Does the central environmental inspection effectively improve air pollution?-An empirical study of 290 prefecture-level cities in China.

Abstract

In order to control air pollution better, China has adopted the central environmental inspection mechanism. This paper adopts the data of 290 prefecture-level cities in China to evaluate the air improvement effect of the central environmental inspection mechanism. Firstly, based on the Mechanism Design Theory and Principal-agent Theory, this paper analyzes the government incentive measures and effort levels under the conditions of information as symmetry and asymmetry. Then, this paper introduces Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) Model to evaluate the air improvement effect of the central environmental inspection mechanism. Lastly, this paper explores the sustainability of the environmental inspection mechanism through the regression analysis of environmental inspection revisit. The results show that: under the condition of information symmetry, the central government can make the local governments reach the Pareto optimal effort level through the design of incentive contract. In a short period of time, the first round of environmental inspection and environmental inspection revisit have significantly improved air quality, and significantly reduced PM2.5 and PM10 and other major single pollutants. In general, this system has had an immediate effect. The environmental inspection revisit has also significantly reduced the concentrations of AQI, PM2.5 and PM10. Compared with the first round of environmental inspection and environmental inspection revisit, the latter has a higher level of air pollution reduction and better effect. The sustainability of the improvement effect of environmental inspection mechanism is questioned. It is of great significance to evaluate the actual effect of the central environmental inspection system and tap the unique experience of Chinese style to explore how to control air pollution and promote green development.