Leveraging Towards Restraint: Nuclear Hedging and North Korea’s Shifting Reference Points during the Agreed Framework and the Six-Party Talks

Abstract

The emergence of new nuclear aspirants has posed a great threat to the post-Cold War global non-proliferation regime. These states have adopted a nuclear hedging strategy that has been deemed both strategically risky and politically difficult to maintain. Yet, hedging has not automatically resulted in nuclearisation. We analyse the conditions under which a nuclear hedger shifts its nuclear policy towards one of restraint. Drawing insights from prospect theory, we argue that a nuclear policy shift occurs when a nuclear hedger gains an asymmetric leverage vis-a-vis its adversary. Specifically, a hedging strategy that is based on loss aversion will only be abandoned when a shift in the nuclear aspirant s reference point occurs during negotiations. To test our theoretical arguments, we conduct an in-depth case study of North Korea s nuclear policies throughout the 1990s and 2000s. The empirical study of the changes in North Korea s negotiating stance during the Agreed Framework negotiations and the Six-Party Talks supports our asymmetric leverage thesis. We conclude with broad policy implications for the non-proliferation regime.