisbonAlamedadaUniversidade,1600-214Lisboa,[email protected]
Analogy,mindandlifeAbstractI'llshow thatthekindofanalogybetweenlifeandinformation[argueforbyauthorssuchasDavies(2000),WalkerandDavies(2013),Dyson(1979),Gleick(2011),Kurzweil(2012),Ward(2009)]–thatseemstobecentraltotheeffectthatartificialmindmayrepresentsanexpectedadvanceinthelifeevolutioninUniverse–islikethedesignargumentandthatifthedesignargumentisunfoundedandinvalid,theargumenttothe ereira,VitorM.D.(2015),Analogy,MindandLife.Tran,Q-N.andArabnia,H.R.(eds.).EmergingTrendsinComputationalBiology,Bioinformatics,andSystemsBiology.Elsevier/MorganKaufmann.DOI:10.1016/b978-0-12-802508-6.00020-xThismanuscriptversionismadeavailableundertheCC-BY-NC-ND4.0licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ effectthatartificialmindmayrepresentsanexpectedadvanceinthelifeevolutioninUniverseisalsounfoundedandinvalid.However,ifwearepreparedtoadmit(thoughweshouldnotdo)thismethodofreasoningasvalid,I'llshow thattheanalogybetweenlifeandinformationtotheeffectthatartificialmindmayrepresentsanexpectedadvanceinthelifeevolutioninUniverseseemssuggestsometypeofreductionismoflifetoinformation,butbiologyrespectivelychemistryorphysicsarenotreductionist,contrarytowhatseemstobesuggestedbytheanalogybetweenlifeandinformation.KeywordsPhenomenalconsciousness,totalTuringtest,artificialintelligence,androids,analogy,pattern,recognition,reductionism,life,information.AcknowledgementsMymother,MariaDulce. ereira,VitorM.D.(2015),Analogy,MindandLife.Tran,Q-N.andArabnia,H.R.(eds.).EmergingTrendsinComputationalBiology,Bioinformatics,andSystemsBiology.Elsevier/MorganKaufmann.DOI:10.1016/b978-0-12-802508-6.00020-xThismanuscriptversionismadeavailableundertheCC-BY-NC-ND4.0licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ IntroductionTheanalogybetweenlifeandinformation— forexample,patternrecognition,withhierarchicalstructureandsuitableweightingsforconstituentfeatures(Kurzweil,2012)— seemstobecentraltotheeffectthatartificialmindmayrepresentsanexpectedadvanceinthelifeevolutioninUniverse,sinceinformation(namely,patternrecognition)issupposedtobetheessenceofmindandallinformation(namely,patternrecognition)isimplementedbythesamebasicneuralmechanisms.Andsincewecanreplicatedthesemechanismsinamachine,thereisnothingtopreventusfrom setupanartificialmind—wejustneedtoinstall therightpatternrecognizers.ArtificialmindandcognitivescienceThelandscapeoftheartificialmindresearchcanbedescribedasfollows:machinelearning,reasoning,knowledgerepresentation,restrictionfulfilment,search,planningandscheduling,agents,robotics,philosophicalfoundations,naturallanguageprocessing,perceptionandvision,cognitivemodelling,knowledgeandapplicationsengineering.The Tocreateamind,asarguebyKurzweil(2012),weneedtocreateamachinethatrecognizespatterns,suchaslettersandwords.Consider:translateapaper.Indespitethebesteffortstodevelopartificialuniversaltranslators,wearestillveryfarfrom beingabletodispensethehumancorrectionofwhatwewriteinanotherlanguage. ereira,VitorM.D.(2015),Analogy,MindandLife.Tran,Q-N.andArabnia,H.R.(eds.).EmergingTrendsinComputationalBiology,Bioinformatics,andSystemsBiology.Elsevier/MorganKaufmann.DOI:10.1016/b978-0-12-802508-6.00020-xThismanuscriptversionismadeavailableundertheCC-BY-NC-ND4.0licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ maincoreconsistsofthefirstthreeitems:machinelearning,reasoning,andknowledgerepresentation.Nowlet’sgotothelandscapeofthecognitivescienceresearch.Consideredthefollowingitems.Perceptionandaction,memory,attentionandconsciousness,theso-callednuclearknowledge,classification,lexiconandontology,learning,languageandrepresentation,choice,rationalityanddecision,cultureandsocialawareness.Thelandscapethatwecanoutlinewiththemisthelandscapeofthecognitivescienceresearch,withtheartificialmindresearchasait’sproperpart.Cybernetics,computersciences,languagesciences,neurosciences,brainsciences,psychology,biology,philosophy,mathematics,physics,engineeringsciences,inawayallofthesesciencescontributetothestudyofhumancognition(theaforementioneditems).Theartificialmindresearchisawayofdiscovering,describingandmodellingsomeofthemainfeaturesofconsciousness–specificallythecognitiveones.Artificialmindresearchersassistcognitivescienceresearchersinexplaininghow consciousnessemergesorcould emerge(becaused)bynon-consciousentitiesand processes(aexplanatoryquestion),orifconsciousnessmakesanydifferencefortheperformance(theoperation) ofthe systems in which consciousness is allegedly present;and ifconsciousnessmakesanydifference,whyandhowconsciousnessmakesanydifference(afunctionalquestion).Acentralnotioninartificialmindresearchisthatofagent.Theideaofanagentisanongoingandautonomouslyoperatingentityinanenvironmentinwhichthereareotherprocessesandagents.Weareinterestedinknowinghowanmindagentisdesigned.Usualquestionsarethefollowing:how doesitperceive,rationalize,decide,learn,howdoesitperform independentlyinamutualenvironmentofproblems(specificagentsforcertaininterventiondomains)?Artificialmindresearchersareinterestedinmultiplying ereira,VitorM.D.(2015),Analogy,MindandLife.Tran,Q-N.andArabnia,H.R.(eds.).EmergingTrendsinComputationalBiology,Bioinformatics,andSystemsBiology.Elsevier/MorganKaufmann.DOI:10.1016/b978-0-12-802508-6.00020-xThismanuscriptversionismadeavailableundertheCC-BY-NC-ND4.0licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ thoseagentsandaskhow itworksthatanenormousvarietyofthoseagentscanarticulate coherently in a multi-agentsystem (interaction and organization).Thecombinationofthesequestions(andtheiranswers)canbedesignatedbytheterm“DistributedArtificialIntelligence”(DAI).ConsciousnessWithrespecttoconsciousness,itcanbeclassifiedinthefollowingthreeways(Block2002).1.Accessconsciousness:wehaveaccessconsciousnessofsomethingifwehaveitsrepresentation,itcanbetransmittedtoeachpartofthebrainandinthiswayitcanbeusedinourreasoningand(rational)controlofouractions.Itislikelythatthisisthetypeofconsciousnessthatcanbeimplementedinamachine.Butwehavetheproblem ofdebatingwhetherthemachine“actually”experiencessomethingornot(andinthiscase,“actually”isnotclearlydefined).2.Phenomenalconsciousness:x isin a phenomenalconsciousstate ifxexperiencessomethingthatcharacterizesthatstate.Thecriterionwidelyusedtotalkaboutphenomenalconsciousnessisthatof“thereissomethingitisliketobeinthatstate”.Forexample,ifwearephenomenallyconsciousofabrightbluesky,thenitisbecauseweareexperiencingsomethingthatmakesthatmentalstateaphenomenalconsciousstate.Thisexperienceisthekeyconceptofphenomenalconsciousness.Blockidentifiesthefollowingthreedifferencesbetweenaccessconsciousnessandphenomenalconsciousness. ereira,VitorM.D.(2015),Analogy,MindandLife.Tran,Q-N.andArabnia,H.R.(eds.).EmergingTrendsinComputationalBiology,Bioinformatics,andSystemsBiology.Elsevier/MorganKaufmann.DOI:10.1016/b978-0-12-802508-6.00020-xThismanuscriptversionismadeavailableundertheCC-BY-NC-ND4.0licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ereira,VitorM.D.(2015),Analogy,MindandLife.Tran,Q-N.andArabnia,H.R.(eds.).EmergingTrendsinComputationalBiology,Bioinformatics,andSystemsBiology.Elsevier/MorganKaufmann.DOI:10.1016/b978-0-12-802508-6.00020-xThismanuscriptversionismadeavailableundertheCC-BY-NC-ND4.0licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ hasbeeninjury,buthisrepresentationsenabletheindividualtorespondtosuchvisualstimuli.Aretheirrepresentationsthatenablehimtorespondtosuchvisualstimuli.However,wecanstillgiveanotherexample.Theonefrom theBelief-Desire-Intention (BDI)agent(Bratman,1987),which doesnothave experiences:he ispresumably“aware”ofeverythinginfrontofhim butdoesnotexperienceanyofit[adiscussionrelatedtothisexampleisthethoughtexperimentoftheChineseRoom bySearle(1980)].Hisalleged“consciousness”ispresumably“access”,notphenomenalconsciousness.(b)Onecaseofphenomenalconsciousnesswithoutaccessconsciousnessis,forexample,inwhichweexperiencetheenvironmentalcitysound,becauseofbeingsousedtolivingwithit,wedonotrepresentit.Perhapsafriendofyours,usedtothesilenceofthecountryside,couldfinditstrangehow weareabletoliveintheenvironmentalcitysound.Thereasonisthatwearenotaccessconsciouseventhoughwearephenomenalconsciousofit.3.Self-awareness:is the state ofsomething when there is an internalrepresentationofoneself.Forexample,achimpanzeeorababy(babyaroundtwoyears,twoandone-halfyearsold)iscapableofrecognizingitselfinthemirrorbutadogisnot.Itislikelywhenadoglooksatthereflectedimage(ofitself)inthemirror,itisconsciousofthephenomenalbutitinterpretstherepresentationtowhichithasconsciousaccessasanotherdog.Coelho(2008)assertstheneedofatheoryofsubjectivityandatheoryofthebody.Thedifficultyofthesubjectivitytheorycanbeillustratedinthefollowingway:wearenotcapableofhavingthesensationsofabat(Nagel,1974)becausewearenotbats.Andthedifficultthingaboutthetheoryofthebody,inthefollowingway:robotic“organs”are ereira,VitorM.D.(2015),Analogy,MindandLife.Tran,Q-N.andArabnia,H.R.(eds.).EmergingTrendsinComputationalBiology,Bioinformatics,andSystemsBiology.Elsevier/MorganKaufmann.DOI:10.1016/b978-0-12-802508-6.00020-xThismanuscriptversionismadeavailableundertheCC-BY-NC-ND4.0licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ notorgansfrom naturalselection,butourbrain isan organ ofnaturalselection(Edelman,2006).Themaindifficultyistheso-calledphenomenalconsciousness.Theso-calledhardproblem ofconsciousness(Chalmers,1995).Thereisnothingweknowmoreintimatelythantheconsciousexperience,butthereisnothingmoredifficulttoexplain.However,thisdifficultisfarfrom beingexclusivetotheartificialmindresearch.Forexample,inneurosciencethefarthestonegetsaretheneuralcorrelatesofaccessconsciousness.Inotherwords,"accessconsciousness”referstothepossibilityofamentalstatetobeavailabletotherestofthecognitivesystem (tobeavailable,forexample,toourproductionsystem languagelikewhenwetrytodescribethestingingsharpnessofapinprick,thetasteofchocolateorthevibrantred ofafiretruck).Theaccessisrepresentationalinawaythatphenomenologyisnot:thecontrastisbetweenfeelingthatsting,savoringthatchocolateorseeingthatredandassociatedrepresentationssuchthatwemaynotaccesstheserepresentations(notbeinginpossessionofrelevantconcepts)but,ifweexperience,wehavetheexperiencethatinfactwehave(forexample,seetheredofthetruckincontrastwithseethatthistruckisred).In artificialmind research the alleged “consciousness”one gets are alsopresumably“access”,agentshave“representationsof”their“owninternalstates”,theso-called“self-awareness”.ExamplesoftheseagentsareHomer–implementedbyVereandBickmore(1990)–and“ConsciousMachine”(COMA)–projectbySchubertetal.(1993).ArchitecturessuchasState,OperatorAndResult(SOAR),IntelligentDistributionAgent(IDA)andAdaptiveControlofThought—Rational(ACT-R)arecomputationalmodelsofhumancognition(forexample,realprocessingtime).However,researchers ereira,VitorM.D.(2015),Analogy,MindandLife.Tran,Q-N.andArabnia,H.R.(eds.).EmergingTrendsinComputationalBiology,Bioinformatics,andSystemsBiology.Elsevier/MorganKaufmann.DOI:10.1016/b978-0-12-802508-6.00020-xThismanuscriptversionismadeavailableundertheCC-BY-NC-ND4.0licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ workingin thoseareasdo notexplicitly attemptto build an agentwith “accessconsciousness”.Otherresearchprojectsinvolvetheconstructionofandroids.Thesehaveprovidedanempiricaldeviceforvariousdebates:thedebateabouttherelationshipbetweenthemindandthebody(unifyingthepsychologicalandbiological),therelationshipofthesocialinteraction withinternalmechanisms(unifyingsocialsciencesand cognitivepsychology),thealleged reductionism in neurosciences(theso-called “theoriesofcreationofartificialintelligence”),connectionism versusmodularityincognitivescience(thearchitectureswhichproduceresponsessimilartohumanones),natureversuscreation(therelativeimportanceofinnatenessandlearninginsocialinteraction).Theconstruction ofandroidscould very wellprovide empiricaldata to the study ofsubjectivity.Here,wemustnotethefollowing:missingatheoryofsubjectivityisnotmissinginformation aboutsubjectivity;rather,thisinformation aboutsubjectivity may beavailable(presumablyprovidedbyresearchersinartificialmind)butstilllackatheoryofsubjectivity.Forexample,considerwhathappenswhenyoulookataNecker(1832)cube:suddenlyitflips,andalthoughtheretinalimageandvisibletwo-dimensional(2-D)structureareunchanged,thethree-dimensional(3-D)interpretationisdifferent.Lines,orrathercube-edges,thatonceslopeddownawayfrom theviewernowslopeupawayfrom theviewer,andtheverticalsquarecubefacethatwaspreviouslyfartherawayisnownearer.TheNeckerflipinwhatit'sliketoseethepatternoflinesasacubeislikelytooccurinvisuallysophisticatedrobots,underappropriateconditions.Therecanbeno ereira,VitorM.D.(2015),Analogy,MindandLife.Tran,Q-N.andArabnia,H.R.(eds.).EmergingTrendsinComputationalBiology,Bioinformatics,andSystemsBiology.Elsevier/MorganKaufmann.DOI:10.1016/b978-0-12-802508-6.00020-xThismanuscriptversionismadeavailableundertheCC-BY-NC-ND4.0licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ reasonforwhichthatvariationinwhatitisliketoseetheselinesasacubecouldnottakeplaceinrobotsvisuallysophisticated(inappropriateconditions).However,beornotbewellinformedaboutthisxitisaepistemologicalproblem,notaontologicalproblem andinthissense,ofinformationnotbeingaontologicalproblem,Sloman(1996)cansaythathere— subjectivity— thereisnonephilosophicalproblem.Wehaveinformationabout,butnotatheoryof,subjectivitybecausehere,weareconfusingtwothings:epistemologyandontology.Onethingishow weknow;anotherwhatthingsare.Artificialmindresearchcontributestothestudyofhumancognitionandalsotothestudyofsubjectivity:contributesnotexhaustedthestudyofsubjectivity.Theso-calledTuring(1950)Testassumed,initsevaluationofintelligence,thatthementaldoesnothavetobeembodied.However,Turingwaswrongregardingthenatureofthemental.Theso-calledTotalTuringTest(TTT)preservestheideathatthementalhastobeembodied(Harnad,1991).ThecandidatetotheTTThastobecapableofdoing,intheworldofobjectsandpersons,alltheycando,anddothem inawaythatisindistinguishable(topeople)from theirworkings.Theenvironmentandthesetdesign(Coelho2008).So,arguably,wehaveexperimentalgroundstobuildandroids.Bystudyingneuron-cognitivemechanismswiththeadditionalandsubsidiaryhelpofandroids,evaluatingtheirinteractionswith human beings,researcherscan hopetobuild abridge,forexample,betweenNeuroscienceandtheBehaviouralSciences.Withandroidswehaveanexperimentalapparatusfortestsofsubjectivity,thephenomenologicalproperties ofhuman bodies being allegedly the same as the ereira,VitorM.D.(2015),Analogy,MindandLife.Tran,Q-N.andArabnia,H.R.(eds.).EmergingTrendsinComputationalBiology,Bioinformatics,andSystemsBiology.Elsevier/MorganKaufmann.DOI:10.1016/b978-0-12-802508-6.00020-xThismanuscriptversionismadeavailableundertheCC-BY-NC-ND4.0licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ phenomenologicalpropertiesofandroids’bodies.Evenifandroidshavenotsubjectivity,weputoursubjectivity— confusedbyandroids’bodies— inandroidsexperimentally,atleastbythetwoseconds(Ishiguro,2005)ofourconfusionbetweenandroids’bodiesandhumanbodiesbecauseofthephenomenologicalpropertiesofthebodiesoftheandroids.Weneedbothworkinghypothesisaboutthestudyofthehumanmind,atheoryofsubjectivityandatheoryofthebody.Humanbeingshavethemindthathasbecausetheyhavethebodythathave,therearenodisembodiedmind,outsidetheenvironment(asinstantiatedbyhumans).Themind,evenifthemindisadistinctsubstancefrom thebody,getsmostofitsstimulationfromthebody.Furthermore,themindactsthroughthebody.Giventhatsomuchofmentalactivityarisesfrom bodilystimulationandsomuchofitisdesignedtocontributetobodilymovement,thehumanmindisradicallyunlike,say,themindofapureintellectasGod(ifexist).Takingthisseriously,itseemsthatthehumanmindcouldnotexistwithoutabody.Theconsciousnessofhumanbeingsisbothofaccessandphenomenal.Ourproblemisthatthereisnoplaceforanecessaryconnectionwithphysiologyinthespaceofpossibledevelopmentdefinedbytheconceptofthemind.Althoughsuchconceptualexpansiondoesnotimplyacontradictionwiththeessentialnatureofthesubjectiveexperience,nothingprecludesaexpandedconceptofmindfrom preservingthefeaturesoftheformerconceptandallowingthediscoveryofthisconnection(Nagel1998,2002).HomerandCOMA(onlytoreturntotheexamplesgivenabove),asaworkinghypothesis about the study ofthe human cognition,presumably have “accessconsciousness”(“representationsof”)butnotphenomenalconsciousness(subjectivity).Presumably“accessconsciousness”ofagentsasHomerandCOMA cannotbe ereira,VitorM.D.(2015),Analogy,MindandLife.Tran,Q-N.andArabnia,H.R.(eds.).EmergingTrendsinComputationalBiology,Bioinformatics,andSystemsBiology.Elsevier/MorganKaufmann.DOI:10.1016/b978-0-12-802508-6.00020-xThismanuscriptversionismadeavailableundertheCC-BY-NC-ND4.0licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ separatedfromabody(TotalTuringTest).However,thisbodycannotbeanyaggregateofmatter;rather,abodymustbeindistinguishablefrom humanstohumans:humanbeingslookingatthesebodiesandconfuseus,to“process”(Ishiguro,2005)themastootherhumans.Thephenomenologicalpropertiesofthebodiesoftheseagents— thatis,thewaytheyappeartous— areindistinguishablefrom thephenomenologicalpropertiesofhuman bodies.Our brain “processes” (Ishiguro,2005) androids (note thatthesophisticatedrobotsSloman1996talksabouthaveabodyverydifferentfrom ours)ashumanfortwoseconds.Therearestudies,asIshiguro2005,showingthatin70% ofparticipantsthisisthecase.Itisforthisthatweneedatheoryofsubjectivityandatheoryofthebodyasworkinghypothesisaboutthestudyofthehumanmind.Notwithstanding,thekindofanalogybetweenlifeandinformation[argueforbyauthorssuchasDavies(2000),WalkerandDavies(2013),Dyson(1979),Gleick(2011),Kurzweil(2012),Ward(2009)]–thatseemstobecentraltotheeffectthatartificialmindmayrepresentsanexpectedadvanceinthelifeevolutioninUniverse–islikethedesignargumentandthatifthedesignargumentisunfoundedandinvalid,theargumenttotheeffectthatartificialmindmayrepresentsanexpectedadvanceinthelifeevolutioninUniverseisalsounfoundedandinvalid.Theclassicwatchmakeranalogy ereira,VitorM.D.(2015),Analogy,MindandLife.Tran,Q-N.andArabnia,H.R.(eds.).EmergingTrendsinComputationalBiology,Bioinformatics,andSystemsBiology.Elsevier/MorganKaufmann.DOI:10.1016/b978-0-12-802508-6.00020-xThismanuscriptversionismadeavailableundertheCC-BY-NC-ND4.0licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Thedesign argumentpresented and criticized,forexample,byHumein hisDialogues concerning naturalreligion (1779),can be formulated as the classicwatchmakeranalogyasfollows.1.Theclock,foritscomplexityandthewayisordered,isamachinethathastohaveanintelligentauthorandbuilder,withproportionalcapacitiestohiswork— ahumanwatchmaker.2.Theworld,foritscomplexityandthewayisordered,itislikeaclock.3.Therefore,theworld also hasto haveasmartauthorand builder,withproportionalcapacitiestohiswork— thedivinewatchmaker(God).Succinctly,thisargumentholdsthatgiventheallegedlysimilaritiesbetweenaclockandtheworld,justaswecanassumethatanintelligententitybuiltaclockinaspecificwayandforaspecificpurpose,presumablywecandothesamefortheworld.Whileinthefirstcase,themostplausiblehypothesisforthebuilderoftheclockwouldbeahumanwatchmaker,inthesecondcase,themostplausiblehypothesisforthebuilderoftheworldwouldbea"divinewatchmaker"because,presumably,onlysuchabeingcouldbecapableofsuchawork.Thisargumentisananalogy,but,asweshallseenext,itraisesseveralproblems.Considerthis:itisobviousthattheworldiscomplex,hasanorderandnaturaleventshavearegularity,yettheanalogywiththewatchisfragile,remoteandreductive. ereira,VitorM.D.(2015),Analogy,MindandLife.Tran,Q-N.andArabnia,H.R.(eds.).EmergingTrendsinComputationalBiology,Bioinformatics,andSystemsBiology.Elsevier/MorganKaufmann.DOI:10.1016/b978-0-12-802508-6.00020-xThismanuscriptversionismadeavailableundertheCC-BY-NC-ND4.0licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Theclassicwatchmakeranalogyisfragile,remoteandreductiveFirstly,itisfragile,becausewhiletheclockisaperfectmachine,theworldisa"machine"fullofimperfectionsandirregularitiesthatgobeyondtheirusualorderorregularity.Secondly,itisremote,becauseanysimilaritiesbetweenthewatchandtheworldcanonlyberegardedasverydistantsimilarities,onlyinsomeaspects.Thatis,onecannotsaywithcertaintythattheworldorderissimilartotheorderoftheclock,becausewhilewearesure,byexperience,thattheclockandtheirorderwerecreatedaccordingtoanend,wehavenocertainty(nothavinghadanyexperienceofthis)thattheworldanditsorderwereevencreated,muchlessthatitoccurredinaccordancewithanend(thatwouldbedivine)andnotjustthenaturalaccident(thelatterexplanationis,moreover,thescientificexplanation).Thirdly,itisareductiveanalogy,becausewhiletheclockisamachinewithalimitedcomplexitytoitssmalldimensions,theworldisa"machine"notcomparabletothedimensionsofthewatch,soitscomplexitycannotbecomparedwiththatoftheclock.Now,ananalogycanbeestablishedfrom anexamplethatissimilarinarelevantaspect— inthecaseofthewatchmakeranalogy,theexamplewouldbetheclockandtherelevantaspectwouldbethecomplexityoftheclockcomparabletothecomplexityoftheworld.Andwehaveseenthatthewatchmakeranalogydoesnotfulfiltheseconditions,soweconcludethattheanalogyisneitherfoundednorvalid.Therefore,theargumentisunfoundedandinvalidandshouldnotbeconsideredasagoodproofoftheexistenceofGod.Theanalogybetweenmentallifeandinformationisofthesamekindofanalogy ereira,VitorM.D.(2015),Analogy,MindandLife.Tran,Q-N.andArabnia,H.R.(eds.).EmergingTrendsinComputationalBiology,Bioinformatics,andSystemsBiology.Elsevier/MorganKaufmann.DOI:10.1016/b978-0-12-802508-6.00020-xThismanuscriptversionismadeavailableundertheCC-BY-NC-ND4.0licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ involvedintheargumentfromdesign.From thefactthattherearementaloperationsasthoughtandintentioninsomepartsofnature,particularlyinhumansandotheranimals,itdoesnotfollow thatthismaybetheruleofthewholethatisthenature(thatfartherexceedspartsashumansandotheranimals).Theanalogybetweenlifeandinformationtakesapart(information)bythewhole(life).Theideathatanaturalbiologicalfunctionofthebrainisprocessinginformationhasnotbeenestablishedempiricallybycognitiveneuroscience,isametaphor.Theconceptsof"processing"and"information"areconceptsoffolkpsychologythatseemsscientifically rigorous,but are not scientifically rigorous.Concepts as “patternrecognition”doesnotexhaustallmentalactivity:ifanymentalactivityfallsundertheconceptof“patternrecognition”,isonlypartoftheactivityofthemind.Inwhatwaydoesthinkingco-occurwithastimulusandcategorizingit?WhenIam thinkingaboutWaltham (Massachusetts,USA)whileinLisbon(Portugal),Iam notrecognizinganypresentedstimulusasWaltham (Massachusetts,USA)— sinceIam notperceivingWaltham (Massachusetts,USA)with mysenses.Thereisnoperceptualrecognitiongoingonatallinthinkingaboutanabsentobject.Soconceptsas“patternrecognition”,althoughsomepartofwhatthereistosayaboutthenatureofthought—suchaswhenIam perceivingWaltham (Massachusetts,USA)withmysenses— isfarfromallthereistosayaboutthenatureofthought.ContrastwithPereira(2015),inwhichtherelevantcomputationtotheeffectofthe occipitaland lefttemporalcorrelatesofthe distinction between accessandphenomenologyisthecomputationofthehighdegreeofvisibility"4"and"5"assigned ereira,VitorM.D.(2015),Analogy,MindandLife.Tran,Q-N.andArabnia,H.R.(eds.).EmergingTrendsinComputationalBiology,Bioinformatics,andSystemsBiology.Elsevier/MorganKaufmann.DOI:10.1016/b978-0-12-802508-6.00020-xThismanuscriptversionismadeavailableundertheCC-BY-NC-ND4.0licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ bytheparticipantsinbothexperimentstothecorrectlyidentifiedstimuli(andwhattherearemoreinthesecondexperimentismoreincorrectanswersthaninthefirstexperiment), because to distinguish electrophysiologically the access fromphenomenology we need that access and phenomenology will be cognitivelyconsciousnessofsomethingandweneedthataccesswillbethesameforallparticipantsinthetwoexperiments.Inallexperiments(Pereira,2015),notonlyaretargetsalwaysshown,theymustalwaysbeingshown.Reachtotheexplanationofthewhole[nature,asinthediscussionoftheargumentfrom design byHume;life,asin thediscussion oftheanalogybetween lifeandinformationbyauthorssuchasDavies(2000),WalkerandDavies(2013),Dyson(1979),Gleick(2011),Kurzweil(2012),Ward(2009)]startingwithjustonepart(humansandotheranimals,asinthediscussionoftheargumentfromdesignbyHume;information,asinthediscussionoftheanalogybetweenlifeandinformation),withoutmore,makestheseargumentsveryweak:totheeffectoftheexistenceofGod(criticizedbyHume);totheeffectoftheanalogybetweenlifeandinformation[argueforbyauthorssuchasDavies(2000),WalkerandDavies(2013),Dyson(1979),Gleick(2011),Kurzweil(2012),Ward(2009)].Atthesametime,asHumesays,ifwearepreparedtoadmit(thoughweshouldnotdo)thismethodofreasoningasvalid,whythenchoosethepartofnaturethatsaysmoreaboutus,andnotchooseanotherpartofnature?Or,asIsays,whythenchoosethepartofmentallifethatsaysmoreaboutperceptualcasesandnotemotion,imagination,reasoning,willing,intending,calculating,silentlytalkingtooneself,feelingpainandpleasure,itches,andmoods—thefulllifeofthemind?Certainly,theyarenothingliketheperceptualcasesonwhichtheanalogy ereira,VitorM.D.(2015),Analogy,MindandLife.Tran,Q-N.andArabnia,H.R.(eds.).EmergingTrendsinComputationalBiology,Bioinformatics,andSystemsBiology.Elsevier/MorganKaufmann.DOI:10.1016/b978-0-12-802508-6.00020-xThismanuscriptversionismadeavailableundertheCC-BY-NC-ND4.0licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ betweenlifeandinformationrest.Whythenchoosespecificallysomeoftheaccessfeaturesofconsciousnessandnotthephenomenologyfeaturesofconsciousness(Pereira,2015)?Namely,whythenchoosethepartofmentallifethatsaysmoreaboutaccessfeaturesofconsciousnessandnotthephenomenologyfeaturesofconsciousnessas,forexample,Pereira,2015?Certainly,phenomenologyfeaturesofconsciousnessarenothinglike(seePereira,2015)theinformationaboutphenomenologyfeaturesofconsciousnessonwhichtheanalogybetweenlifeandinformationrest.Accordingtoscience,werenaturaleventsthat,inasuccessionofchances(withoutanyspecialordivineplan),althoughaccordingtothe"lawsofnature",ledtothecreationoftheworldanditsexistenceasweknowit.Thus,evenbeforebeingabletodreamevenwithDarwiniantheoriesandhowtheyrevolutionizedscientificknowledge,Hume,throughhischaracterPhilo,alreadyhadanobjectiontotheargumentfromdesignthathecouldnotimaginebeoneofscientificbasisagainstthemostdevastatingeffectsofsuchanargumentfrom design— namelythewatchmakeranalogy.Indeed,thehypothesisofHumeofasuccessionofchances,besidesbeingmorelogicalandplausiblethanthetheistichypothesis,isonethatmostcloselymatchesDarwiniantheoriesofevolutionbynaturalselection,whichwouldariseacenturylater(inthe19thcentury),aswellasapproachesallsubsequentscientificdiscoveries,notonlyofbiology,butalsoofchemistry,andphysics,regardingthepossiblecertaintieswecanhaveaboutthecreationoftheUniverse. ereira,VitorM.D.(2015),Analogy,MindandLife.Tran,Q-N.andArabnia,H.R.(eds.).EmergingTrendsinComputationalBiology,Bioinformatics,andSystemsBiology.Elsevier/MorganKaufmann.DOI:10.1016/b978-0-12-802508-6.00020-xThismanuscriptversionismadeavailableundertheCC-BY-NC-ND4.0licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ TheanalogybetweenlifeandinformationseemssuggestsometypeofreductionismTheanalogybetweenlifeandinformation,ifwearepreparedtoadmit(supposeyoudonotagreethatthekindofanalogybetweenlifeandinformationislikethedesignargument)thismethodofreasoningasvalid(thoughweshouldnotdo),seemssuggestsometypeofreductionismoflifetoinformation.However,biologyrespectivelychemistryorphysicsarenotreductionist,contrarytowhatseemstobesuggestedbytheanalogybetweenlifeandinformation.On the biologicallevel,for example,molecular genetics cannotprovide aderivationbaseforevolutionarybiology(Lewontin,1983;Levins,1968)orevenforclassicalgenetics (Kitcher,1984).Particularly,Kitcher (1984:350) writes:‘‘themolecular derivation forfeits something important.[...] The molecular accountobjectivelyfailstoexplainbecauseitcannotbringoutthatfeatureofthesituationwhichishighlighted in the [biological]cytologicalstory’’.Richard Lewontin (quoted inCallebaut,1993:261),initsturn,claim:“Anytextbookorpopularlectureongeneticswillsay:‘Thegeneisaself-reproducingunitthatdeterminesaparticulartraitinanorganism’.Thatdescription ofgenesasself-reproducingunitswhichdeterminetheorganismcontainstwofundamentalbiologicaluntruths:Thegeneisnotself-replicatinganditdoesnotdetermineanything.Iheard an eminentbiologistatan importantmeetingof ereira,VitorM.D.(2015),Analogy,MindandLife.Tran,Q-N.andArabnia,H.R.(eds.).EmergingTrendsinComputationalBiology,Bioinformatics,andSystemsBiology.Elsevier/MorganKaufmann.DOI:10.1016/b978-0-12-802508-6.00020-xThismanuscriptversionismadeavailableundertheCC-BY-NC-ND4.0licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ evolutionistssaythatifhehadalargeenoughcomputerandcouldputtheDNAsequenceofanorganism intothecomputer,thecomputercould‘compute’theorganism.Nowthatsimplyisnottrue.Organismsdon’tevencomputethemselvesfrom theirownDNA.Theorganismistheconsequenceoftheuniqueinteractionbetweenwhatithasinheritedandtheenvironmentin which itisdeveloping[cf.Changeux(1985),Edelman (1988a,1988b)],whichisevenmorecomplexbecausetheenvironmentisitselfchangedintheconsequenceofthedevelopmentoftheorganism”.So,asexemplifiedbythesetwoquotesfrompeopleworkinginthefield,biologyisnotreductionist.Neitherchemistrynorphysicsisreductionist.Onthechemicallevel,forexample,thereductionofchemistrytoquantum mechanics[Cartwright(1997),Primas(1983)]isacaseoffailedorincompletereduction.Andthepresumedreductionism in physicsisalsonotmoresuccessfulthanbiologyorchemistry,onphysicallevel,forexample,itisnotalwayspossibletocombinemodelsofgravitationandelectromagneticforcesinacoherentway:theygenerateinconsistentorincoherentresultswhenapplied,forexample,todensematter.Thisisthemainproblemcurrentlydrivingpeoplesearchingforaunifiedfieldtheory.ConclusionThingsintheworldarenotrepresentational,intentionalmentalstatesaboutthemis thatthey are representational,butphenomenological,physicaland functionalcharacteristicsofmentalstates(certaintypeofnervecellactivationco-occurringwithourlookingattheworld)alsoarenotrepresentational,aresensationsandexperiences. ereira,VitorM.D.(2015),Analogy,MindandLife.Tran,Q-N.andArabnia,H.R.(eds.).EmergingTrendsinComputationalBiology,Bioinformatics,andSystemsBiology.Elsevier/MorganKaufmann.DOI:10.1016/b978-0-12-802508-6.00020-xThismanuscriptversionismadeavailableundertheCC-BY-NC-ND4.0licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Cognitivementalstatesrepresent,butsensationsnotrepresentanything:ifcertainthingsouttherestimulatenervecells,arenotthesecellsthatrepresentingthingsouttheretobeingofsuchandsuchamanner.Semanticsisoutthere,thingsouttherestimulatenervecells,buttheco-occurringconfigurationofthesenervecellswiththatstimulation,ifclaim tobe"representationalorinformationalorcoding",isjustamisuseandoveruseoftermslike"representation":neurons,theirsynapses,neurotransmitters,receptorsmolecularetal.arecellularorganismsmorethanwecanaccessbecausethereisnoinformationorrepresentationaboutcellularorganismsthatexplainwhatinfactwefeltandexperienced.Theideathatneurons(theirchemistryand physics)"encode"orrepresent"information"iswrong.Ifneuronsencodeorrepresent,isstartingtotakeforgrantedwhatisintendedtoshow:thereisnodifferencebetweensayingthatcertainBloodOxygenationLevelDependent(BOLD)(forexample,Ogawaetal.,1992)signal(fMRI)orelectroencephalogram (EEG)signalcorrelateswithcertaininformationandsayingthatcertainBOLD(fMRI)orEEGsignaliscorrelatedwithcertainconsciousmentalstates(phenomenaloraccess).What'stherehereisquestion-begging.Afallacy,becausetheyassume"information",theystudy"consciousness":butsomeonealreadyshowedthatneuronsencodeorrepresent?Neuronsneitherencodenorrepresentanythingornothing:whatitisthatthehumanvoiceencodesorrepresents?Certainsoundwaves.Expressionssuchas"neuralcode"arenotneurons,areustalkingaboutthem.Theyaretobethingsoutthere,theyarebeingrepresentedbyus,buttheythemselvesarenotrepresentations.Expressionslike"information"and"representation"canbeeliminated,thatwhattherelevantdisciplinesaysaboutneurons(andrelated)remainsinformative.Andif"information"isacertainkindoffrequency,thefrequencyisenough! ereira,VitorM.D.(2015),Analogy,MindandLife.Tran,Q-N.andArabnia,H.R.(eds.).EmergingTrendsinComputationalBiology,Bioinformatics,andSystemsBiology.Elsevier/MorganKaufmann.DOI:10.1016/b978-0-12-802508-6.00020-xThismanuscriptversionismadeavailableundertheCC-BY-NC-ND4.0licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Wetelephoned,thelistenerunderstandsus.Butwedonotsaythatthesignalbetweenthesedevices,representorencodeorisinformation.Abookaboutoceansisnotanocean:wecanbatheourselvesinpartsoftheoceanwithouthaveanyconceptof"ocean"orof"part",wecanseeredthingswithoutseeingthatarered(nothavingtheconceptof"red").Havinginformationaboutlivingorganismsdoesnotmakethisinformationlivingorganisms–theycanbe“automata”(DescartesinthesecondofhisMeditationsontheFirstPhilosophy,1641).Bydefinitionanartificial,forexample,plant(informationaboutthewayplantslooklike)isnotalivingorganism,isnotaplant.Inthesamevein,artificialmindisnotmindandcannotrepresentanexpectedadvanceinthelifeevolutioninUniverseinawaysuggestbytheanalogybetweenlifeandinformation.However,asatool,patternrecognition(withtheadditionalandsubsidiaryhelpofandroids)canhelpustohavemoreinformationaboutsubcorticalbrainsomatic-visceralactivityco-occurringwith"emotionalcontrol"suchasanger,fear,lust(maycontributetonew treatments and medications for psychiatric disorders and neurobehavioraldisorders,seeaboveIntroduction),havemoreinformationabouthumansandotheranimalsperceptualcasesandhavemoreinformationaboutsubjectivity.Information,neitherunfoundednorinvalidanalogiesasthewatchmakeranalogy,orfallaciesastakingthepartbythewhole,withoutsometypeofreductionism orquestion-beggingfallacies.Forexample,given methodologicalconcernsofanimalexperimentsastheproblem ofdisparateanimalspeciesandstrains,withavarietyofmetabolicpathwaysanddrugmetabolites,leadtovariationinefficacyandtoxicityorastheproblemoflengthoffollow-upbeforedeterminationofdiseaseoutcomevariesandmaynotcorrespondto ereira,VitorM.D.(2015),Analogy,MindandLife.Tran,Q-N.andArabnia,H.R.(eds.).EmergingTrendsinComputationalBiology,Bioinformatics,andSystemsBiology.Elsevier/MorganKaufmann.DOI:10.1016/b978-0-12-802508-6.00020-xThismanuscriptversionismadeavailableundertheCC-BY-NC-ND4.0licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 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