Incorporating conflict risks in pedestrian-motorist interactions: A game theoretical approach.

Abstract

At semi-controlled crosswalks with yield signs and markings, negotiations as to the right-of-way occur frequently between pedestrians and motorists, to determine who should proceed first. This kind of negotiation often leads to traffic delay and potential conflicts. To minimize misunderstandings between pedestrian and motorist that can have serious safety consequences, it is essential that we understand the decision-making process as the players interact in real street-crossing situations. This paper employs a game-theoretic approach to investigate the joint behaviors of pedestrians and motorists from the perspective of safety. Assuming bounded rationality for each player, the quantal response equilibrium is a special kind of game with incomplete information. Explanatory variables such as conflicting risks and time savings can be incorporated into the payoff functions of the players via expected utility functions. Finally, model parameters can be estimated using an expectation maximization algorithm. The game-theoretic framework is applied to model pedestrian-motorist interactions at a semi-controlled crosswalk on a university campus. The estimation results indicate that the likelihood of pedestrian-vehicle conflict can be quantified. The results can lead to control measures that facilitate the negotiation between pedestrian and motorist and reduce the conflict risk at semi-controlled crosswalks.