Aaron Hatcher

Normative and Social Influences Affecting Compliance with Fishery Regulations

Economic models of regulatory compliance in fisheries usually assume an instrumental determination of individual behavior in which the decision to comply or to violate depends primarily on the expected monetary costs and benefits. Policy implications tend, as a result, to focus only on deterrence, that is, increasing the expected monetary costs of violation. More complete models of compliance behavior take into account factors such a social influence, moral values, and the perceived legitimacy of regulations and the regulatory authority. The paper describes an investigation into the non-monetary factors affecting compliance with output (quota) restrictions among fishermen in the United Kingdom.

Subsidies for European fishing fleets: the European Community's structural policy for fisheries 1971-1999

This paper outlines the development of the European Communitys structural policy for fisheries since 1971 and looks at the extent to which public funds have been disbursed by the Community in aid to assist both the development and the restructuring of Europes fishing fleets.

On the microeconomics of quota management in fisheries

This paper compares the economic incentives created by transferable and non-transferable quotas in a fishery, in particular the incentives to discard fish of certain species or grades when quotas are enforced at the landing site. With a hypothetical efficient allocation of non-transferable quotas, the incentive structure is essentially the same as under transferable quotas. However, in the absence of the information provided by the quota price, outcomes may not be the same under all conditions. Inefficient allocations of non-transferable quotas will tend to reduce discards due to highgrading but increase discards in multispecies fisheries. The impact of discarding on the quota price in a transferable quota fishery is examined.

A note on relative violation arguments in expected penalty functions for permit noncompliance

Models of firm noncompliance under imperfectly enforced standards and permit regimes normally include a level violation argument in the firms expected penalty function, analogous to the constraint term in a Lagrangian function. This article suggests that a relative violation argument may be more appropriate in many cases and demonstrates how this can change our predictions about firm behaviour under permit regimes.

29th Plenary Meeting Report of the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (Plen-08-03)

The Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries hold its 29 plenary on 3-7 November 2008 in Brussels. The terms of reference included both issues assessments of STECF working group reports and additional requests submitted to the STECF by the Commission. Topics dealt with ranged from fisheries economics to stock review issues. How to obtain EU publications Our priced publications are available from EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu), where you can place an order with the sales agent of your choice. The Publications Office has a worldwide network of sales agents. You can obtain their contact details by sending a fax to (352) 29 29-42758. The mission of the JRC is to provide customer-driven scientific and technical support for the conception, development, implementation and monitoring of EU policies. As a service of the European Commission, the JRC functions as a reference centre of science and technology for the Union. Close to the policy-making process, it serves the common interest of the Member States, while being independent of special interests, whether private or national. A A B B XXXXLC