Epistemología genética y la (in)visibilidad de los enfoques constructivistas en neurociencias

Abstract

This paper discusses the current debate about the field of cognitive neurosciences, its possible relation with the genetic epistemology of Jean Piaget and the reasons why the constructivist approaches in the neurosciences have been little promoted. In order to demonstrate that the neurosciences don’t constitute a singular, unanimous and finalized area as it establishes the common sense, is proposed a theoretical revision of the stages of development of Piaget and the discussion of the psycho-physiological parallelism defended by him. Thus, is presented the neurobiological evidences pointed out by Herman T. Epstein for the occurrence of Phrenoblysis (periods of fast brain growth), interspersed with periods of slow growth and that occurring in correlation with the Piagetian stages. With this, we search to draw possible approximations between the genetic epistemology of Piaget and cognitive neurosciences, demonstrating that human cognitive development is structured in the psychological and biological pillars, and that these are linked to social, cultural, educational and genetic factors as well as to demonstrate that the base of support of the constructivist pole in the neurosciences is quite solid. Also is discussed that the superficial analysis of Piagetian precepts, the adoption of partiality and omission of data, the failure to consider his works as a whole, the attachment to isolated works in certain periods, secondary and tertiary readings of the Piagetian work and the problems of reading and translation of the original texts impede Piaget’s view as epistemologist and justify the little dissemination of the constructivist approach in neuroscientific research.