A. Sinan Cebenoyan

Ownership Structure, Charter Value, and Risk-Taking Behavior for Thrifts

This paper investigates the relationships among manager ownership, charter value, and thrift risk-taking for 1986 to 1995, a decade of significant regulatory change. We hypothesize that during periods of regulatory laxity and low charter values, manager-owned thrifts are likely to engage in unprofitable risk-taking. However, for periods of regulatory efficacy and high charter values, manager-owners are likely to engage in profitable risk-taking. In support of these premises, we find that manager-owned thrifts exhibit unprofitable risk-taking in the mid-1980s, years of regulatory laxity and low charter values, but demonstrate profitable risk-taking in the mid-1990s, a period of more stringent regulations and high charter values.

Firm efficiency and the regulatory closure of S&Ls: An empirical investigation

This paper uses a two-step methodology to examine the relationship between firm inefficiency and the regulatory closure of savings and loans (S&Ls). In the first step, using multiproduct, translog stochastic cost frontiers, the authors estimate inefficiency scores separately for mutual and stock S&Ls operating in the Southwest in 1988. They use the inefficiency scores in second step logit models to identify determinants of regulatory closure. For both mutual and stock S&Ls, the authors find a significant positive relationship between firm inefficiency and regulatory closure. They also find a greater probability of closure for S&Ls in economically depressed states. Copyright 1993 by MIT Press.