Deterrence theory, as an important strategy in international relations, reached its peak of influence during the Cold War, especially with a focus on the use of nuclear weapons. However, the core problem of this theory is how to make credible threats to opponents without harming one's own interests. From a simple definition, deterrence can be seen as a way of discouraging other actors from taking action through explicit or implicit threats. This view is still worth exploring in today's international relations.
The success of deterrence is often based on the potential attacker's belief that the probability of success of his actions is low and the cost is high.
According to existing theories, deterrence can be divided into general deterrence and immediate deterrence. General deterrence aims to prevent potential actors from committing violations by conveying threats to them, while immediate deterrence targets actors who are considering immediate military action. Based on these different types, we can clearly see that although deterrence does not require absolute military superiority, it must have clear communication methods and integrity.
The success of a deterrence strategy depends on the ability to defend a nation and respond quickly and effectively when faced with an attack.
The complexity of contemporary international politics poses many challenges to deterrence strategies. First, attackers may underestimate or overestimate the defender’s capabilities, and this misjudgment often leads to an escalation of the conflict. Second, various factors in the international community—such as economic, political, and military—will affect the effectiveness of deterrence. In this context, an effective deterrence strategy needs to be built on trust, reputation, and various international alliances.
In past conflicts, a country's past behavior often affects its international reputation and thus its future deterrence effect.
Experts and scholars generally believe that a reasonable deterrence strategy is not only about demonstrating military strength, but also about using the complexity of international diplomacy to convey information. Especially when facing non-traditional threats, cooperation and compromise between countries become particularly important. It is widely recognized in the scientific community that the theoretical development of deterrence dates back more than 2,000 years, and its influence has never diminished.
In addition, the "principle of proportionality" and the "principle of reward" are also essential for the deterrent effect. The former requires that the defender's demands must match the only means available, while the latter emphasizes that the defender's incentives must be large enough to make the attacker consider the value of cooperation. Scholars Jentleson and others pointed out that deterrence must not only consider military means, but also flexibly use diplomatic means to respond to different international situations.
The success of deterrence theory lies in its ability to clearly emphasize the consequences of actions, thereby conveying the defender's firm intentions to potential attackers.
However, the real challenge of deterrence strategy lies in how to communicate effectively on the international stage. Trust between countries is often built on past experiences. If a country shows signs of wavering in past crises, its future deterrent power will be greatly reduced. In contrast, a stable, resolute attitude will prompt potential threat actors to reconsider the costs and benefits of their actions.
The current international situation may seem more peaceful at first glance, but there are many potential conflicts lurking beneath the surface. As emerging nations rise, one must ask: How will this new global balance of power create new deterrence challenges? Will it further increase conditions favorable for deterrence, or will it make the deterrence strategy face greater challenges? Where will international relations develop in the future?