The Problem of Representation, Real Patterns, and Rainforests

Abstract

This chapter surveys a different version of SR that does not rely on set/model-theoretic structures. Ladyman J, Ross D, Collier J, Spurrett D (Every thing must go. Oxford University Press, Oxford. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276196.001.0001, 2007) version of Informational SR (ISR) (ISR is usually used to refer to Floridi’s version of Informational Structural Realism. Here, I extend the term to also include Ladyman and Ross’ version.) offers an information-theoretic account of the underlying structure of scientific theories. At times it seems that Ladyman and Ross’ version of ISR relies on John Collier’s development of the notion of physical information. This may facilitate connecting the underlying informational structures to the physical world. However, as I will discuss in this chapter, despite its promising approach, Ladyman and Ross’ version of ISR cannot tell us a full story about grounding the representational relation between theories and the world. I shall argue that this version of Informational SR cannot address the problem of representation satisfactory either.