Economics

Aggregating risks from multiple sources can be complex and demanding, and decision makers usually adopt heuristics to simplify the decision process. This paper axiomatizes two such heuristics, narrow bracketing and correlation neglect, by relaxing the standard independence axiom in the expected utility benchmark. Our representation theorem allows for either narrow bracketing, or correlation neglect, or both of them. The flexibility of our framework allows for applications in various setups. For example, we accommodate the experimental evidence in narrow bracketing and risk aversion over small gambles with background risk. In intertemporal choices, we show how our framework unifies three seemingly distinct models in the literature and introduce a new model that can satisfy many desirable normative properties in time preferences simultaneously, including indifference to temporal resolution of uncertainty, dynamic consistency and separation of time and risk preferences. One special class of the model shares the same predictions as Epstein and Zin (1989) in macroeconomics and finance applications, and is immune to the critique in Epstein, Farhi, and Strzalecki (2014).

We introduce a new updating rule, the conditional maximum likelihood rule (CML) for updating ambiguous information. The CML formula replaces the likelihood term in Bayes' rule with the maximal likelihood of the given signal conditional on the state. We show that CML satisfies a new axiom, increased sensitivity after updating, while other updating rules do not. With CML, a decision maker's posterior is unaffected by the order in which independent signals arrive. CML also accommodates recent experimental findings on updating signals of unknown accuracy and has simple predictions on learning with such signals. We show that an information designer can almost achieve her maximal payoff with a suitable ambiguous information structure whenever the agent updates according to CML.

Empirical evidence suggests that the rich have higher propensity to save than do the poor. While this observation may appear to contradict the homotheticity of preferences, we theoretically show that that is not the case. Specifically, we consider an income fluctuation problem with homothetic preferences and general shocks and prove that consumption functions are asymptotically linear, with an exact analytical characterization of asymptotic marginal propensities to consume (MPC). We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the asymptotic MPCs to be zero. We calibrate a model with standard constant relative risk aversion utility and show that zero asymptotic MPCs are empirically plausible, implying that our mechanism has the potential to accommodate a large saving rate of the rich and high wealth inequality (small Pareto exponent) as observed in the data.

We establish that statistical discrimination is possible if and only if it is impossible to uniquely identify the signal structure observed by an employer from a realized empirical distribution of skills. The impossibility of statistical discrimination is shown to be equivalent to the existence of a fair, skill-dependent, remuneration for workers. Finally, we connect the statistical discrimination literature to Bayesian persuasion, establishing that if discrimination is absent, then the optimal signaling problem results in a linear payoff function (as well as a kind of converse).

Black and Cox (1976) claim that the value of junior debt is increasing in asset risk when the firm's value is low. We show, using closed-form solution, that the junior debt's value is hump-shaped. This has interesting implications for the market-discipline role of banks' junior debt.

We propose and study a strategic model of hiding in a network, where the network designer chooses the links and his position in the network facing the seeker who inspects and disrupts the network. We characterize optimal networks for the hider, as well as equilibrium hiding and seeking strategies on these networks. We show that optimal networks are either equivalent to cycles or variants of a core-periphery networks where every node in the periphery is connected to a single node in the core.

The basic concepts of the differential geometry are shortly reviewed and applied to the study of VES production function in the spirit of the works of Vîlcu and collaborators. A similar characterization is given for a more general production function, namely the Kadiyala production function, in the case of developable surfaces.

We consider a symmetric two-player contest, in which the choice set of effort is constrained. We apply a fundamental property of the payoff function to show that, under standard assumptions, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. It is shown that all equilibria are near the unconstrained equilibrium. Perhaps surprisingly, this is not the case when players have different prize evaluations.

Growth theory has rarely considered energy despite its invisible hand in all physical systems. We develop a theoretical framework that places energy transfers at centerstage of growth theory based on two principles: (1) goods are material rearrangements and (2) such rearrangements are done by energy transferred by prime movers (e.g. workers, engines). We derive the implications of these principles for an autarkic agent that maximizes utility subject to an energy budget constraint and maximizes energy surplus to relax such constraint. The solution to these problems shows that growth is driven by positive marginal energy surplus of energy goods (e.g. rice, oil), yet materializes through prime mover accumulation. This perspective brings under one framework several results from previous attempts to insert energy within growth theory, reconciles economics with natural sciences, and provides a basis for a general reinterpretation of economics and growth as the interplay between human desires and thermodynamic processes.

ELECTRE TRI is a set of methods designed to sort alternatives evaluated on several attributes into ordered categories. The original ELECTRE TRI-B method uses one limiting profile per category. A more recent method, ELECTRE TRI-nB, allows one to use several limiting profiles for each category. We investigate the properties of ELECTRE TRI-nB. When the number of limiting profiles used to define each category is not restricted, ELECTRE TRI-nB is easy to characterize axiomatically and is found to be equivalent to several other methods proposed in the literature. We extend this result in various directions.