From the tax-sharing system to the program system: Institutional evolution and organizational mechanism

Abstract

Soon after implementing reforms to the tax-sharing system, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) implemented public budgeting reform, and thus formed a new kind of state governance system, the program system (PS). There are three categories of program expenditures available to local governments: “earmarked grants” from higher-level authorities; “non-grant program funds” from higher-level authorities; and program funds from same-level government departments. The convergence and reorganization of these three categories of program expenditure at the local level has, to a great extent, molded the fiscal structure of grassroots government in the PRC. The PS in essence does not mean discarding or surpassing the bureaucratic state system, rather, it is the active improvement and supplementing of the bureaucratic system by the state: a continuation and development of state regime construction. The overt purpose of the PS is to “solidify” budgetary constraints, while the underlying purpose is to enhance the government’s ability to respond to society. The two purposes present some tension in practice, as the rationalized and professionalized forms of governance that result do not necessarily enhance the ability to respond to public needs; in fact the reverse is quite possible.