Biological Observer-Participation and Wheeler's 'Law without Law'
aa r X i v : . [ phy s i c s . g e n - ph ] O c t Biological Observer-Participation and Wheeler’s‘Law without Law’ ∗ Brian D. JosephsonTrinity College, Cambridge CB2 1TQ, UKOctober 2011
Abstract
It is argued that at a sufficiently deep level the conventional quantitativeapproach to the study of nature faces difficult problems, and that biologicalprocesses should be seen as more fundamental, in a way that can beelaborated on the basis of Peircean semiotics and Yardley’s Circular Theory.In such a world-view, Wheeler’s observer-participation and emergent lawarise naturally, rather than having to be imposed artificially. This points theway to a deeper understanding of nature, where meaning has a fundamentalrole to play that is invisible to quantitative science.
Keywords
Observer-participation, Peirce, semiotics, signs, interpretation, emergence,complexity, cognitive development, space-time generation, wholeness, sym-metry, Circular Theory. ∗ Based on talk given at the ACIB ’11 conference, INBIOSA project[1], to be publishedin ‘Integral Biomathics: Tracing the Road to Reality’, Proceedings of iBioMath 2011,Paris and ACIB ’11, Stirling UK,
P. L. Simeonov, L. S. Smith, A. C. Ehresmann (Eds.),Springer-Verlag, 2012.
Introduction
It is commonly assumed that nature can be described in terms of fixedmathematical laws. However, the discovery that the Standard Model cannotbe reconciled with general relativity in a straightforward way has createdproblems for this point of view. An alternative is Wheeler’s proposal to theeffect that participation by observers, as postulated in some formulationsof quantum mechanics, is the mechanism whereby physical laws emerge.According to Wheeler, that principle might suffice to build everything[2].In Wheeler’s article the gap between acts of observer-participancy andphysical reality was not filled in, an insufficiency that we attribute to theabsence of an appropriate theory of observation. In the following we discussa biologically oriented scheme where observation plays a central role, andshow how it can lead to the emergence of physical laws.The structure of this scheme can be summarised as primordial reality → circular mechanics → semiotics and structure → technological development → regulatory mechanisms → emergent laws. Here ‘circular mechanics’ is a reference to a generic scheme of biologicalorganisation proposed by Yardley[3], encompassing among its aspects signprocesses in accord with the semiosis concepts of Peirce[4], which in turnunderlie processes of a technological character, among which we hypothesiseare the capacity to form systems such as our universe, to which laws ofa mathematical kind are applicable. In this way, we are able to link life,viewed from a generic point of view, to the origin of universes.We discuss first of all the relationship between idealised situationsin physics which can be characterised precisely in mathematical termson the one hand and on the other, biology, which it will be argued isprimarily concerned with patterns and only secondarily with quantities.The characteristics of biosystems are then related to the forward-lookingrole of signs, and to circular theory approach, thus paving the way to amore detailed analysis of universe generation.
Theoretical physics is mathematics-based, typically involving differentialequations with respect to time. Such a mathematical approach carries thepresumption that systems found in nature can be represented adequatelyby explicit formulae. Experimental biology gives the appearance of demon-strating the derivability of life from conventional physics, such investigations1ncovering a great variety of processes that accord with known physics aswell as having biological functions. However, things are not what theyseem. To see this, compare life with a phenomenon of physics such assuperconductivity. In the latter case there is a specific model, the BCSmodel, defined by a specific mathematical expression, which accords wellwith many experimental observations. Small changes in the model wouldhave small consequences, and would not affect this agreement. Biosystemsdiffer in that fine details may drastically affect behaviour; rather than therebeing a specific model there is a landscape of possibilities, with only thepeaks reflecting viable systems. Thus the properties of biosystems cannotbe accounted for on the basis of a first-principles computation, which couldnot apply to such a landscape.Biosystems must therefore be addressed in a way different from the waysystems that are the subject of mathematical physics are normally studied.They can be conceived of as systems that have passed certain tests, asituation similar to that of prime numbers, where in general a numbercan be shown to be prime only by testing for factors, rather than therebeing a formula that generates all primes. Despite the absence of sucha formula, passing such tests has important implications. The situationaddressed by G¨odel, whereby there exist true statements that cannot beproved starting from specified axioms, is similar in the way it demonstrateslimits of specifiability. In the biosystem case, the test-passing factor isrelated to viability, and is also responsible for different instances of anorganism behaving similarly, which permits their non-quantitative analysis.
One way in which life differs from nature is general is the way it creates itsown structures, in a way that does not admit of any very direct mathematicalinterpretation. Rather, in life we find systems that have come into existencethat are able to pass particular tests, as required for the survival of thegiven system. One aspect of this is the semiosis discussed by Peirce[4],Semiotics empasises the role of information processing and more specificallythe importance of the interpretation of signs , in the light of the fact thatat the cognitive level the appropriate use and interpretation of signs isessential. In Peirce’s scheme there is a specific, possibly context dependent,relationship between signs, and objects to which they are linked, with athird element, the interpretant , having the role of linking them. Typically,a complicated interpretant mechanism links the simpler sign and object,2eliably producing a well defined situation linked to the sign.The role played by signs in biological situations can be illustrated by thesituation of road traffic. The fact that cars collide with each other much lessfrequently than if they were driven at random can be related to appropriateinterpretation of the relevant signs. Large quantitative changes can be made,and the collision-avoidance phenomenon remains. This phenomenon, in amore general context, makes biology ‘a different game’ to ordinary physics.Signs play an important role in advanced activities through the waycomplicated signs open up new possibilities, the power of natural languageproviding a simple illustration of this fact.The question now arises how semiotic processes manifest and develop,and whether this can happen in the primoridal context which we imagine tobe the source of universes and physical laws. A more global perspective isrequired, and we now discuss this in the light of Yardley’s Circular Theory.
Circular Theory[3] is a work in progress, aimed at expressing structure andfunction in biological systems in its most basic conceptual form, the keyelements being units (‘circles’), links between units, and the tendency forunits to form (unitisation).We first discuss the terms unit and link. Unit is not defined in rigorousterms, the existence of units being something that is discovered thoughattempts to characterise systems of interest; a unit is something that itis convenient to treat as a whole. The concept of a unit may usefully beextended to refer to classes that it is convenient to deal with in an analysis,and it may equally well be applied to processes.Turning to the concept of link, what is crucial in circular theory is theway systems are able to work together, acting effectively as a single system.A simple example is provided by a thermostatically controlled system, wherea controller, together with a controlled system whose temperature is subjectto variation from external inputs, become a system with approximately fixedtemperature, while a more complicated case consists in a function presentin a computer as a part of a program, interacting with some other system soas to exercise that function. A server-client situation such as a web browserinteracting with a web server illustrates on the other hand a situation ofmutual influence. The point is that there is a special kind of situationof ‘systems being attuned to each other’ that produces highly coordinatedbehaviour, and this is very relevant to mechanisms and to life generally. Yet3nother example is the correlation between the two strands of DNA, in whichcase the correlations are put to work in the service of copying information.Intuitively (no attempt will be made here to formulate the conceptsrigorously), the point is that the coupling between the systems concernedreduces the range of variation available to the joint system, while stillmaking degrees of freedom available. Arguably, this will tend to happenspontaneously under certain circumstances (as when two clocks are coupledby placing them on a common platform). This coordination may also beinduced by a third influence, as happens during learning involving thedevelopment of coordination between two processes.
A packing model
The concepts of circular theory, including the ‘attunement’ concept, canbe underpinned by an idea to the effect that what is involved at rootis the packing together of a set of dynamical systems subject to certainconstraints; indeed learning involves the attempt to make systems that areinteracting generate activity that conforms to particular constraints. Asan implementation mechanism, we suppose that in place of fixed structureswe are concerned in each case with a collection of structures distinguishedfrom each other by a set of bits, which are adjusted bit by bit until a highdegree of conformance to the relevant constraints is achieved. This processis equivalent to that of Ross Ashby’s ultrastability[5].We can take the idea further by invoking an additional system that canpack other structures together ‘intelligently’, that is to say by recognisingsigns and responding appropriately, in the manner of semiotic theory. Such agrouping of three systems can be expected to cohere together more effectivelythan with situations where there is no such intelligent response to signs.With such a grouping there is no essential difference between the threecomponents, and all three can be considered interpretants, each interpretingsigns originating in the other two systems, and also the interactions betweenthese two.Conversely, the splitting of a unit into three subunits brings intoexistence a triadic situation of the kind discussed by Peirce. What remainswhen systems disperse in this way is the potential to bond with systemssimilar to those with which they have previously formed the capacity tobond. In this way we can understand creative development, where newstructures form, with new capacities.These points can be illustrated with analogies from chemistry: (i) if amolecule A can split into two specific molecules B and C, then in a different4nvironment B and C can combine again to form A; (ii) in an extensionof the idea, we consider A splitting into three consitutents B, C and D.In the context of recombination, D can act as a catalyst holding B and Cin the correct configuration to enable all three to bond together; (iii) thepoint about bonding of similar systems is illustrated by the way that if onehalogen can bond in a particular place in a specific molecule then a differenthalogen is likely also to be able to bond in the same place.
Two complementary forms of change to be considered in the above pictureare (i) systems joining together to form one unit, and (ii) a system splittinginto a number of units. This leads to the possibility of a fractal, or scale-free,situation where similar structures exist at all scales. In this context, somesigns would have a universal significance at all levels. However, as systemsbecome more complex, differentiation and specialisation start to occur.If the multiple scale picture is correct, we would have a situation wheredetails are governed by finer details which are governed by finer details andso on ad infinitum , in conformity with the ‘turtles all the way down’ concept[6].
We first recall what the purpose of the discussion of semiosis and the circulartheory has been. The idea was to be able to treat universe generation as,in essence, a kind of technological development. The familiar technologicaldevelopment is a product of human beings and brains, and clearly cannot beused to account for universe generation, but our discussion of developmentin terms of semiosis and circular theory indicates that something analogousto cognitive development (including cultural development, assuming thatcognitive development, in a social system, provides a basis for culturalemergence) can occur in a wider context, including that of our postulatedprimordial system.The hypothesis then is that primordial constructs of various levelsof complexity can form, whose links with other systems including theirenvironment can be equated with ‘knowing’. What might such systems cometo know? If their culture acts on the basis of perceived benefit only (as istending to become the norm in our modern society), then such developments5ay have limited outcomes. If wider explorations are not excluded, thendevelopments such as mathematics are possible, which might then be appliedto such scientific knowledge as might be discoverable, and subsequentlyin technological applications including, it is hypothesised, mathematicallygoverned universes that could be beneficial to life.
Outliers
In this connection, Yardley (private communication) notes that an importantrole in determining the general direction of development is played by outliers ,that is to say situations encountered that have not yet made effective linkswith existing structures. Chance contacts may cause new structures to bebuilt, which structures may on occasion be applicable in a wide range ofsituations, leading to more extended developments.
Mathematical precision
One important issue is how mathematical precision emerges from a systemthat is initially very imprecise. We can usefully consider in this connectionEuclidean geometry, a mathematically precise system that emerged throughthe consideration of properties of the world that were not known with anygreat precision. Geometry, like any mathematical enterprise, is a symbolicactivity that does not depend in any essential way on interaction withthe world. It was, nevertheless, inspired by knowledge of real point-likeobjects and approximate straight lines. By retreating into symbolism oneescapes inconvenient facts about the world and is able to create a systemthat has a certain resemblance to the world even though there is no exactcorrespondence. The Euclidean plane, is in essence, a fantasy that one canaddress through symbols even though the real world does not correspondexactly to it. However, in this case the correspondences between theEuclidean world and the real world are sufficiently close that Euclideangeometry is of value in the real world, but this is something that has to bediscovered through observation rather than taken for granted.
Generation of space and physical universes
In our ordinary world, Euclidean geometry is simply a system that providesa good model for phenomena in space, using specialised techniques toconnect the model with the reality. From the perspective of our primordialcommunity, it conversely provides a model for forming a universe-system(more generally, physical laws provide a basis for forming the corresponding6hysical reality). The model is not the technology, any more thanunderstanding the sphere equates to the existence of physical spheres. Wehypothesise however that some such technology, which in due course we mayourselves be able to understand, was discovered at the primordial level, andforms the basis upon which physical universes are generated. Mathematicalprecision exists only in the world of discourse, and is realised to whateverdegree is possible by technology.Symmetry and symmetry breaking may play a key role here, in view ofthe fact that conceptually symmetry is defined in terms of transformationsthat may have physical correlates, while at the same time symmetry is foundto play an important role in actual physics.In this picture locality is understood as an emergent property, analogousto the frequency of a physical process. Just as in some circumstances fre-quencies of physical processes become well defined, with different frequenciesbecoming independent of each other as far as linkages are concerned, inthis case location becomes a well defined quantity, with different locationsbecoming independent of each other. Quantum entanglement and wholeness,on the other hand, would be derivative of the units of circular theory. Moregenerally, the high degree of correlation associated with the packing modelcan be expected to be manifested in phenomena similar to those associatedwith quantum mechanics.
We have addressed in a natural way Wheeler’s question of how observer-participation can lead to the emergence of specific laws of nature inparticular systems. The key point is the fact that the interpretation ofsigns changes the game , facilitating the emergence of new kinds of systemand process, which are correlates of cognitive and cultural developmentthat, in the present context, lead to emergent laws. In this picture, theresponsible system or systems are the determiners of the observed laws,rather than the laws concerned being presumed absolute, or derivable fromsome mathematical analysis.One can imagine a scenario whereby conventional science would be forcedsimilarly to renounce the idea of a Final Theory. We already have a situationwhere some theory X (e.g. the Standard Model) proves inadequate andtheory Y (e.g. string theory) is proposed to take its place. Then certainfurther issues lead to the idea that the real ‘fundamental theory’ is Z (e.g.M-theory). At each stage, however, the supposed fundamental theory gets7arther from what is accessible by experiment, and its connections withreality become more obscure.The idea that nature at some deeper level has biological aspects is notfundamentally absurd, and has been previously explored by authors such asSmolin[7] and Pattee[8]. The above analysis has explored some aspects of the‘biological logic’ applicable to such a scenario, in particular the mechanicsof development, which could lead to what might be termed ‘extendedmind’. Faculties such as mathematical intuition, difficult to account forin conventional ways, might be manifestations of the extended mind, whichmight also be related to experiences of meaning in art.To what extent can these proposals be considered scientific in character?While the absence of a fixed, universal mathematical law may seem at firstsight to be a radical departure from scientific tradition, the idea that thelaws manifested in the laboratory are emergent rather than fundamental isalready a feature of string theory. And, as practiced, biology is a sciencethat makes extensive use of phenomenology (e.g. that of chemical reactions),and concepts specific to biology, and typically makes less use of the methodsof theoretical physics (i.e. mathematical models).A typical biological concept is the idea that particular systems (e.g.the immune system) have particular functions. Such concepts have valuein interpreting what one finds and in guiding investigations. The ideasexpounded here can be expected to be of similar value in constructing modelswhere conventional methods prove inadequate.Some scientists have accepted the idea that not everything can becharacterised in quantitative terms, asserting however that the only realknowledge is that based on scientific measurement; but alternatives [1, 9],offering a broader understanding of what constitutes knowledge, are possible.The present discussion offers some insight into what is involved in that latterposition. Nature is pervaded by patterns (signs) which through practice wehave become expert in interpreting, a process that has pragmatic value evenif it is not amenable to the traditional quantitative methodology. If thepicture developed here is correct, there is much more in the way of meaningto be found in the natural world by such means than can be found throughthe traditional methodology of science.
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Ilexa Yardley for numerous discussions that have helpedshape these ideas, and to Dr. Plamen Simeonov for helpful comments on themanuscript. 8 eferences [1]
INBIOSA (INtegral BIOmathics Support Action). [2] Wheeler, J.A.:
Law without Law . In: Wheeler, J.A. andZurek W.H. (eds.) Quantum Theory and Measurementpp. 182–213. Princeton University Press, Princeton (1983). http://what-buddha-said.net/library/pdfs/wheeler_law_without_law.pdf [3] Yardley, I.:
The Circular Theory (Kindle edition), ISBN 0972575626. [4]
Peirce’s Theory of Signs . In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/ [5] Ashby, W. Ross:
Design for a Brain (Chapman and Hall, 1960). http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/ASC/ULTRAS_SYSTE.html [6]
Turtles all the Way Down . In: Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turtles_all_the_way_down [7] Smolin, L.
The Life of the Cosmos , Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London,1997.[8] Pattee,H. H.
Can life explain quantum mechanics?
In: Quantum Theoryand Beyond, E. Bastin, ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,1971, pp. 307-319.[9]
Shifting Assumptions in Science (the Hokkaido-8 Symposium, 2008). http://sms.cam.ac.uk/media/687386http://sms.cam.ac.uk/media/687386