PUTIN EL CAUDILLO

Abstract

This paper examines the historical development of the relationship between the Putin regime in Russia and the Chávez and Maduro regimes in Venezuela. Key differences and similarities in their foreign and domestic policies are explored, as well as how they interact with each other on the world stage. It makes the case that \u200bchavismo\u200b in Venezuela has lead to increasingly autocratic policies as oil prices have declined and leadership has changed hands, changing the character of Venezuela and Russia’s relationship into one that closely resembles the patron-client relationships of Latin American \u200bcaudillismo\u200b. SUMMER 2019 UNDERGRADUATE HISTORY JOURNAL 88 88 University of Massachusetts Undergraduate History Journal, Vol. 3 [2019], Art. 5 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/umuhj/vol3/iss1/5 DOI: https://doi.org/10.7275/1wtq-np46 I. INTRODUCING THE REGIMES When Hugo Chávez became President of Venezuela in 1999, he declared his victory to be the beginning of a Bolivarian revolution. In doing so he invoked Simón Bolívar, a 19th century Venezuelan general who had defeated the forces of the Spanish Empire and for a time ruled a vast South American confederation encompassing Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. Despite Bolívar’s charismatic leadership, the confederation of Gran Colombia collapsed and formed five different nations. Before his death, Bolívar placed the blame for his failure squarely on the shoulders of \u200bcaudillismo\u200b, a form of government dominated by mutually beneficial but inherently unequal patron-client relationships that confounded attempts at South American unification. \u200bCaudillismo \u200bgets its name from the \u200bcaudillos\u200b (military strongmen) that created these patron-client relationships between themselves and local leaders. Ironically, in 2015, almost two decades after Chávez declared himself Bolívar’s heir, Chávez’s appointed successor Nicolás Maduro would lead Venezuela into a patron-client relationship with one of the 21\u200bst \u200b century’s most dangerous \u200bcaudillos\u200b: Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Putin and Chávez regimes were initially drawn together as allies through shared geopolitical interests and ideological opposition to the United States. Chavismo (the style of government employed by Chávez and his followers) was uniquely well suited for an alliance with the Putin regime. This relationship changed radically in 2014 when Venezuela’s leadership crisis was compounded with a sharp downturn in oil prices. Unable to recover from either crisis, Maduro’s regime now has a patron-client relationship with Vladimir Putin. This mutually beneficial, yet inherently unequal, relationship has solidified Putin as Maduro’s most important ally and indeed one of his only allies. Russian support is sustaining the Maduro regime, and SUMMER 2019 UNDERGRADUATE HISTORY JOURNAL 89 89 Schnur: PUTIN EL CAUDILLO Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 2019 influencing how Venezuelan governance is shifting toward a more autocratic model. In this paper I will explore what Chavismo is, why the chavista system made Venezuela an ideal ally for Russia, and what characterizes the new patron-client relationship between the Putin and Maduro regimes. II. NATURAL ALLIES Chavismo is a complicated ideology and form of government, but one of its most basic principles is aggressive and public opposition to the extension of U.S. influence on the world stage. This explicit rejection of a U.S.-dominated global system carried a great deal of risk, but it served to ingratiate first the Chávez and then the Maduro regime with President Putin. One of the cardinal rules of operating within Putin’s system was that a threat must always originate, “from an external or foreign source.” The chavista regimes have operated much the same way, 1 perpetually linking the members of the Venezuelan opposition to the U.S. and accusing them of not being true Venezuelans, but rather professional protesters being funded by foreign interests in order to wage, “economic war”. This determination to blame the U.S. and its allies for all 2 internal problems, of course, limited Russia and Venezuela’s options for international cooperation. In 2004, in the midst of the Ukrainian Orange Revolution, Chávez visited the Kremlin and cemented a close alliance with Moscow. After some expertly crafted anti-U.S. speeches and denunciations of NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe, Chávez had impressed Putin enough to conclude several landmark deals. The entire Venezuelan military was converted to Russian technology, a massive undertaking and a very profitable one for Putin. Russian energy companies were also invited to invest heavily in Venezuela. 3 1 Maxim Trudolyubov. A Guide to Getting Along in Putin s Russia. \u200bThe New York Times\u200b, Apr 16, 2018. 2 \u200bDavid Smilde, The End of Chavismo? \u200bCurrent History\u200b 114 (769)(2015): 50. 3Mark N. Katz, The Putin-Chavez Partnership. \u200bProblems of Post-Communism\u200b 53 (4)(2006): 5. SUMMER 2019 UNDERGRADUATE HISTORY JOURNAL 90 90 University of Massachusetts Undergraduate History Journal, Vol. 3 [2019], Art. 5 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/umuhj/vol3/iss1/5 DOI: https://doi.org/10.7275/1wtq-np46 While the Chávez and Putin regimes were closely aligned in terms of foreign policy, they differed greatly in governing strategies and styles. Where Russian elections were reserved and formulaic affairs designed to emphasize stability and continuity, those organized by Chávez were bombastic, populist affairs aimed at whipping his political base into a frenzy. Where political opposition parties in Russia were tightly controlled in by Putin, the Venezuelan opposition was able to oppose Chávez and Maduro openly and loudly and even to win electoral victories. Despite this difference, the structure and methods of Chavismo actually contributed to the strength of Russia and Venezuela’s current relationship. Chávez’s fourteen years in power laid the groundwork for a crisis, forcing the Venezuelan government to choose either serious concessions to the opposition or a Putinesque campaign of repression if it was to survive. Putin’s domestic policy was calculated to discourage high levels of mass mobilization and political action. In contrast, Chavismo demanded constant mass mobilization for elections 4 that were given a great deal of fanfare and news coverage. These elections, presented as free and fair, were seen as constant referenda on the Chávez presidency. Large-scale poverty-reducing 5 social programs sustained by state oil profits were the foundation of Chavismo and that could be relied upon to produce an outpouring of enthusiastic support come election day. These populist 6 policies were augmented with an extensive state propaganda apparatus that included, “five television channels, dozens of radio stations, electronic networks and websites, and massive propaganda on the streets...” Chávez was a perpetual guest in every Venezuealan home. His 7 4Allen C. Lynch, The Influence of Regime Type on Russian Foreign Policy Toward “the West,” 1992–2015. Communist and Post-Communist Studies\u200b 49(2016): 106-107 5Margarita López Maya. 2014. Venezuela: The Political Crisis of Post-Chavismo. \u200bSocial Justice\u200b (4)(2014): 70. 6Smilde, The End? , 49. 7 Maya, “Post-Chavismo”, 70. SUMMER 2019 UNDERGRADUATE HISTORY JOURNAL 91 91 Schnur: PUTIN EL CAUDILLO Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 2019 message was consistently for them to mobilize in support of his government agenda. Where Putin relied on large scale repression of the opposition, Chávez relied on drowning them out. Despite differences in electoral strategy, in hindsight the system Chávez built now seems designed to fall back on a Putin-style autocracy as soon as the charismatic leadership and/or the vast oil wealth of the chavistas faltered. Shortly after his rise to power, in a move reminiscent of Putin’s cronyism Russia, Chávez took over most independently organized community councils and projects in Venezuela. These groups were integrated into a vast system of state patronage, so that even local fundraisers and environmental projects owed their funding and organization to the president himself. At the national level, Chávez took advantage of majorities in the legislature 8 and friendly members of the judiciary eroded the powers of both branches, making it very difficult for them to enact substantial checks on the president’s power. Chávez also considerably 9 weakened the opposition media by either buying up unfriendly outlets or simply imprisoning opposition journalists, courses of action that would be utilized even more liberally under Maduro. This undermining of the competitive political sphere so deeply entrenched the 10 chavistas and so intensely alienated the opposition, that any peaceful transfer of power would have been extremely difficult to achieve. Difficult though a transfer of power would be, Chávez left Maduro with few options. In addition to leaving him a government structure that could not easily be converted to genuinely competitive politics, Chávez also left him with a brewing crisis that obliterated the widespread popularity of Chavismo. Under Chavez the state oil company \u200bPetróleos de Venezuela, S.A (PDVSA) was the key to maintaining popular support. As long as oil profits sustained social 8 Maya, “Post-Chavismo”, 71. 9 Maya, “Post Chavismo”, 79. 10 Freedom House, Freedom of the Press: Venezuela. , 2015. SUMMER 2019 UNDERGRADUATE HISTORY JOURNAL 92 92 University of Massachusetts Undergraduate History Journal, Vol. 3 [2019], Art. 5 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/umuhj/vol3/iss1/5 DOI: https://doi.org/10.7275/1wtq-np46 programs, Chavismo remained ascendent. Yet despite PDVSA’s central position in Chávez’s grand strategy, he left it in complete disarray after years of mismanagement. After countering a 2005 strike with mass layoffs in middle and upper management positions, Chávez never invested sufficient resources to train replacement managers. The state oil company was also sadd