Aaron Belkin

Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk

Although coup risk plays an important role in theories of war, revolution, and democratization, scholars have not developed a rigorous conceptualization and valid measure of the concept. We develop a structural understanding of coup risk as distinct from proximate causes of coups as well as coup-proofing strategies that regimes implement to avert coups. Theoretical insights into factors that predispose regimes toward coup vulnerability provide the groundwork for an improved measure based on strength of civil society, legitimacy, and past coups. Cross-national statistical analyses are used to significantly improve on previous coupincidence models and highlight deficiencies of the common approach to measuring coup risk. The structural conceptualization of coup risk enhances understanding of broader civil-military dynamics, in particular the well-known distinction between motives and opportunities for launching coups. This distinction is shown to be insensitive to an important observational equivalence: that coups may be rare in both high-and low-risk cases.

Does Social Cohesion Determine Motivation in Combat? An Old Question with an Old Answer

Based on a new Army War College study of unit cohesion in the Iraq War, Wong et al. argue that successful unit performance is determined by social cohesion (the strength of interpersonal bonds among members) rather than task cohesion (a sense of shared commitment to the unit’s mission). If correct, these conclusions have important implications for scholarship as well as for numerous U.S. military policies such as the Unit Manning System. However, this article disputes their contentions. Wong et al. ignore a large body of empirical research on military and nonmilitary groups showing that social cohesion has no independent impact on performance. They provide no evidence for the representativeness of the interview quotes they cite as evidence for the reliability or validity of their measures. Their methodology fails to meet social science standards for causal inference (e.g., ruling out causal rival factors)

Coup Risk, Counterbalancing, and International Conflict

Contrary to the literature on rallies-around-the-flag, this article argues that, in some circumstances, leaders may use international conflict to promote domestic divisiveness. More specifically, the threat of a military coup generally prompts leaders to divide their militaries (a practice known as counterbalancing), and even to engage in international conflict to ensure that various branches of their own armed forces remain distrustful of one another. Two empirical tests of these claims are offered: a large-N statistical analysis that examines whether coup risk leads to counterbalancing, and whether counterbalanced nations engage in more low-level military conflict (controlling for other causes of conflict); and a case study of Georgia shortly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Both empirical studies support the arguments advanced by the authors. Aaron Belkin is associate professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Evan Schofer is assistant professor of sociology at the University of Minnesota.

Homosexuality and the Israel Defense Forces: Did Lifting the Gay Ban Undermine Military Performance?

In this article we argue that Israels 1993 decision to lift its gay ban did not influence military performance. Then we assess three arguments raised by experts who claim that Israeli experiences are not relevant for determining what would happen if the U.S. Congress and Pentagon lifted the American gay ban. In particular, we assess the arguments that most gay Israeli combat soldiers do not disclose their sexuality to peers, that some receive special treatment, and that cultural differences distinguish the U.S. and Israeli cases. We agree with each argument, but our interpretation of them differs from experts who believe that Israeli military experiences are irrelevant. While no single case study can show decisively what would happen if the U.S. changed its policy, we suggest that the Israeli experience lends some weight to the claim that American military effectiveness would not decline if known homosexuals were allowed to serve.

A Modest Proposal: Privacy as a Flawed Rationale for the Exclusion of Gays and Lesbians from the U.S. Military

A slightly modified version of this study appears in International Security, vol. 27, no. 2, (Fall, 2002), pp. 178-197. International Security is edited at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University. “A Modest Proposal: Privacy as a Flawed Rationale for the Exclusion of Gays and Lesbians from the U.S. Military” by Aaron Belkin* and Melissa Sheridan Embser-Herbert** *Assistant Professor Department of Political Science University of California Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9420 belkin@polsci.ucsb.edu; (805) 893-5664 **Associate Professor Department of Sociology Hamline University Box 162, 1536 Hewitt Ave. St. Paul, MN 55104 embserherbert@gw.hamline.edu; (651) 523-2564