European Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal | 2019
Individual Behaviour, Regulatory Liability, and a Company’s Exposure to Risk: The Deterrent Effect of Individual Sanctions in UK Competition Law
Abstract
UK competition law authorities primarily target companies. Such a strategy exposes companies to the risk of liability and loss, and its lack of effectiveness in deterring anti-competitive behaviour has led to the introduction of individual sanctions, which were greatly expected to deter wrongdoing directors. They however have not achieved the desired deterrent effect on wrongdoing directors, since there have been few cases in which individuals have been targeted. This illustrates either that serious obstacles faced by UK competition law authorities in cracking down on individuals, or that there is considerable reluctance from both these authorities and the courts to enforce the tools and convict. In either scenario, companies are left with no option but to mitigate the risk arising from the anticompetitive behaviour of directors.