The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order

Abstract

Pakistan’s division. General Farman’s perspectives and analytical introspection on the events leading to the secession of Bengal (East Pakistan) offer a unique lens through which to see the events that unfolded from the late 1960s through the early 1970s. The brutality of the division is heartwrenching in terms of victim impacts on all sides. This book is Farman’s articulate and heartfelt, yet highly logical, autopsy of the division of West and East Pakistan, the latter of which established itself as Bangladesh. He identifies the causal factors on both sides that drove Bengali nationalism and hatred of West Pakistan, as well as the gross ineptitude of political leaders on all sides, who preferred denial over realism. Farman’s daughter presents the foreword, and then he sets the stage in the preface, consisting of questions and answers translated from the Urdu edition of his memoirs, published in 1999. He frankly addresses the causal factors behind the Bengalis (of East Pakistan) wanting to secede. He explains that the leaders of both West and East Pakistan were wholly selfinterested, as opposed to meeting the public’s needs. He contends that there really was no need for military action, because the East Pakistan rebellion could have been avoided, and political and diplomatic tools could have been used to defuse the tensions. Farman pointedly criticizes poor decision-making on both sides. He also blames both sides for committing atrocities. The first chapter, “Changing Patterns of Muslim Bengal,” explains the circumstances in West and East Pakistan prior to hostilities. One of the most important points he makes is about the disconnect between the state and the emotional sentiments of the nation. He writes, “A state has a physical form; a nation an emotional cohesion,” which the West Pakistan–based government failed to appreciate (7). Farman blames the Pakistani leadership for being more focused on money and self-interest than on taking the indicators of discontent in East Pakistan seriously. Some of these indicators included the hate-Urdu campaign, rising Bengali nationalism, and increasing hatred of West Pakistan. In particular, Farman provides an insider’s perspective on the dynamics between military officers. He gives the examples of West and East Pakistan’s military officers refusing to speak to each other; how Bengali officers stuck together; and that communication, in general, was not possible because the West Pakistani officers did not know the Bengali language. Chapter 2, “Estrangement,” discusses the differences between West and East Pakistan regarding foreign and domestic policies. In the realm of foreign policy, the main issue was India, which East Pakistanis viewed as a potential trade partner, but West Pakistanis viewed as enemy number one. East Pakistanis resentfully viewed West Pakistan as neglecting their needs and deliberately marginalizing them in terms of political representation and resource allocation. Linguistic differences added to their resentment, especially when West Pakistan nationalized Urdu. Governing a country that was geographically partitioned, with India wedged in the center, further complicated the situation. The next few chapters focus on elections, their outcomes, and their impact in both flanks of the country. Then, the middle of the book provides details about military actions, including India’s intervention. Chapter 12 analyzes Pakistan’s operational successes and failures, and this is followed by postwar delineations of friends and foes. In chapter 16, Farman specifies the “Politicians’ Responsibility in the Breakup of Pakistan” (239). Woven throughout the book are painful reminders for the general and his military colleagues about how West Pakistanis blamed the army for the defeat in the 1971 war. However, Farman is steadfast in critiquing the woeful failures of the politicians and decision-makers on all sides. He assails Mujibur Rahman for stoking anti–West Pakistan hatred in “an open revolt,” and for fanning the flames of hatred based on ethnic and linguistic differences between both flanks. India took advantage of the situation, resulting in “the breakup of our country” (246). The final chapter presents Farman’s critique of the Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report. It is a firsthand account of how Farman was raked over the coals in the after-action report following the 1971 debacle, which, at the time, was considered a military failure. Then, he explains how the tables were turned and the politicians, including Bhutto, came under scrutiny. Farman feels that the politicians failed the country. He does an outstanding job explaining how that happened. His references and research are impeccable. Moreover, having served as an insider in these events strengthens the credibility of this book. The appendices and graphic maps at the end of the book are extremely resourceful. Farman’s book is an indispensable resource in the form of a first-person account of a historical tragedy in South Asia. In the present, reading this book begs the question: have the region’s politicians learned from history?