Truth and Generalized Quantification*

Abstract

ABSTRACT Kripke [1975] gives a formal theory of truth based on Kleene s strong evaluation scheme. It is probably the most important and influential that has yet been given—at least since Tarski. However, it has been argued that this theory has a problem with generalized quantifiers such as All(ϕ, ψ)—that is, All ϕs are ψ—or Most(ϕ, ψ). Specifically, it has been argued that such quantifiers preclude the existence of just the sort of language that Kripke aims to deliver—one that contains its own truth predicate. In this paper I solve the problem by showing how Kleene s strong scheme, and Kripke s theory based on it, can in a natural way be extended to accommodate the full range of generalized quantifiers.