Archive | 2019
The Problem of Domination by Reason and Its Non-Relativistic Solution
Abstract
This paper outlines a solution to what can be called “the problem of domination by reason”, “conceptual domination” or “clarificatory injustice”. This problem relates to situations where a philosopher may appear to be in a position to legitimately coerce, by means of arguments, an interlocutor, who shares with the philosopher a concept or a conceptual system, to accept a philosophical characterization of a concept or whatever the concept concerns. The proposed solution is based on a particular interpretation of what Wittgenstein means by agreement in his later philosophy, when he says that philosophy only states what anyone grants to it. Wittgenstein’s view and the proposed solution are characterized by their continued recognition of the value of logic and reason, truth and knowledge, as opposed to attempting to solve the problem by embracing relativism and questioning the value of the logic, reason, truth and knowledge. Relevant kind of disagreements licence no relativistic conclusions, because problems relating to them can be solved without going this far. 1. The problem of injustice and domination by reason One of the most common claims made by philosophers is that they will (intend or want to) clarify something. A much more contested issue is whether and how often they actually manage to clarify what they set out to clarify, either to themselves or others. In connection with such Oskari Kuusela CC-BY 24 clarifications, or attempts to clarify, a problem arises which we might call “the problem of domination by reason”, “the problem of conceptual domination” or “the problem of clarificatory injustice”. The problem can be described as follows. Assuming that the philosopher and her interlocutor share a common system of concepts or that they both partake in reason, the philosopher seems to be sometimes in a position, due to her more advanced capacity or skill to clarify those shared concepts or principles of reason, to coerce or force, by means of arguments, the interlocutor to accept against her will philosophical clarifications (for example, conceptual definitions). Problematically, nothing seems to exclude the possibility that in such a case the interlocutor would be wrongly made to accept a merely alleged clarification that does not really reflect her concepts or thinking, but distorts them. Thus, the philosopher might end up, regardless of good and honest intentions, doing injustice to the interlocutor’s thinking. This problem of injustice and domination by reason arises especially in the context of conceptions of philosophy which assume that the philosopher’s task is to articulate universal or exceptionless theses of essence (concerning the non-accidental features of the objects of investigation) or universally or exceptionlessly valid conceptual determinations that cover all instances falling under a concept. Here an important tacit assumption is made about conceptual unity or the unity of cases sharing an essence, according to which it is always possible to give an overarching definition or determination of a concept or essence in terms of features common to all cases falling under the concept that covers all possible instances of the concept’s application. However, this assumption is problematic in that, insofar as it is not part of the concept of concept that concepts necessarily possess this kind of simple unity, agreement between the philosopher and the interlocutor on a conceptual clarification regarding some cases 1 Throughout this discussion I will assume that the philosopher, in giving such arguments, is engaged in what might be called “immanent critique” of the interlocutor’s concepts or language use. She is not trying to impose on the interlocutor a system of concepts or beliefs that the interlocutor does not already share with her, but the problem concerns the misrepresentation of those shared concepts. The philosopher’s argument is therefore assumed to be nondogmatic in the sense of Kant, proceeding from within shared concepts or principles of reason, and not relying on anything to which the interlocutor is not already committed. For Kant’s notion of dogmatism and Wittgenstein’s broader notion of the same, see Kuusela 2008 and 2008a. Nordic Wittgenstein Review Special Issue 2019 • Post-Truth | pp. 23-42 | DOI 10.15845/nwr.v8i0.3505 25 falling under a concept does not automatically imply an agreement regarding other cases falling under the same concept. But evidently, simple conceptual unity is not a necessary feature of concepts, as shown by there being no contradiction in the description of other more complex modes of conceptual unity. I give three examples for illustration. 1) Wittgenstein’s account of family-resemblance concepts, whereby conceptual unity is determined through criss-crossing similarities. Schematically, this allows two different kind of cases to fall under the same concept, despite their not sharing any features, as long as they share features with a third kind of case that unites the two cases as an intermediary (PI: §65ff.). 2) Concepts expressed by what J. L. Austin calls “dimension-words”, characteristic of which is that they have multiple different opposites. Austin example is “real” whose contrasts include “fake”, “artificial”, “copy”, “makeshift”, “imaginary”, and so on, and which can be taken to mean something different depending on what it is contrasted with (Austin 1962: 71). 3) Nietzsche’s genealogical account of morality as a multi-layered construct, whereby the concepts of good and evil reflect their complex history of formation, and incorporate different, even incompatible elements and considerations that derive from what Nietzsche describes as the morality of the nobles and slaves (Nietzsche 2008). Given the possibility of this kind of conceptual complexity, philosophical clarification can readily fail to do justice to the thinking and concepts of the philosopher’s interlocutor, insofar as such clarifications assume simple conceptual unity, but the interlocutor’s concepts possess a more complex unity. Evidently, agreement about how to characterize or define a certain type of case that falls under a particular concept does not here guarantee the applicability of the same characterization or definition to other cases falling under the same concept. I agree that the feeling of injustice being done to one’s thinking or concepts can accurately reflect the situation. Given the possibility of preceding kind of conceptual complexity, clarificatory injustice in the sense of conceptual domination or domination by reason can readily occur. Problematically, however, the possibility of this kind of clarificatory injustice seems to have led to responses in certain quarters of philosophy and cultural studies that put into question the value of Oskari Kuusela CC-BY 26 the notions of reason, logic, knowledge and truth, which are consequently regarded as instruments of domination and oppression rather than as necessary for emancipation and liberation in the sense in which both ancient and enlightenment philosophy have regarded them as necessary for freedom. Sometimes this may have led to the acceptance of relativism, and sacrificing the notions knowledge, truth, and/or logic, perhaps thus pushing us towards something like an era of post-truth, whatever that would mean. Arguably, however, such a response is problematic – an unnecessary overkill. To be sure, if there is no objective truth or knowledge and no principles of reason or logic, then the philosopher cannot tell others what the objective truth is and what the principles governing reason are, or force them to accept and comply with the philosopher’s an account of such things. However, overthrowing the notions of truth, knowledge, reason and logic seems an unacceptably high price to pay for solving the problem of domination by reason, conceptual domination or clarificatory injustice. I am inclined to think that this response merely constitutes a tempting confusion, although I will not try to argue so. Nevertheless, one may certainly wonder whether justice and freedom are possible at all without truth, knowledge, reason and logic. (Is it possible to be free without a correct understanding of one’s situation?) I would therefore like to outline a different solution to the problem. As I will explain, there is a way to construe Wittgenstein’s notion of agreement in philosophy that can solve the problem of domination by reason and clarificatory injustice without our being forced to abandon reason, logic, knowledge and truth, and without our being led to relativism or to deny the value of reason, logic and truth. On the proposed interpretation of the notion of agreement in Wittgenstein’s philosophy, philosophy can involve no attempt to try to force anyone to accept anything. 2 It may be that the kind of relativism imagined here is merely a popular post-modern fiction or a creature of university politics in the US. There are rumours of philosophers holding such a view, but I have yet to identify any serious philosopher who would do so. Ultimately nothing depends on this, however. The problem of domination by reason and clarificatory injustice is real, and calls for a solution. For varieties of relativism, see Haack 1998 and Hales 2011. Nordic Wittgenstein Review Special Issue 2019 • Post-Truth | pp. 23-42 | DOI 10.15845/nwr.v8i0.3505 27 2. The Wittgensteinian solution According to Wittgenstein (PI: §599), “Philosophy only states what everyone grants to it.” Various readings of this remark have been offered, including a reading by Anthony Kenny according to which Wittgenstein’s claim cannot be taken seriously in that the only thing that can be agreed upon in Wittgenstein’s writings are uninteresting trivialities, while anything of philosophical interest is controversial (Kenny 2004). According to a somewhat different interpretation put forward by Hans-Johann Glock, and agreed upon by Peter Hacker and the influential scholar-duo B