Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Italy: Beyond Deference?

Abstract

This paper proposes a vision of judicial review of administrative action that is in contrast with the (perhaps diminishingly important) strand of thought according to which the existence of administrative courts is a deviation from constitutional principles. It argues, first, that such courts were set up simply because existing judges did not ensure an adequate judicial protection against the State and, second, that the Constitution does not simply acknowledge the existence of administrative courts, but strengthens their powers and the protection for citizens. The paper also shows that there are still significant differences between the views of the various courts. There is not a single standard, but a variety of standards, which evolve with a different pace. Moreover, the capacity of agencies to positively adapt their conduct to the new and more demanding standards remains doubtful and certain political circles are likely to continue to encourage agencies to tolerate some degree of official misconduct. Any attempt to read these issues in a way that simply highlights some sort of linear ‘progress’ is thus unlikely to provide an adequate picture of a complex reality.