Consideration of Context and Meanings of Neuro-Cognitive Enhancement: The Importance of a Principled, Internationally Capable Neuroethics

Abstract

Conrad, Humphries, and Chaterjee (2019) have examined and analyzed public opinions about cognitive enhancement (CE) for various purposes. They gather good evidence that framing metaphors and contexts of discourse have significant influence on social attitudes toward the use of CEs in varied circumstances. We support this sort of empirical study, and find its main results to be plausible and unsurprising. Judgments about CEs are formed within both personal and social contexts, and assessments of CEs must take contexts of capability and performance into account (Mihailov and Savulescu 2018; Shook and Giordano 2014; Shook et al. 2014). As regards public policy, much formative work on the roles of metaphor and framing language has been done by George Lakoff (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 2008). Briefly, Lakoff explains how framing establishes— and thus enables the contextual application of—language that fits a particular worldview. He notes both that value-laden metaphors are pervasive in all languages, and that much of public discourse is somewhat “preframed” in terms of a given moral viewpoint. Lakoff rebuts the notion that moral viewpoints are subjective and apart from the social context of ongoing public discourse. Likewise, what is heard in public discourse is not simply the aggregate of personal viewpoints, as if the public and private spheres do not continuously affect each other. Rather, public discourse and personal opinion are intermingled in ongoing transactions, dynamically exerting mutual and reciprocal effect(s). Personal opinions can seem firmly established and stable in the short term, and this can be reflected in data from restricted temporal sampling. But such personal views can change with time and effect. Indeed, Conrad and colleagues affirm that metaphorical discourse can shift individual opinion: “Metaphors may be more likely to sway people’s opinion toward public policy even if they do not change individual behavior” (Conrad, Humphries, and Chaterjee 2019, 43). Thus, one “take-away” from their study is that morality-laden metaphors can and do influence people’s judgments, at least to certain degrees. The authors conclude by providing the straightforward stance that (a) policies toward CEs should be socially responsive by reflecting public attitudes about CE use; (b) public attitudes toward CEs can be ascertained through surveys applying frameworks to distinguish various attitudes; and (c) surveying with frameworks can assist efforts to craft policies that take distinct public attitudes into account. This straightforward stance about public attitudes is not the whole story, and we wish to explore some important considerations for neuroethics. First, we do not feel confident that the authors offer a fully warranted conclusion about the significance of their study for setting policies towards CEs. Second, we suggest that neuroethical discourses must both be aware of the effects of framing metaphors on public attitudes, and should be proactive toward managing and resisting such framings, as when seeking to formulate and standardize ethical positions about CEs. We agree with the authors that public attitudes surely should not be ignored. However, “socially responsive” policies are not necessarily “socially responsible” by promoting what is good and right for the public. Eliciting public attitudes on an issue may not always measure what the public already regards as being “best.” To be sure, a greater lesson from this article, apropos the work of Lakoff, argues against such a naive stance.