Quantitative Finance

We develop a model of stable assets, including non-custodial stablecoins backed by cryptocurrencies. Such stablecoins are popular methods for bootstrapping price stability within public blockchain settings. We derive fundamental results about dynamics and liquidity in stablecoin markets, demonstrate that these markets face deleveraging feedback effects that cause illiquidity during crises and exacerbate collateral drawdown, and characterize stable dynamics of the system under particular conditions. The possibility of such `deleveraging spirals' was first predicted in the initial release of our paper in 2019 and later directly observed during the `Black Thursday' crisis in Dai in 2020. From these insights, we suggest design improvements that aim to improve long-term stability. We also introduce new attacks that exploit arbitrage-like opportunities around stablecoin liquidations. Using our model, we demonstrate that these can be profitable. These attacks may induce volatility in the `stable' asset and cause perverse incentives for miners, posing risks to blockchain consensus. A variant of such attacks also later occurred during Black Thursday, taking the form of mempool manipulation to clear Dai liquidation auctions at near zero prices, costing $8m.

We develop a theory of Bayesian price formation in electronic markets. We formulate a stylised model in which market participants update their Bayesian prior on an efficient price with a model-based learning process. We show that exponential intensities for aggressive orders arise naturally in this framework. The resulting theory allows us to derive simple analytic formulas for market dynamics and price impact in the case with Brownian efficient price and informed market takers. In particular we show that for small spreads there is an asymptotic market regime. We illustrate our results with numerical experiments.

Richard Bellman's Principle of Optimality, formulated in 1957, is the heart of dynamic programming, the mathematical discipline which studies the optimal solution of multi-period decision problems. In this paper, we look at the main trading principles of Jesse Livermore, the legendary stock operator whose method was published in 1923, from a Bellman point of view.

The large integration of variable energy resources is expected to shift a large part of the energy exchanges closer to real-time, where more accurate forecasts are available. In this context, the short-term electricity markets and in particular the intraday market are considered a suitable trading floor for these exchanges to occur. A key component for the successful renewable energy sources integration is the usage of energy storage. In this paper, we propose a novel modelling framework for the strategic participation of energy storage in the European continuous intraday market where exchanges occur through a centralized order book. The goal of the storage device operator is the maximization of the profits received over the entire trading horizon, while taking into account the operational constraints of the unit. The sequential decision-making problem of trading in the intraday market is modelled as a Markov Decision Process. An asynchronous distributed version of the fitted Q iteration algorithm is chosen for solving this problem due to its sample efficiency. The large and variable number of the existing orders in the order book motivates the use of high-level actions and an alternative state representation. Historical data are used for the generation of a large number of artificial trajectories in order to address exploration issues during the learning process. The resulting policy is back-tested and compared against a benchmark strategy that is the current industrial standard. Results indicate that the agent converges to a policy that achieves in average higher total revenues than the benchmark strategy.

Motivated by empirical data, we develop a statistical description of the queue dynamics for large tick assets based on a two-dimensional Fokker-Planck (diffusion) equation, that explicitly includes state dependence, i.e. the fact that the drift and diffusion depends on the volume present on both sides of the spread. "Jump" events, corresponding to sudden changes of the best limit price, must also be included as birth-death terms in the Fokker-Planck equation. All quantities involved in the equation can be calibrated using high-frequency data on best quotes. One of our central finding is the the dynamical process is approximately scale invariant, i.e., the only relevant variable is the ratio of the current volume in the queue to its average value. While the latter shows intraday seasonalities and strong variability across stocks and time periods, the dynamics of the rescaled volumes is universal. In terms of rescaled volumes, we found that the drift has a complex two-dimensional structure, which is a sum of a gradient contribution and a rotational contribution, both stable across stocks and time. This drift term is entirely responsible for the dynamical correlations between the ask queue and the bid queue.

We develop a flexible approach to solve a continuous-time, multi-asset/multi-option Kyle-Back model of informed trading under very general assumptions, including on the distribution of the belief about the fundamental, and the noise process. The main insight is to postulate the pricing rule of the market maker at maturity as an optimal transport map. The optimal control of the informed trader reduces to the computation of a conjugate convex function, explicit in some cases, and otherwise easily obtainable using fast numerical algorithms. To illustrate the power of our method, we apply it to a long-standing problem: how are informed investors splitting trades between a spot asset and its options? Our method allows to i) prove the existence of an equilibrium and characterize the informed trader's trading strategy in the spot and the option markets, even for non-Gaussian price priors (e.g., lognormal); ii) show there can be cross-market price impact between the spot market and multiple options even when their noise trading is independent; and iii) compare our pricing results to a simple Black-Scholes model and quantify the price distortion of the option due to strategic trading. In particular, we show that a Black-Scholes implied volatility (IV) smile/smirk can emerge because of the market marker's adaptation to asymmetric information.

We present a generalization of the Simultaneous Long-Short (SLS) trading strategy described in recent control literature wherein we allow for different parameters across the short and long sides of the controller; we refer to this new strategy as Generalized SLS (GSLS). Furthermore, we investigate the conditions under which positive gain can be assured within the GSLS setup for both deterministic stock price evolution and geometric Brownian motion. In contrast to existing literature in this area (which places little emphasis on the practical application of SLS strategies), we suggest optimization procedures for selecting the control parameters based on historical data, and we extensively test these procedures across a large number of real stock price trajectories (495 in total). We find that the implementation of such optimization procedures greatly improves the performance compared with fixing control parameters, and, indeed, the GSLS strategy outperforms the simpler SLS strategy in general.

This paper relaxes the common prior assumption in the public and private information game of Morris and Shin (2000, 2004). For the generalized game, where the agent's prior expectations are heterogenous, it derives a sharp condition for the emergence of unique/multiple equilibria. This condition indicates that unique equilibria are played if player's public disagreement is substantial. If disagreement is small, equilibrium multiplicity depends on the relative precisions of private signals and subjective priors. Extensions to environments with public signals of exogenous and endogenous quality show that prior heterogeneity, unlike heterogeneity in private information, provides a robust anchor for unique equilibria. Finally, irrespective of whether priors are common or not, we show that public signals can ensure equilibrium uniqueness, rather than multiplicity, if they are sufficiently precise.

This paper introduces a high frequency trade execution model to evaluate the economic impact of supervised machine learners. Extending the concept of a confusion matrix, we present a 'trade information matrix' to attribute the expected profit and loss of the high frequency strategy under execution constraints, such as fill probabilities and position dependent trade rules, to correct and incorrect predictions. We apply the trade execution model and trade information matrix to Level II E-mini S&P 500 futures history and demonstrate an estimation approach for measuring the sensitivity of the P&L to the error of a Recurrent Neural Network. Our approach directly evaluates the performance sensitivity of a market making strategy to prediction error and augments traditional market simulation based testing.

We analyze a tractable model of a limit order book on short time scales, where the dynamics are driven by stochastic fluctuations between supply and demand. We establish the existence of a limiting distribution for the highest bid, and for the lowest ask, where the limiting distributions are confined between two thresholds. We make extensive use of fluid limits in order to establish recurrence properties of the model. We use the model to analyze various high-frequency trading strategies, and comment on the Nash equilibria that emerge between high-frequency traders when a market in continuous time is replaced by frequent batch auctions.