Featured Researches

Theoretical Economics

Empirical strategy-proofness

We study the plausibility of sub-optimal Nash equilibria of the direct revelation mechanism associated with a strategy-proof social choice function. By using the recently introduced empirical equilibrium analysis (Velez and Brown, 2019, arXiv:1804.07986) we determine that this behavior is plausible only when the social choice function violates a non-bossiness condition and information is not interior. Analysis of the accumulated experimental and empirical evidence on these games supports our findings.

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Theoretical Economics

Endogenous structural transformation in economic development

This paper proposes a framework to model how a country develops its economy by endogenous structural transformation and efficient resource allocation in a market mechanism. To achieve this goal, the paper first summarizes three attributes of economic structures from the literature, namely, structurality, durationality, and transformality, and discuss their implications for methods of economic modeling. Then, with the common knowledge assumption, the paper studies a Ramsey growth model with endogenous structural transformation in which the social planner chooses the optimal industrial structure, recource allocation with the chosen structure, and consumption to maximize the representative household's total utility subject to the resource constraint. The paper next establishes the mathematical underpinning of the static, dynamic, and structural equilibria. The Ramsey growth model and its equilibria are then extended to economies with complicated economic structures consisting of hierarchical production, composite consumption, technology adoption and innovation, infrastructure, and economic and political institutions. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of applications of the proposed methodology to economic development problems in other scenarios.

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Theoretical Economics

Envy-free Relaxations for Goods, Chores, and Mixed Items

In fair division problems, we are given a set S of m items and a set N of n agents with individual preferences, and the goal is to find an allocation of items among agents so that each agent finds the allocation fair. There are several established fairness concepts and envy-freeness is one of the most extensively studied ones. However envy-free allocations do not always exist when items are indivisible and this has motivated relaxations of envy-freeness: envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) are two well-studied relaxations. We consider the problem of finding EF1 and EFX allocations for utility functions that are not necessarily monotone, and propose four possible extensions of different strength to this setting. In particular, we present a polynomial-time algorithm for finding an EF1 allocation for two agents with arbitrary utility functions. An example is given showing that EFX allocations need not exist for two agents with non-monotone, non-additive, identical utility functions. However, when all agents have monotone (not necessarily additive) identical utility functions, we prove that an EFX allocation of chores always exists. As a step toward understanding the general case, we discuss two subclasses of utility functions: Boolean utilities that are {0,+1} -valued functions, and negative Boolean utilities that are {0,−1} -valued functions. For the latter, we give a polynomial time algorithm that finds an EFX allocation when the utility functions are identical.

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Theoretical Economics

Equilibria in a large production economy with an infinite dimensional commodity space and price dependent preferences

We prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium in a production economy with infinitely many commodities and a measure space of agents whose preferences are price dependent. We employ a saturated measure space for the set of agents and apply recent results for an infinite dimensional separable Banach space such as Lyapunov's convexity theorem and an exact Fatou's lemma to obtain the result.

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Theoretical Economics

Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games

We add here another layer to the literature on nonatomic anonymous games started with the 1973 paper by Schmeidler. More specifically, we define a new notion of equilibrium which we call ε -estimated equilibrium and prove its existence for any positive ε . This notion encompasses and brings to nonatomic games recent concepts of equilibrium such as self-confirming, peer-confirming, and Berk--Nash. This augmented scope is our main motivation. At the same time, our approach also resolves some conceptual problems present in Schmeidler (1973), pointed out by Shapley. In that paper\ the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria has been proved for any nonatomic game with a continuum of players, endowed with an atomless countably additive probability. But, requiring Borel measurability of strategy profiles may impose some limitation on players' choices and introduce an exogenous dependence among\ players' actions, which clashes with the nature of noncooperative game theory. Our suggested solution is to consider every subset of players as measurable. This leads to a nontrivial purely finitely additive component which might prevent the existence of equilibria and requires a novel mathematical approach to prove the existence of ε -equilibria.

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Theoretical Economics

Equilibrium Behaviors in Repeated Games

We examine a patient player's behavior when he can build reputations in front of a sequence of myopic opponents. With positive probability, the patient player is a commitment type who plays his Stackelberg action in every period. We characterize the patient player's action frequencies in equilibrium. Our results clarify the extent to which reputations can refine the patient player's behavior and provide new insights to entry deterrence, business transactions, and capital taxation. Our proof makes a methodological contribution by establishing a new concentration inequality.

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Theoretical Economics

Equilibrium Refinement in Finite Evidence Games

Evidence games study situations where a sender persuades a receiver by selectively disclosing hard evidence about an unknown state of the world. Evidence games often have multiple equilibria. Hart et al. (2017) propose to focus on truth-leaning equilibria, i.e., perfect Bayesian equilibria where the sender prefers disclosing truthfully when indifferent, and the receiver takes off-path disclosure at face value. They show that a truth-leaning equilibrium is an equilibrium of a perturbed game where the sender has an infinitesimal reward for truth-telling. We show that, when the receiver's action space is finite, truth-leaning equilibrium may fail to exist, and it is not equivalent to equilibrium of the perturbed game. To restore existence, we introduce a disturbed game with a small uncertainty about the receiver's payoff. A purifiable equilibrium is a truth-leaning equilibrium in an infinitesimally disturbed game. It exists and features a simple characterization. A truth-leaning equilibrium that is also purifiable is an equilibrium of the perturbed game.

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Theoretical Economics

Equilibrium in Production Chains with Multiple Upstream Partners

In this paper, we extend and improve the production chain model introduced by Kikuchi et al. (2018). Utilizing the theory of monotone concave operators, we prove the existence, uniqueness, and global stability of equilibrium price, hence improving their results on production networks with multiple upstream partners. We propose an algorithm for computing the equilibrium price function that is more than ten times faster than successive evaluations of the operator. The model is then generalized to a stochastic setting that offers richer implications for the distribution of firms in a production network.

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Theoretical Economics

Equitable preference relations on infinite utility streams

We propose generalized versions of strong equity and Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. We study the existence and the real valued representation of social welfare relations satisfying these two generalized equity principles. Our results characterize the restrictions on one period utility domains for the equitable social welfare relation (i) to exist; and (ii) to admit real-valued representations.

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Theoretical Economics

Equitable voting rules

May's Theorem (1952), a celebrated result in social choice, provides the foundation for majority rule. May's crucial assumption of symmetry, often thought of as a procedural equity requirement, is violated by many choice procedures that grant voters identical roles. We show that a weakening of May's symmetry assumption allows for a far richer set of rules that still treat voters equally. We show that such rules can have minimal winning coalitions comprising a vanishing fraction of the population, but not less than the square root of the population size. Methodologically, we introduce techniques from group theory and illustrate their usefulness for the analysis of social choice questions.

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