Divine Emanation as Cosmic Origin: Ibn Sina and His Critics
VVol. 8, No. 2, Oktober 2012
Divine Emanation As Cosmic Origin:Ibn Sînâ and His Critics
Syamsuddin Arif*
Institut Studi Islam Darussalam (ISID) GontorEmail: [email protected]
Abstract
The question of cosmic beginning has always attracted considerableattention from serious thinkers past and present. Among many contestingtheories that have emerged, that of emanation was appropriated by Muslimphilosophers like Ibn Sînâ in order to reconcile the Aristotelian doctrine of theeternity of matter with the teaching of al-Qur’ân on the One Creator-God.According to this theory, the universe, which comprises a multitude of entities,is generated from a transcendent Being, the One, that is unitary, through themedium of a hierarchy of immaterial substances. While the ultimate source isundiminished, the beings which are emanated are progressively less perfect asthey are further removed from the first principle. The process is conceived asbeing atemporal and often compared to the efflux of light from a luminousbody, or to water flowing from a spring. This metaphysical theory has enabledIbn Sînâ to solve the vexed problem: given an eternally existing world and oneeternally existing God, how can the two necessarily co-exist without having theperfect, simple unity of God destroyed by contact with the multiplicity ofmaterial things? The following essay delineates and evaluates both Ibn Sînâ’sarguments as well as the counter-arguments of his critics.Masalah permulaan kosmos selalu menarik perhatian para pemikir yangserius di masa lalu dan masa kini. Di antara berbagai teori yang muncul adalahteori emanasi yang telah dimodifikasi oleh filsuf Muslim seperti Ibn Sina untukmenyesuaikan doktrin Aristoteles tentang keabadian materi dengan ajaran al-Qur’an tentang Tuhan sebagai Pencipta Yang Esa. Menurut teori ini, alam, yangterdiri dari berbagai entitas, diturunkan dari Wujud yang transenden, Yang Satu, * Pascasarjana Institut Studi Islam Darussalam (ISID) Gontor, Ponorogo, telp. (0352)488220 yamsuddin Arif
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TSAQAFAH yang Esa, melalui hirarki substansi material. Sementara sumbernya tetap dantidak berkurang tingkatannya, wujud-wujud yang beremanasi secara progresifmenjadi kurang kesempurnaannya ketika semakin jauhnya dari prinsip pertama.Proses ini dipahami sebagai tidak temporal dan seringkali dibandingkan denganpancaran cahaya dari benda yang bercahaya, atau seperti air yang mengalir daripancuran. Teori metafisika ini telah memungkinkan Ibn Sina menyelesaikanproblem yang rumit yaitu: bagaimana dua wujud yang pasti yaitu wujud alamyang abadi dan wujud Tuhan yang juga abadi dapat berada secara bersamaantanpa merusak kesempurnaan dan keesaan Tuhan yang berhubungan dengankeragaman benda-benda materi? Tulisan berikut ini membahas dan mengevaluasiargumentasi Ibn Sina dan juga argumentasi yang mengkritiknya.
Keywords : Ibn Sina, emanation, cosmology, metaphysics, eternity,origination
Preface F ew philosophers exercised as much and profound an influenceon medieval Islamic, Jewish and Christian thought as Ibn Sînâ(d. 428/1037) or Avicenna as he was known in Latin. Herepresents a development in philosophical thinking away from theapologetic concerns for harmonizing religion with philosophytowards an attempt to make philosophical sense of key religiousdoctrines. In this article I shall present his metaphysical cosmologyand examine his views about the universe as an eternal, inevitableemanation or ‘overflow’ of the Divine One, rather than as somethingHe created out of nothing. I shall discuss also the critical responsesto Ibn Sînâ’s views as put forward by subsequent thinkers, notablyal-Ghazâlî (d. 555/1111) and Fakhr al-Din al-Râzî (d. 606/1210).
The Problem of Beginning
Does the universe have a beginning? Is it created and originatedor not? Although Ibn Sînâ’s answer to these crucial questions turnsout to be in the negative, the full account and detailed arguments by On his biography and philosophical works, see W. Gohlman,
The Life of lbn Sina (Albany: SUNY Press, 1974); D. Gutas,
Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1988); J. McGinnis,
Avicenna (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). ivine Emanation as Cosmic Origin...
Vol. 8, No. 2, Oktober 2012 which he corroborates his theses are by no means simple andtherefore deserve careful examination. Briefly stated, Ibn Sînâ’sposition on this issue is a kind of synthesis between two rival schemes.The standard doctrine held by the majority of Muslim theologiansaffirms (1) that the universe, by which is meant the physical worldof matter, does have a ‘beginning in time’—a definite moment inthe past at which it was originated or created; (2) that its creator isone transcendent, eternal God; (3) that God’s act of creation is volun-tary in the sense that it is neither necessitated nor due to His eternalEssence; and (4) that God created it not from anything pre-existentwhatsoever, but ‘out of nothing’ ( la min syay’ ), which also meansthat its origination is preceded ‘in time’ by non-existence ( ‘adam ).The other theory, though affirming God’s existence, contendsthat the universe, or rather the constituent matter underlying it, isuncreated and that it has been there, eternally co-existing with God.This is the view subscribed by most philosophers ( falasifah ), whoalso deny God’s active role in the affairs of the world and construeHim as nothing more than the First Cause, an automatically operatingforce that keeps the spheres in motion and thereby sustains the world.Ibn Sînâ’s strategy was to adopt and appropriate the supposedlyAristotelian but actually Plotinian emanation scheme and fuse it withthe Aristotelian metaphysics of self-sufficiency, causal necessity, andcontinuity of nature as well as with the Islamic monotheisticconception of the urgent contingency and immediate dependenceof the world on God.It is in a bid to reconcile those polarized opinions as well as ina move to preserve the Qur’anic conception of God as the One thatIbn Sînâ adopted and appropriated the theory of emanation in hiscosmology, viewing the universe as the necessary outflow or emissionfrom an eternal, necessitating cause, i.e. the ‘necessarily existent’ God,while at the same time maintaining the metaphysical distinctionbetween essence and existence with respect to necessary andcontingent beings. This theory warrants Ibn Sînâ to allow theemergence of multiple things in the universe from the One withoutinfringing in any way the simple oneness of that One, who is thesource of the being of all things that exist.Thus, unlike the theologians who employ the terms khalq and ih } dâts for creation and origination respectively , Ibn Sînâ distinguishesthe terms sun‘ (making) , takwîn (forming or producing) , and ibdâ‘ yamsuddin Arif Jurnal
TSAQAFAH (inventing) , from îjâd (bringing into existence). And he reserves theterm fi‘l (acting) to describe Divine Agency, that is, the manner inwhich God ‘effects’ the universe in the sense of causing it to exist, orto be precise, necessitating its existence and sustaining it. It is in thissense that Ibn Sînâ uses and understands the term “act”, asdistinguished from the ordinary usage. Thus he explains: When we say, “He is the agent of the universe ( fâ‘il al-kull )” we do notmean that He is the one who bestowed existence upon everythingfrom scratch ( jadîdan ) which never before existed, as people commonlyunderstand by it. For such an understanding presumes the followingclaims: either [1] this agent is called an agent insofar as existenceemanates from it, or [2] insofar as existence does not come out of it, or[3] in both respects. Now if [it is an agent] insofar as existence issuesfrom it, without taking into account the [previous] not-being of thatexistence, then [this is untenable because] the best agent should bethe one from which existence emanates eternally. As for the secondclaim, it is obviously a contradiction. Finally, if it is an agent becauseit bestowed existence upon that which [previously] did not exist andat the same time does not give them existence, then it would availnothing [that is, it was useless since it did nothing] when they didnot yet exist. For non-existence does not require any cause, and evennecessitates no cause. Indeed, its actual function consists in the factthat everything else receives its existence from it. Apart from fi‘l, material creation ( takwîn ) , and temporalorigination ( ih } dâts ), there is, however, another plausible term whichin his view could also convey his metaphysical notion of creation,namely the term ibdâ‘. But Ibn Sînâ immediately remarks that thisshould not be taken as the masses understand it. For in popularusage, the term ibdâ‘ simply means origination not from matter ( al-ikhtirâ‘ al-jadîd lâ ‘an mâddah ), that is, creation out of nothing, whe-reas according to the the philosophers, ibdâ‘ signifies the eternal enti-fication of that which in itself is non-entity ( idâmat ta’yîs mâ bi dhâtihilays ), the process being eternal in the sense that the outcome or effectdepends on and is necessitated by the essence of the First alone.For Ibn Sînâ, that creation or creative process must be eternalfollows from the fact that it depends on the essence of the First alone,its true Efficient cause, rather than on matter, instrument, idea, orany intermediary. The two terms thus differ in that whereas fi‘l Al-Mabda’ , 76. Al-Isyârât: al-Ilâhiyyât, ivine Emanation as Cosmic Origin...
Vol. 8, No. 2, Oktober 2012 denotes the bestowal of existence and removal of non-existence atone time but not continuously, the term ibdâ‘ however means thesame act (of giving and depriving existence) but with lasting effects. Only in this sense can the term ibdâ‘ be substituted for the term fi‘l.
As can be seen, already in his terminology Ibn Sînâ indicates hispreference for emanative creation over the well-received opinion thatthe universe was originated out of nothing.
Existence as Divine Overflow
As far as Ibn Sînâ’s doctrine of emanative creation is concerned,one could easily discern that the theory is grounded on a presupposedpremise derived from Revelation and philosophy which states thatGod is a unique and absolutely simple Being. Thus he maintainsthat the effect of God’s creative activity has to be consistent with His‘unique’ nature (that is, His absolute oneness), so that the effect toowould have to be numerically one and substantially simple, and hencehis famous formula: “from one thing only one thing could proceed( al-wâhid min haytsu huwa wâhid innamâ yûjad ‘anhu wâhid ).” However, since the universe is plainly composed and consistsof innumerable things, it could hardly be supposed to have proceededfrom God directly. Therefore, Ibn Sînâ contends, the only plausibleexplanation for the universe deriving its multiplicity from a singlecause is to envisage a continuous series of individuals of various kindsproceeding from other causally prior entities, which serve as inter-mediaries between the First ( al-Awwal ) and the universe. In IbnSînâ’s view, the increasing scope and complexity of these intermediarycauses and effects, ranging from the immaterial ‘first intelligence’ tothe lowest of material things, would eventually account not only forthe tremendous diversity of the world-system, but also for its causalorigin and dependence upon God. Thus God is seen as the agent or Al-Mabda’, The Qur’ân 112:1, “Qul huwa Allâh ahad” ; id. 37:4, “Inna ilâhakum lawâhid.” Al-Syifâ’: al-Ilâhiyyât, al-Isyârât: al-Ilâhiyyât,
Essai sur le principe «de L’un ne procède que de l’un» dans la philosophieislamique (Thèse 3ème cycle; Paris, 1977) and Alain de Libera, “Ex uno non fit nisi unum. Lalettre sur le principe de l’univers et les condamnations parisiennes de 1277,” in
Historiaphilosophiae medii aevii. [Festschrift für Kurt Flasch zu seinem 60. Geburtstag], ed. BurkhardMojsisch and Olaf Pluta, 2 vols. (Amsterdam and Philadelphia, 1991), 1: 543-60. Al-Syifâ’: al-Ilâhiyyât, yamsuddin Arif
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TSAQAFAH efficient cause ( al-‘illah al-fâ‘iliyyah ) of the universe and the latteras the expression of His act.Ibn Sînâ uses several terms to describe emanation, namely: s } udûr (procession), fayd } (overflow), and luzûm (necessary consequen-ce). His choice of these terms reflects at least two assumptions,namely, his view that (1) the actuality of every contingent beingrepresents the existential plenitude and activity of that from whichit emanates, and that (2) such actualization is necessarily outgoingand self-revealing in the sense that the act not only belongs to it butalso extends outward from it.Consequently, the procession of causes and effects will be conti-nuous with its ultimate source in both a temporal and an ontologicalsense; temporally, it will be co-existent with God’s creative activity,and ontologically, the causal series will remain inseparable from Godsimply because it is a necessary overflow of Himself. This is part ofthe reason why Ibn Sînâ holds that the eternity of God’s existencenecessitates a co-eternal universe which is the collective embodimentof the emanation, and this is why for him the universe ( al-kull )—thatis, the totality of things constituting the physical world, though notidentical with God, is somehow a projection out of Divine Plenitude.According to Ibn Sînâ, it is from the Necessary Being, namelyGod, which is described as Pure Intelligence ( ‘aql mahd ) and theFirst Principle ( al-mabda’ al-awwal ) that all other beings derive theirexistence, not directly but through intermediary ( bi wâsitah ). Heinsists, however, that we must not suppose that the universe comesinto existence because God intended so ( ‘alâ sabîl qas } d minhu ), forthen He would act for something lower than Himself and introducemultiplicity ( takatstsur ) within His divine essence. Nor can it be thecase that the universe comes into existence naturally by itself ( ‘alâsabîl al-t } ab‘ ) in the sense that He is not aware of its genesis and doesnot mean it ( lâ bi ma‘rifah wa lâ rid } â minhu ). Indeed, God was and always is completely cognizant of boththe universe (which is His effect) and the goodness emanating fromHim—a fact which not only reflects His perfection but also manifestspart of the necessary consequences of His majestic nature to which Al-Syifâ’: al-Ilâhiyyât, Al-Najât, Al-Syifâ’: al-Ilâhiyyât, al-Mabda’,
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Vol. 8, No. 2, Oktober 2012 every being yearns to return. It is by virtue of His act of self-reflectionthat the universe comes into existence ( ta‘aqquluhu ‘illah li’l-wujûd )as a necessary consequence of His own Existence. Even so, Ibn Sînâremarks, each of the issuing effects, including the universe is by nomeans identical ( mubâyinan ) with Him. Now, the First Principle is designated as Necessary Being ( wâjibal-wujûd ) in a double sense: not only does He exist necessarily, butHe must act necessarily as well, and His act is an act of self-reflection.It is through His contemplation of His own essence ( ya‘qil dhâtahu )that the first effect ( al-ma‘lûl al-awwal ), which is also said to be apure, immaterial intelligence, necessarily proceeds. Since multiplicity( kathrah ) is inconceivable in Him, the effect must be single ( wâh } idbi’l-‘adad ), for as a rule, from one simple thing, only one can proceed. However, this formula breaks down in subsequent emanations.For as Ibn Sînâ tells us, within the first intelligence ( al-‘aql al-awwal )lies the germ of multiplicity, since its thought involves three acts ofreflection, namely: (1) recognition of God’s necessary existence, (2)consciousness of its own causally necessitated existence, and (3) awa-reness of its own existence as in itself only possible. Consequently,the first act gives rise to another intelligence, the second act producesa celestial soul of the outmost sphere ( nafs al-falak al-aqs } â ), whereasthe third act generates the body ( jirm ) of this same sphere. Then thesecond intelligence, in a similar fashion, gives rise to a thirdintelligence, to the soul of the second sphere of the fixed stars, andto the body of that sphere. From the third intelligence there likewiseemanates another triad, namely, a fourth intelligence, the soul of thethird sphere, and the body of the third sphere.This emanation of intelligences, we are told, goes onsuccessively, each giving rise to successive triads and is halted onlywith the production of the sphere of the moon and the tenth or lastintelligence, otherwise called the Agent Intellect ( al-‘aql al-fa‘‘âl ) fromwhich our material world of generation and corruption originated.This Active Intelligence, instead of begetting the soul and body of asphere, begets human souls and the four elements, i.e. water, air,fire, and earth. Al-Syifâ’: al-Ilâhiyyât, al-Mabda’, Al-Syifâ’: al-Ilâhiyyât, Al-Syifâ’: al-Ilâhiyyât, al-Najât, al-Mabda’, Al-Najât , 313-4. yamsuddin Arif
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As noted earlier, Ibn Sînâ conceives the universe as consistingof nine concentric spheres ( aflâk ) with their corresponding souls( nufûs samâwiyyah ) and bodies ( ajrâm ‘ulwiyyah ), in addition to theten intelligences ( ‘uqûl ). In ascending order of the spheres he places,like Ptolemy did, the moon, Mercury, Venus, sun, Mars, Jupiter,and Saturn—called the ‘wandering stars’ or planets ( al-kawâkib al-mutahayyirah ), whereas the Fixed Stars ( al-tsawâbit ) and anotheryet unnamed celestial body are said to be attached to the second andthe first, outermost sphere respectively. Thus each planetary celestial body is believed to have only asingle sphere ( falak ) or orb ( kurah ) to which it is attached and bywhich it is carried around at various distances from the earth. In IbnSînian cosmic system, each intelligence, being the teleological causein every emanative triad, becomes the target of desire ( syawq; ‘isyq )for the celestial soul within the triad, causing the eternal circularmotion of the third component of the triad, the celestial body. Andgiven the eternal motion of the celestial spheres, Ibn Sînâ thuspostulates that the emanative process too must be eternal in the sensethat God, the eternal efficient cause, ever in act, necessitates theexistence of an eternal effect, the universe. One might curiously ask, however, why the process stops atthe tenth, so-called Active Intelligence and does not go on ad infinitum.
To this Ibn Sînâ replies: while it is true that the necessary processionof multiplicity of beings from one intelligence implies plurality ofaspects ( ma‘ânî ) in it, the reverse is not. That is to say, it would bewrong to assume that plurality of aspects always implies the necessaryprocession of multiplicity of beings. Nor is it true that every intelli- Ibid., 313-4. Al-Syifâ: al-Riyâd } iyyât: ‘Ilm al-Hay’ah, ed. M. Ridâ Mudawwar and I. IbrâhîmAhmad (Cairo, 1980), 463. Cf. Ptolemy, The Almagest, trans. R. C. Taliaferro, in the GreatBooks of the Western World, vol. 16 (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., 1952), 270 (bk.9, chap. 1). These two terms are used by Ibn Sînâ indiscriminately, besides the equally commonone: dâ’irah . But according to al-Bîrûnî (d. 1048), “ dâ’irah and falak are two terms thatdenote the same thing and are interchangeable. However, sometimes falak refers to theglobe ( kurah ), particularly when it is moveable ( mutaharrik ) and therefore falak does notapply to the motionless. It is called falak only on account of its similarity with the whorl ofthe rotating spindle ( ‘alâ wajh al-tasybîh bi falakat al-mighzal al-dâ’ir ).” See his al-Qânûn al-Mas‘ûdî (Hyderabad: Osmania Oriental Publications Bureau, 1954), 54-5. Al-Syifâ’: al-Ilâhiyyât, ivine Emanation as Cosmic Origin...
Vol. 8, No. 2, Oktober 2012 gence having the same kind of aspects will produce the same kindof effects. What Ibn Sînâ seemingly wishes to say is that the outcomedepends on the nature and power of each emanative intelligence;and as intelligences succeed one another, their power decreases, andsince the Active Intelligence stands low in the hierarchy its power isno longer sufficient to produce eternal beings like those emanatedby the intelligences above it. Nevertheless, Ibn Sînâ ascribes to theActive Intelligence a set of functions that lend his scheme a balancemissing in that of al-Fârâbî, who assigns the Active Intelligencefunctions related solely to the actualization of the human mind. Bycontrast, in Ibn Sînâ’s scheme, the Active Intelligence, being theemanative cause of matter of our sublunar world ( ‘aql al-âlam al-ardî ), is not only responsible for bestowing the earthly beings theirnatural ‘forms’ (i.e. their souls) but also in charge of ( yudabbiru ) thesouls of humans, animals and plants. Furthermore, the Active Intelligence is also described by IbnSînâ as the cause of the actualization of human minds ( al-jawhar al-mukmil li anfus al-nâs ) as well as the source of their intuitiveknowledge. No wonder then the Active Intelligence is often calledthe Giver of Forms ( wâhib al-suwar ) and sometimes also identifiedas the Archangel Gabriel ( rûh al-quds ) or the Angel of Revelation ( al-rûh al-amîn ). Criticism and Response
Ibn Sînâ’s emanation scheme has stirred up debates and evokedpolemical reaction. I shall review some of the arguments advancedby its prominent critics, notably al-Ghazâlî (d. 1111) and Fakhr al-Dîn al-Râzî (d. 1210). Al-Ghazâlî raises five objections ( i‘tirâd } ât ) to Al-Syifâ’: al-Ilâhiyyât, al-Mabda’, See Al-Fârâbî, al-Madînah al-Fadîlah, ed. and trans. R. Walzer,
Al-Fârâbî on thePerfect State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 100-105. Al-Najât, Al-Najât, al-Shifâ’: al-Ilâhiyyât, al-Mabda’ , 80. Al-Syifâ’: al-Ilâhiyyât, Al-Syifâ’: al-Tabî’iyyât: al-Nafs, Al-Syifâ’: al-Ilâhiyyât, al-Syifâ’: al-Tabî’iyyât: al-Nafs, See Al-Fârâbî,
Kitâb al-Siyâsah al-Madaniyyah, ed. with intro. and notes by FawziM. Najjâr, 2nd imp. (Beirut: Dar el-Machreq, 1993), 32. yamsuddin Arif
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Ibn Sînâ‘s theory of emanation. First, he questions whether the‘being-possible’ of the first effect, whose existence is said to bepossible, is identical with its existence ( ‘ayn wujûdihi ) or not. Ifidentical, then there is no plurality; but if different, then the being-necessary-in-itself of God’s existence too must be other than Hisexistence—a logical conclusion Ibn Sînâ would not allow because itimplies plurality in the One.This objection, however, might just as well be dismissed sinceal-Ghazâlî has, in the first place, seen no harm in affirming thepresence of multiplicity in God, in accordance with the Ash‘aritedoctrine of God’s various Names and Attributes. Moreover, thiscriticism in fact stems from his outright rejection of the mostfundamental thesis in Ibn Sînâ’s metaphysics, that God’s existence isnecessary in itself. For al-Ghazâlî, to affirm the existence of God anddeny the necessity of such an existence at the same time does not atall involve contradiction because God, being transcendent andunknowable, is beyond such human-invented concept. Both the second and third objections are likewise theologicaland even begging the question, arguing that God’s knowledge involvesthe idea of multiplicity and so does His thought, which is preciselythe point at issue. The fourth charge contends that the first effect,being a pure intelligence, is insufficient to produce something com-posed of form (soul) and matter (body), a particular size, axis, etc.,like a celestial body. Finally al-Ghazâlî claims that he finds no convin-cing arguments offered by Ibn Sînâ that prove his assertion that See al-Ghazâlî,
Tahâfut , 100-9. Cf. Michael E. Marmura, “The Conflict over theWorld’s Pre-eternity in the
Tahâfut s of al-Ghazâlî and Ibn Rushd,” (Ph.D diss., University ofMichigan, 1959), 20-4. Other critics include al-Shahrastânî,
Musâra‘at al-Falâsifah, ed. S.M. Mukhtâr (Cairo, 1976), 59-60 and 86-88, as well as Ibn Taymiyyah,
Minhâj al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah fî Naqd Kalâm al-Syî‘ah wa al-Qadariyyah,
4 vols. (Cairo: al-Matba‘ah al-Amîriyyah, 1321 A.H.), 1: 89 and 1: 94-6. The Ash‘arites maintain that God’s Attributes exist in Him as eternal, separateimmaterial entities, in contrast to the Mu‘tazilites who hold that the doctrine of tawhîd necessitates that no entity exists in His Essence and there is a kind of identity between Godand His Attributes. See ‘Abd al-Qâhir al-Baghdâdî (d. 429 AH/ 1037 CE),
Kitâb Usûl al-Dîn,
Nihâyat al-Iqdâm,
204 in which he argues against the philosophers that even the notion of NecessaryBeing admits of duality, i.e. necessity and existence, so that if they (the falâsifah ) can acceptit, why then not the Attributes? For further discussion, see Michel Allard,
Le problème desattributs divins dans la doctrine d’al-Aš‘arî et de ses premiers grands disciples (Beirut: ImprimerieCatholique, 1965). See
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Vol. 8, No. 2, Oktober 2012 emanation is a necessary process.For al-Ghazâlî, the whole account is simply absurd. Again, thisobjection rests on al-Ghazâlî’s conception of God as a voluntary agentwho can create plurality and diversity as He wishes and wills ( yakhluqal-mukhtalifât wa al-mutajânisât kamâ yurîd wa ‘alâ mâ yurîd ). Butwhat Ibn Sînâ seeks, in contrast with al-Ghazâlî’s appeal to Revelation,is a properly rational explanation that would fit well into his grandmetaphysical system. Seen in this perspective, any criticism leveledagainst Ibn Sînâ’s theory would count only if, the basic premiseshaving been admitted, it succeeds to expose the internal logicalinconsistencies that would bring down his system.Interesting to note in this regard is Ibn Rushd’s observationof a fundamental error committed by emanationist philosophers likeal-Fârâbî and Ibn Sînâ. According to the Andalusian philosopher, byaffirming the ex uno non fit nisi unum principle and then assumingmultiplicity in the first entity that proceeds, the philosophers areforced to regard this multiplicity as uncaused, a consequence whichmerely shows inconsistency in their use of the principle.In order to resolve this apparent contradiction, however, oneneeds only to recall the fact that Ibn Sînâ, true to his strict monism,cannot allow more than one effect to proceed from the One preciselybecause His active intellection, reflection or contemplation ( ta‘aqqul )has been and is focussed purely and only on Himself, for in thebeginning “only He and nothing else was,” so that only one singleeffect could emanate. The same rule would have definitely applied ifwe encounter a similar situation in the next process, which is not thecase. For the first intelligence, as Ibn Sînâ put it, is naturally consciousof its own self, cognizant of its Cause, and aware of the fact that itsexistence, considered in itself, is merely possible. It is these seeds ofplurality existing in the first and subsequent intelligences whichnullify the monistic principle when it comes to the nine succeedingemanations. Tahâfut, Tahâfut al-Tahâfut , 249-50. A well-known tradition: “kâna Allâh wa lam yakun shay’ ma‘ahu,” related by al-Bukhârî, al-Jâmi‘ al-Sahîh (Beirut: Dâr al-Fikr, n.d.), 4: 129. Cf. “Kâna Allâh wa lâ shay’ma‘ahu,” reported by al-Zabîdî,
Ithâf al-Sâdah al-Muttaqîn , 2: 105 and “kâna Allâh wa lamyakun shay’ ghayruhu,” narrated by al-Bayhaqî, al-Sunan al-Kubrâ , 9: 3 and al-Tabarânî, al-Mu‘jam al-Kabîr,
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Turning now to al-Râzî’s objections ( syukûk ), we shallsummarize and consider only the following point. Generally, hecomplains of the ambiguity in Ibn Sînâ’s statement about theemergence of plurality from the first effect; is it due to the possibilityof its reflection of its own existence ( imkân ta‘aqquli wujûdih ) or, asnoted earlier, is it because of its very reflection of its own possibility( ta‘aqqul imkâni nafsih ), etc? Al-Râzî indeed refutes both possiblereadings. Specifically, he questions whether in Ibn Sînâ’s scheme asecond intelligence and a celestial body emanated from the firstintelligence because of the latter’s being-possible in itself, or becauseof its being-necessary from another and its knowledge of its Cause.Both alternatives, he contends, are untenable. For neither possibility,nor necessity-by-virtue-of-another, nor existence can serve as acause. Al-Râzî adduces several logical proofs in support of his viewthat they cannot be causes. In the case of possibility, for instance, heargues that whatever is non-existent in the external world (e.g. apossible entity) cannot be the cause of something that does existexternally (e.g. a celestial body). Having proved that possibility is not an existential entity ( amrwujûdî ) and therefore cannot be the cause of anything existent, al-Râzî then takes up each of the other attributes of the first intelligence,namely its possible existence, its necessity, its self-knowledge and itsknowledge of its Cause, showing that none of them is sufficient toserve as a cause. It is clear that most if not all arguments put forthby al-Râzî purport to overthrow the fundamental emanationist thesisthat from a one thing only one can proceed. A sophisticated reply to al-Râzî’s criticisms has come fromNasîr al-Dîn al-Tûsî (d. 1273 CE), who carefully explains two major For more discussion, see Nicholas Heer, “Al-Râzî and al-Tûsî on Ibn Sînâ’s Theoryof Emanation,” in
Neoplatonism and Islamic Thought, ed. Parvez Morewedge (Albany:SUNY Press, 1992), 115-8. Fakhr al-Dîn al-Râzî, al-Mabâhits al-Masyriqiyyah , 2 vols. (Qumm: Matba‘at Amîr,1991), 2: 503. See his commentary in
Kitâb Syarhay al-Isyârât, printed on the margins, 2 vols.(Cairo: n.p., 1907), 2: 48 lines 20-3; cf. ibid., 2: 49 line 12ff. Ibid., 2: 49. Cf. Fakhr al-Dîn al-Râzî,
Lubâb al-Isyârât, printed as in Ibn Sînâ, al-Tanbîhât wa al-Isyârat [sic!] , ed. Mahmûd Shahâbî (Tehran: Tehran University Press, n.d.),267-8. Syarhay al-Isyârât,
2: 48 lines 23-36. Mabâhits,
2: 503-5. Lubâb, ivine Emanation as Cosmic Origin...
Vol. 8, No. 2, Oktober 2012 problems in Ibn Sînâ’s theory, that is, the issue of multiplicity in thefirst intelligence, and the question of exactly which aspects withinthe first intelligence are the causes of which effects. The firstintelligence, says al-û‚sî, has a total of six aspects ( haytsiyyât ), of whichtwo are its constituent parts ( muqawwimât ) namely its existence andquiddity, and the other four are its concomitants ( lawâzim ), whichinclude its possibility in itself, its necessity through its Principle, itsself-knowledge, and its knowledge of its Principle. This is so becauseon Ibn Sînâ’s account it is impossible for the first intelligence, whichis a caused entity, to be composed of various things ( muqawwamanmin mukhtalifât ). But more importantly, al-Tûsî does not equate the first effectwith the first intelligence. For him, the first effect to emanate fromGod was existence ( wujûd ), which he construes as merely an aspector, to be precise, one of the two constituents of the first intelligence. This is because, according to al-Tûsî, the term al-ma‘lûl al-awwal isused equivocally, sometimes it designates the simple existence andat other times it refers to the composite first intelligence. Comingto the second problem, he asserts that quiddity and possibility, whichare considered to be non-existential ( ‘adamiyyayn ) in themselves andexistential only ab alio, and which represent the state of the firstintelligence in its potentiality, are responsible for the matter (body)of the celestial sphere. In contrast, existence and self-knowledge,which represent its state in actuality, are responsible for the form(soul) of the sphere. It is the last two aspects, namely, necessity andknowledge of the First Principle, which represent the state of thefirst intelligence insofar as it is derived from God, that are responsiblefor the emanation of another intelligence. Al-Tûsî concedes that noneof these aspects is existential entity and therefore cannot beindependent causes in themselves. But they do serve, he insists, asconditions ( syurût ) and modes ( h } aytsiyyât ) through which the trueEfficient Cause acts and creates. Cf. N. Heer, “Al-Râzî and al-Tûsî on Ibn Sînâ’s Theory of Emanation,” in
Neoplatonismand Islamic Thought, See his commentary in al-Isyârât: al-Ilâhiyyât,
219 and 221. Comment in al-Isyârât: al-Ilâhiyyât, Comment in al-Isyârât: al-Ilâhiyyât, Comment in al-Isyârât: al-Ilâhiyyât, Comment in al-Isyârât: al-Ilâhiyyât, Comment in al-Isyârât: al-Ilâhiyyât, yamsuddin Arif
Jurnal
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The emanation theory has also led some people to chargeIbn Sînâ with pantheism. They argue that to regard the universeand everything there as an emanation from the One is to blur thedistinction between the Creator and creatures. This criticism,however, happily ignores the clear statement made by Ibn Sînâ that“He is the Existent from which each and every existence emanates;His Existence is Essential and distinct ( mubâyin ) from every otherexistence.” True, there is a big difference between creating from nothingand producing from one’s thought. In the latter case, as Morewedgepoints out, a resemblance is implied between the source and itsoutcome. But as a matter of fact, Ibn Sînâ does postulate a Beingutterly transcendent with respect to all other beings, in spite of hisadherence to emanationism when it comes to the question of creation.In his scheme, as indicated earlier, the gulf separating thetranscendent God and eternally emanated hierarchy of beings isbridged by the First Intelligence, which in one text is identified withthe first Archangel-Cherub. Another guarantee against any dangerof pantheistic interpretation is to be found in Ibn Sînâ’s famous ifnot enigmatic doctrine of essence and existence. Conclusion
To sum up, the theory of emanation was meant to supplementthe meagre and Islamically unacceptable view formulated by Aristotleto whom there was no passage from God, the One, to the world, themany. The theory was apparently intended less as an account of theorigin of the universe than a description, in temporal imagery, of theeternal relation of the world to God. For in Ibn Sînâ’s view there is Al-Mabda’,
76. Cf.
Al-Syifâ’: al-Ilâhiyyât, P. Morewedge,
The Metaphysica of Avicenna (ibn Sînâ).
A Critical Translation-Commentary and Analysis of the Fundamental Arguments in Avicenna’s
Metaphysica in the
Dânish Nâma-i ‘alâ’î (The Book of Scientific Knowledge), Persian Heritage Series, no. 13(New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), Henry Corbin,
Avicenna and the Visionary Recital (Dallas: Springs Publications,1980), 58. This subject has been discussed by Fazlur Rahman, “Essence and Existence inAvicenna,”
Medieval and Renaissance Studies
Hamdard Islamicus
4 (1981): 3-14; and P. Morewedge,“Philosophical Analysis and Ibn Sînâ’s Essence-Existence Distinction,”
Journal of the AmericanOriental Society (JAOS)
92 (1972): 425-35. ivine Emanation as Cosmic Origin...
Vol. 8, No. 2, Oktober 2012 no absolute beginning of a finite being here since, according to him,a beginning refers not to just one now of time, but to every time andage. It is impossible, he says, that a thing begins to be after it wasnot, since [prime] matter would precede it from which it would beginto be. And like al-Fârâbî, he was trying to reconcile the Aristoteliandoctrine of the eternity of matter with the teaching of al-Qur’ân onthe One Creator-God.Indeed, Ibn Sînâ’s emanation theory represents an attempt tosolve this vexed problem: given an eternally existing world and oneeternally existing God, how can the two necessarily co-exist withouthaving the perfect, simple unity of God destroyed by contact withthe multiplicity of material things? Ibn Sînâ’s answer was to interposemany levels of spiritual substances, namely, the intelligences, betweenGod and matter as a shield to safeguard and maintain the divineOneness from multiplicity. In other words, although God remainsin Himself and high above transcending the created world, thereare, nevertheless, intermediary links between the absolute eternityand necessity of God and the world of downright contingency. Thusby relating the spiritual intelligences to God as the necessarily actingSource of their beings, Ibn Sînâ is able to account both for thenecessity of their being and for their indebtedness to God as theirEfficient Cause.[]
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