Outcome and Other Luck

Abstract

This chapter argues that the consequence elements of any crime form a constitutive part of the criminal wrong, in virtue of which criminal culpability is sensitive to outcome luck. Outcomes change what one is culpable for, and they rightly affect what one is convicted of. Yet it does not follow that they alter the degree of one’s culpability, or the quantum of punishment that one deserves. The dependence of outcomes on luck is compatible with moral responsibility, and indeed culpability, for such outcomes. However, because outcome luck occurs after the defendant behaves as she does, it cannot change the manner in which that behaviour reflects a moral vice on the defendant’s part. The chapter also considers challenges posed by other forms of luck. Characteristically, both the criminal law and ordinary blaming judgements accommodate circumstantial luck by means of justifications and excuses; not by irresponsibility defences. In so doing, they disavow the thought that circumstantial luck, too, can undermine moral responsibility.