IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. | 2021

Receiver-Anonymity in Rerandomizable RCCA-Secure Cryptosystems Resolved

 
 
 
 
 
 

Abstract


In this work we resolve the open problem raised by Prabhakaran and Rosulek at CRYPTO 2007, and present the first anonymous, rerandomizable, Replayable-CCA (RCCA) secure public-key encryption scheme. This solution opens the door to numerous privacy-oriented applications with a highly desired RCCA security level. At the core of our construction is a non-trivial extension of smooth projective hash functions (Cramer and Shoup, EUROCRYPT 2002), and a modular generic framework developed for constructing rerandomizable RCCA-secure encryption schemes with receiver-anonymity. The framework gives an enhanced abstraction of the original Prabhakaran and Rosulek’s scheme (which was the first construction of rerandomizable RCCA-secure encryption in the standard model), where the most crucial enhancement is the first realization of the desirable property of receiveranonymity, essential to privacy settings. It also serves as a conceptually more intuitive and generic understanding of RCCA security, which leads, for example, to new implementations of the notion. Finally, note that (since CCA security is not applicable to the privacy applications motivating our work) the concrete results and the conceptual advancement presented here, seem to substantially expand the power and relevance of the notion of rerandomizable RCCA-secure encryption. ∗College of Computer, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha, China †College of Computer, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha, China. Part of this work was done while visiting COSIC, KU Leuven, Belgium. ‡School of Computing and Information Technology, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia §Fujian Provincial Key Laboratory of Network Security and Cryptology, College of Mathematics and Informatics, Fujian Normal University, Fuzhou, China ¶College of Computer, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha, China ‖Google LLC & Columbia University, New York, USA

Volume 2021
Pages 862
DOI 10.1007/978-3-030-84259-8_10
Language English
Journal IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.

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