Embodied gestalts: Unstable visual phenomena become stable when they are stimuli for competitive action selection.

Abstract

An animal s environment is rich with affordances. Different possible actions are specified by visual information while competing for dominance over neural dynamics. Affordance competition models account for this in terms of winner-takes-all cross-inhibition dynamics. Multistable phenomena also reveal how the visual system deals with ambiguity. Their key property is spontaneous instability, in forms such as alternating dominance in binocular rivalry. Theoretical models of self-inhibition or self-organized instability posit that the instability is tied to some kind of neural adaptation and that its functional significance is to enable flexible perceptual transitions. We hypothesized that the two perspectives are interlinked. Spontaneous instability is an intrinsic property of perceptual systems, but it is revealed when they are stripped from the constraints of possibilities for action. To test this, we compared a multistable gestalt phenomenon against its embodied version and estimated the neural adaptation and competition parameters of an affordance transition dynamic model. Wertheimer s (Zeitschrift fur Psychologie 61, 161-265, 1912) optimal (β) and pure (φ) forms of apparent motion from a stroboscopic point-light display were endowed with action relevance by embedding the display in a visual object-tracking task. Thus, each mode was complemented by its action, because each perceptual mode uniquely enabled different ways of tracking the target. Perceptual judgment of the traditional apparent motion exhibited spontaneous instabilities, in the form of earlier switching when the frame rate was changed stepwise. In contrast, the embodied version exhibited hysteresis, consistent with affordance transition studies. Consistent with our predictions, the parameter for competition between modes in the affordance transition model increased, and the parameter for self-inhibition vanished.