Towards an Interoperable Security Policy for Space-Based Internetworks

Abstract

Renewed focus on spacecraft networking by government and private industry promises to establish interoperable communications infrastructures and enable distributed computing in multi-nodal systems. Planned near-Earth and cislunar missions by NASA and others evidence the start of building this networking vision. Working with space agencies, academia, and industry, NASA has developed a suite of communications protocols and algorithms collectively referred to as Delay-Tolerant Networking (DTN) to support an interoperable space network. Included in the DTN protocol suite is a security protocol - the Bundle Protocol Security Protocol - which provides the kind of delay-tolerant, transport-layer security needed for cislunar and deep-space trusted networking. We present an analysis of the lifecycle of security operations inherent in a space network with a focus on the DTN-enabled space networking paradigm. This analysis defines three security-related roles for spacecraft (Security Sources, verifiers, and acceptors) and associates a series of critical processing events with each of these roles. We then define the set of required and optional actions associated with these security events. Finally, we present a series of best practices associated with policy configurations that are unique to the space-network security problem. Framing space network security policy as a mapping of security actions to security events provides the details necessary for making trusted networks semantically interoperable. Finally, this method is flexible enough to allow for customization even while providing a unifying core set of mandatory security actions.