The Securitarian Personality: What Really Motivates Trump’s Base and Why It Matters for the Post-Trump Era. By John R. Hibbing. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020. 304p. $29.95 cloth.

Abstract

society. The specific emotions of pessimism, anger, and anxiety exerted a minimal impact on their trust in government and broader attitudes toward the federal government. Despite the claims by many political pundits and the media, the authors found no evidence of a hard or soft exiting among Latino immigrants. Moreover, foreignborn Latinos did not hide in the shadows; their levels of political participation and engagement remained strong during this time period, particularly with respect to their participation in protest activity. Yet the analysis reveals that protest activity was uneven: younger Latino immigrants were more likely to engage in in it than older ones. Those who were worried that friends or family members might be deported were alsomore likely to engage in protest activity than those with no such concerns. Notably, concerns about deportation outweighed worries over personal finances in helping explain who decides to engage in protest. McCann and Jones-Correa’s in-depth analysis of the relationship between emotions and political preferences contributes to an exciting body of work examining racial differences in the way that emotions shape political thought and action. Davin Phoenix’s (The Anger Gap: How Race Shapes Emotion in Politics, 2019) recent work, for example, demonstrates how anger fails to mobilize whites and Blacks in the same manner: being angry generally is less of a mobilizer for Black Americans than it is for white Americans. In instances when anger is a mobilizing force for Black Americans, such emotion is directed toward activism by way of marches, protests, and demonstrations. In contrast, anger leads whites to participate in more typical forms of political behavior, such as turning out to vote. Importantly, Phoenix goes beyond the Black–white dichotomy to determine whether his theory can also be applied to Latinos and Asian Americans. Of course, given that the social positioning of both Latinos and Asians is unique, he expects anger to function differently for these groups than for whites. McCann and JonesCorrea’s findings support this contention and highlight the problems of assuming that one particular explanatory variable will operate consistently and uniformly across all ethnic/racial groups (Natalie Masuoka and Jane Junn. The Politics of Belonging: Race, Public Opinion and Immigration, 2013). As these scholars contend, the context of reception and America’s racial hierarchy are important factors that shape how these emotions interact with political activity. Future studies would also be well served to examine how other, more positive emotions, such as hope and optimism, affect the political attitudes and behavior of Latino immigrants. Ultimately, the research findings presented in Holding Fast set the stage for future scholars to address a whole range of research questions. For example, one could imagine designing a cohort study of young foreign-born Latinos who were socialized in this particularly politicized era. Did participating in the marches and protests politicize them in such a way that it positively changed their cognitive schema? Much like the research conducted by Lisa Garcia Bedolla (Fluid Borders: Power, Identity and Politics in Los Angeles, 2005) on Latino youth in the wake of Proposition 187, there is strong reason to believe that coming of age in the Trump presidency will uniquely shape the political mindset of young Latino immigrants and serve as a “crystallizing” moment (David Sears and Nicholas Valentino, “Politics Matters: Political Events as Catalysts for Preadult Socialization,” American Political Science Review, 1997). Such an event has the potential to shape not only their partisan preferences but also their opinions on immigration (Marisa Abrajano and Lydia Lundgren, “How Watershed Immigration Policies Affect American Public Opinion over a Lifetime, International Migration Review, 2014). That being the case, we can expect that Latino immigrants who came of age during the Trump years will recognize themselves as firmly belonging to the polity, much in the same way that Latino youth felt in the wake of Proposition 187. Only time will tell whether Latino immigrants’ resilience and steadfastness will produce long-term civic change and engagement, but if the past is any indicator, we have strong reason for optimism. The work by Adrian Pantoja and Gary Segura (“Fear and Loathing in California: Contextual Threat and Political Sophistication among Latino Voters,” Political Behavior, 2003), Pantoja and colleagues (“Citizens by Choice, Voters by Necessity: Patterns in Political Mobilization by Naturalized Latinos,” Political Research Quarterly, 2001), and Garcia Bedolla (2005) all revealed the mobilizing power that antiimmigration rhetoric exerted on Latino immigrant behavior. Not only will the next 5 to 10 years potentially lead millions of Latino immigrants to consider themselves as full participants in the US political system, they will also very likely result in millions of Latino immigrants engaging in the naturalization process. This fine book gives us reason for hope about an American future that includes them.