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Do you really understand what “quasi-abstract” is? This emerging concept will change the way we think about social objects!
The fundamental distinction between abstract and concrete objects is a subject of much discussion in philosophy and art. Abstract is usually understood as a concept that does not depend on the existence of a concrete form, while concrete is a physical existence, a material that can be perceived. Although the distinction between the two is blurred, in philosophy and semantics, abstract objects such as numbers, sets, and ideas are generally considered intangible, while concrete objects such as plants, animals, and planets are tangible.
Despite differing opinions on these definitions, there is a fairly consistent consensus on the abstract or concrete properties of most objects. Most people would agree that rocks are concrete objects, while numbers are abstract objects.
The study of abstract objects focuses mainly on metaphysics and semantics, and these objects are often called abstract entities, as opposed to concrete entities. Abstract object theory focuses on the nature and role of abstract objects. Its basic view is the way in which properties are linked to objects, including instantiation and encoding. Concrete objects exhibit their properties through instantiation, while abstract objects merely encode these properties. This approach is called the double-link strategy.
The difference between abstract and concrete
In philosophy, the distinction between type and instance explicitly identifies the connection between concrete instances of physical objects and the abstract types to which they belong. This distinction is often made through explicit examples, and abstract objects are of great interest to philosophers because they often present challenges to prevailing theories. The ontology of abstract objects poses puzzles for physicalism and some forms of naturalism, especially the problem of universals. At the same time, abstract objects also pose a challenge to empiricism epistemologically.
Do abstract objects lack causal powers and spatial location? How do we know these objects exist? Why should we agree with their broad claims?
Interest in abstract objects may thus become a central question in metaphysics. Some philosophers, such as Ernst Mally and Edward Zalta, have even argued that abstract objects are the subject of metaphysics or broader philosophical inquiry. Over time, the independence of philosophy from empirical research made the discussion of abstract objects a more effective way to answer questions.
The rise of quasi-abstract objectsThe recent rise of "quasi-abstract objects" in philosophy suggests a reconsideration of the old dichotomy between the abstract and the concrete. Quasi-abstract objects have attracted special attention in social ontology and documentary studies. It has been argued that an over-reliance on this dichotomy has led to the neglect or exclusion of many social objects because they display characteristics that are traditionally considered incompatible: having a temporal location but no spatial location, and being able to have causal agency. . Certain social objects in the international legal system exhibit this characteristic.
How should we understand these quasi-abstract objects? Do they challenge our traditional understanding of abstract and concrete objects?
In psychology, Jean Piaget's work proposed two different types of learning, concrete thinking and formal thinking. Concrete thinking involves readily tangible facts of things, while abstract thinking involves higher-level mental processes and concept construction.
Thinking about the future
Quasi-abstract concepts may change our understanding of social objects and prompt us to ask whether various views on the existence of objects have become outdated in a changing world.
