A.C.M. Roothaan

Theological Ethics and Moral Value Phenomena: The Experience of Values

The experience of moral values is often side-lined in discussions about moral reasoning, and yet our values define a large part of our moral motives, standards and expectations. Theological Ethics and Moral Value Phenomena explores whether the experience of a meeting point of the immanent and the transcendent, i.e. the moral self and God, can be the source of our values. The book starts by arguing for a greater theological engagement with value ethics, personalism and the phenomenological method by drawing on thinkers such as Max Scheler and William James. It then provides an understanding of the social and religious dimension of the valuing person, demonstrating the importance of the emotional, as well as the cognitive, dimension of value experience. Finally, this value perspective is utilised to engage with current moral issues such as professional ethics, environmental ethics, economical ethics and family ethics. Integrating the concepts of religious experience, moral motivation, and subjective and objective value within a broad framework of Christian theology and philosophy, this is vital reading for any scholar of Theology and Philosophy with an interest in ethics and moral reasoning.This chapter discusses Weil’s criticisms of personalism and of an ethics of rights, given in her essay on Human Personality, and compares them with similar ideas of Levinas and Derrida. All three thinkers aimed to address the moral and spiritual neglect of actual human beings by a universalistic moral philosophy of humanity. A central place will be given in this examination to the Levinasian/Derridian concept of hospitality, which, I propose, could better express Weil’s intent than her concept of attention.

Aren’t We Animals? Deconstructing or Decolonizing the Human – Animal Divide

Ever since the influential Thomas Hobbes, who claimed that ‘natural men’ were ‘like wolves’ to one another, Western philosophy has valued the animal aspects of our humanity negatively, and seen the growth of reason and civilization as the way to overcome them. The relations between different human peoples were understood in a similar vein: the Western, white, man was considered endowed with reason, while the ‘others’ were seen as almost ‘animals’ – almost, as Kant and Hegel saw beneficial effects in colonizing them, and leading them out of their supposed natural state into (Western) history. I will discuss two critical approaches to the double divide, between a) humans and animals and b) ‘reasonable’ and ‘savage’ human beings, that characterizes modern Western thought. One approach seeks to decolonize (Eze, Fanon), and the other to deconstruct (Derrida) the divide. The first criticizes the non-inclusive nature and oppressive effects of the modern idea of ‘humanity’, while the second seeks to ‘undefine’ the animal, thereby undermining the oppressive effects of the divide. To begin with, I will describe the alternative views of human-animal relations in shamanistic cultures, as interpreted by anthropologists (Bamana, Kohn), who aim to escape the white canon of disciplinary philosophy.

A World of Quality. Codes of Conduct, Phenomenology of Feeling and Morality in Scientific Research

The past decades have seen the introduction, in scientific institutions, of codes of conduct that describe good practices of scientific research and clarify which behavior is not to be tolerated. They find their basis in some version of the norms of science formulated by Robert K. Merton in 1942. They tend to have a double effect, on the one hand streamlining procedures and preventing unprofessional behavior, on the other reducing personal responsibility, while externalizing morality in a body of rules. To repair this problem I propose to turn to the so called ‘phenomenology of feeling’, developed by Max Scheler and improved in an important respect by Stephan Strasser. This approach highlights personal responsibility, while understanding the world as a world of quality, to which we connect through ‘value-ception’ – the experiencing of value. It promises ways to reconstruct codes of conduct in such a way that they not only focus on rules for behavior, but also stimulate personal responsibility by taking positive values as the condition for a good working climate in science.

COULD A RELIGIOUS ETHICS EVER BE UNIVERSAL

Through the centuries Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) has been respectively admired for being an early Enlightenment thinker, or criticized for his antireligious views. Being raised in Amsterdam as the son of Portuguese Jewish immigrants, 1 he was expelled from the synagogue as a young man. Since historical facts about his life are scarce, the grounds for this event are still subject to discussion. Although he found his friends among unorthodox Christians, he did not convert to Christianity in any formal way. From his writings, however, we can be sure that, in the years following, he developed the ideal of a universal religion, which should provide the grounds for a peaceful social and individual life. This minimalist religion, expressed in a seven paragraph credo, should tolerate all kinds of personal views of God, while holding high a universal ethics, which should be acceptable to all good men. Two of his former friends, the well-known Danish anatomist Nicolas Stensen and his younger Dutch friend Albert Burgh had moved away from Spinozas tolerant and secularised religious views. Both had converted to Roman Catholicism and felt obliged to try to convert the famous philosopher to their new religious position. Their letters to Spinoza on this topic have been published in the collected letters, together with Spinozas reply to one of them, the letter of Burgh. Elements in this small correspondence can be clarified from Spinozas works, which will be done in this article. Its content is, however, not only of historical interest. The discussion between the converted Catholics and the secularized Jew provide an intriguing mirror for those who reflect on present day discussions on (universal) ethics in an age of religious pluralism. Against Burghs and Stensens claim to have found truth in the

Anna Maria van Schurman’s ‘Reformation’ of Philosophy

Philosophy is a difficult subject to pin down. Most philosophers have occupied themselves not only with pursuing their subject, but also with defining the object and the methods of philosophy — and in this they are by no means always in agreement.