Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal | 2019

RE: Amendments to Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy Voting Advice

 

Abstract


The SEC’s recently proposed Amendments to Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy Voting Advice is an efficient and necessary response to the “collective action�? problem that is imbedded in the shareholder voting of public companies and the deficiencies that this problem creates in the voting recommendations of proxy advisors. The amendments will enhance the value of voting recommendations by requiring proxy advisors to make much needed investments in a few key areas of the voting recommendation process. Part I of this letter will describe the collective action problem that is at the heart of shareholder voting. Part II will discuss the problems that this collective action causes for the voting recommendations of proxy advisors, including the creation of a resource constrained business environment. Part III discusses how proxy advisors deal with such a business environment. Part IV will discuss how the market for voting recommendations is an example of a market failure, requiring the SEC to pursue regulatory action to mitigate the harm caused by two significant negative externalities. Part V will discuss how the collective action problem of shareholder voting and the market failure impacts corporate governance. Part VI will discuss the value of the proposed amendments.

Volume None
Pages None
DOI 10.2139/ssrn.3507731
Language English
Journal Comparative Political Economy: Regulation eJournal

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