Should the assembly system with direct omnichannel introduce integrated management service? A game-theoretical modelling study

Abstract

Against the background of omnichannel retailing, this paper tries to explore the incentive conditions/regions of adopting integrated management service (IMS) and the operational strategies/performance for the assembly system with direct omnichannel (AS). Six different game-theoretical decision models, including a centralized, two decentralized and a coordination decision modelssss for the AS, and a centralized and a coordination decision models for the assembly system with direct omnichannel and IMS (ASI), are developed, analyzed and compared, respectively. Based on an electronic product case, the corresponding numerical and sensitivity analyses are conducted. On this basis, the analytical and numerical results are compared and validated to derive managerial insights. It is found that only when the dual incentive ratio indicators are in the quadrant $$\\{ \\alpha \\ge 1$$ { α ≥ 1 and $$\\beta \\ge 1\\}$$ β ≥ 1 } of bidimensional incentive region matrix would the AS and IMS provider have the incentive to introduce and provide IMS. Introducing and providing IMS can effectively enhance the ability of quick response, boost the collaborative operations, and improve the operational performance of the AS. Furthermore, a revenue sharing contract-based coordination strategy can effectively improve the operational performance of ASI.