Multiple Energies Retailing Based on Stackelberg Game Model

Abstract

Abstract Gas-based distributed energy stations are supported by Chinese government and have significant commercial potential. Recently, Chines retail electricity market is reforming. Integrating distributed energy stations makes retailers transform into multi-energy providers (MEPs) and brings huge competitive advantages. A multi-leaders and multi-followers Stackelberg game between MEPs and energy consumers (ECs) is applied to simulate the dynamic behaviors of pricing, producing and consuming. MEPs as the leaders optimize the electricity and heat prices with the aim of maximizing their own income. ECs as the followers optimize the electricity and heat demands with the aim of maximizing their own consumer surplus based on the prices from different MEPs. In addition, the price set by a MEP also depends on the prices of other MEPs. Therefore, there is a non-cooperative game among MEPs. A distributed algorithm is executed by a virtual energy exchange center (VEEC) to solve the game equilibrium and analyze the joint pricing of multiple energy in the retail energy market. By analyzing the numerical results, we verify the validity of the Stackelberg game model, as well as the accuracy of the proposed algorithm and mathematical derivation.