After the end of the Cold War, the world is facing new nuclear security challenges. Cooperation between the United States and Russia, particularly in the area of nuclear Materials Protection, Control and Verification (MPC&A), shows how the two countries can work together to address nuclear proliferation risks. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the question of how to protect nuclear weapons and their materials has become more pressing. This article will explore the evolution of the US-Russian MPC&A program and its impact on the global nuclear security landscape.
The purpose of the MPC&A system is to protect nuclear materials from theft or diversion and to be able to detect the occurrence of such events. It mainly includes the following aspects:
Physical protection systems: These systems detect unauthorized intrusions and trigger immediate responses when necessary.
Material Control Systems: These systems prevent unauthorized movement of materials and quickly detect the theft or diversion of materials.
Material accounting systems: These systems ensure that all materials are verified and irregularities can be tracked and investigated.
Personnel reliability: includes security screening, awareness education and training.
Procedural control: such as the two-person rule.
After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Department of Energy estimated that Russia and the newly independent states possessed 603 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material, enough to build 41,000 nuclear bombs. These materials are found in Russian regions where security systems are severely weakened and vulnerable to the effects of political and economic instability.
Since 1992, the U.S. Department of Defense has initiated government-to-government cooperation programs. In 1993, formal U.S.-Russian MPC&A cooperation was launched under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) project, with an initial allocation of $10 million for the program. However, due to suspicion and confidentiality issues between the two countries, this plan encountered many difficulties in progress.
In addition to cooperation between governments, there are also plans for cooperation between laboratories, with an emphasis on cooperation between U.S. national laboratories and the Russian nuclear agency. This cooperation was launched in 1994, through the signing of a contract, the two parties are committed to improving the protection and control technology of nuclear materials.
In 1995, President Clinton issued a directive establishing the Department of Energy's formal responsibility for improving the security of nuclear materials in the United States. As the economic crisis in Russia intensified, the United States intensified its support measures for Russian nuclear facilities in 1998 to meet the urgent challenge of nuclear material security.
In order to prevent Russian nuclear scientists from selling their knowledge to other countries, the United States has also implemented several programs, such as expanding the Nuclear Cities Initiative to promote Russia's economic development and prevent scientists from selling technology.
U.S.-Russian cooperation in the field of nuclear security has played a key role since the end of the Cold War, significantly improving the security of nuclear materials and reducing proliferation risks. However, as the international situation changes, this cooperation faces new challenges. In the face of an increasingly complex global security environment, are these nuclear security measures sufficient to ensure world peace?