Why Negotiating Matters

Abstract

O riana Skylar Mastro’s new book The Costs of Conversation: Obstacles to Peace Talks in Wartime is a fresh and welcome addition to political science scholarship on the dynamics of war termination diplomacy. Both scholars and policymakers focused on Asia will be especially intrigued by this book, given its deep, well-researched historical case studies of the Korean War, the 1962 Sino-Indian War, and the Vietnam War. The book will also be of interest to international relations scholars more generally. Indeed, its insights are more important than the modest title might imply and shed light on diplomatic behavior outside as well as during war, negotiations over territorial disputes, weapons of mass destruction programs, and other timely issues. To frame the book’s argument, consider first the conventional political science wisdom that wars end when belligerents negotiate by exchanging what might be called war termination offers. That is, one side might say, “I am willing to end the war if I receive 60% of the disputed territory,” and the other side might say, “I am willing to end the war if I receive 70% of the disputed territory.” The war ends when the two sides agree on the terms of a deal. If this sounds similar to two people haggling over the price of a used car, it should, as the basic bargaining insights were imported from economics. Mastro builds on this theoretical framework by importing an insight that leaders, policymakers, and historians have long recognized: that an essential element of war termination policy is not just what offers the belligerents exchange but also whether they negotiate at all. The potential problem is that the very act of offering to negotiate can be perceived as a sign of weakness, and belligerents concerned about conveying weakness might not elect to open peace talks. Adolf Hitler recognized this, for example, when, brushing off suggestions in late 1942 that he open peace talks with the Soviet Union, he remarked that “a moment of weakness [was] not the right time for negotiations with the enemy.”1 This fear of appearing weak