Theoretical and experimental investigation of driver noncooperative-game steering control behavior

Abstract

This paper investigates two noncooperative-game strategies which may be used to represent a human driverʼ s steering control behavior in response to vehicle automated steering intervention. The first strategy, namely the Nash strategy is derived based on the assumption that a Nash equilibrium is reached in a noncooperative game of vehicle path-following control involving a driver and a vehicle automated steering controller. The second one, namely the Stackelberg strategy is derived based on the assumption that a Stackelberg equilibrium is reached in a similar context. A simulation study is performed to study the differences between the two proposed noncooperative-game strategies. An experiment using a fixed-base driving simulator is carried out to measure six test driversʼ steering behavior in response to vehicle automated steering intervention. The Nash strategy is then fitted to measured driver steering wheel angles following a model identification procedure. Control weight parameters involved in the Nash strategy are identified. It is found that the proposed Nash strategy with the identified control weights is capable of representing the trend of measured driver steering behavior and vehicle lateral responses. It is also found that the proposed Nash strategy is superior to the classic driver steering control strategy which has widely been used for modeling driver steering control over the past. A discussion on improving automated steering control using the gained knowledge of driver noncooperative-game steering control behavior was made.