A. Dassen

Networks: structure and action : steering in and steering by policy networks

This thesis explores the opportunities to build a structural policy network model that is rooted in social network theories. By making a distinction between a process of steering in networks, and a process of steering by networks, it addresses the effects of network structures on network dynamics as well as on the production of policy outputs. Steering in policy networks refers to the process of horizontal bargaining over policy positions in which resources are exchanged between individual network actors. Steering by policy networks refers to the policy making processes in which policy networks are utilized as policy instruments. The details of network configuration profoundly influence individual actors’ capacities to influence such bargaining processes and the social structures of policy networks change due to the process of steering in networks. The individual, sequential actions that characterize bargaining over various resources nevertheless do not explain how policy networks produce policy outputs. The study investigates how actor-based models of network dynamics provide a theoretical point of departure for explaining firstly the structural outcomes of steering in networks, and secondly the utility of any potential policy outputs for both government and individual actors. Because of the interdependency between actors in heterogeneous policy networks, outputs require subgroup-level coordination. There is therefore a mismatch between individual and group utility – whilst some individuals will benefit from a sparse network structure in negotiation processes, the optimum system outcome is produced by dense and cohesive social structures. The study elaborates on this paradox and shows the utility of different characteristics of network structures for both individual actors and government, and presents hypotheses on the relations between policy goals, policy positions, network structures, and the utility of policy outputs.

Understanding the Limits to Higher Education Policy Networks

One of the characteristics of the university reform in the last quarter century has been an increasing marketisation of higher education. In response to fears that universities represent classic dominant producers, governments have sought to stimulate efficiency and innovation in the higher education sector with a mix of increasing autonomy and competition for funding. The concept on which this lies is that stimulating competition drives out inefficiency by underperforming institutions. The most successful universities can recruit more students and win more research projects, allowing them to thrive. Conversely, less successful institutions will see their funding drop. They will either have to improve service levels or witness their gradual disappearance. Whilst the empirical value of the efficiency of higher education markets remains to be proven, marketisation is an undeniable landmark of the contemporary policy field.