Aaron Schiff

Open and closed systems of two-sided networks

Abstract Firms with two-sided networks facilitate connections or transactions between two distinct populations of consumers. This paper analyzes the behavior of such firms where there are no intrinsic benefits to consumers other than the network effects, such as employment agencies, real estate agents and videogame platforms. The modelling framework encompasses both matching service and platform business models and allows for subscription or per-transaction pricing. Three different market structures are considered: monopoly, and duopoly with and without compatibility. Comparisons of prices, profits, consumer surplus, and welfare are made between the three regimes. It is shown that duopoly with compatibility is socially preferable to the other regimes, while monopoly is socially preferable to duopoly without compatibility.

The Economics of Open Source Software: A Survey of the Early Literature

This paper reviews the recent literature on the economics of open source software. Two different sets of issues are addressed. The first looks at the incentives of programmers to participate in open source projects. The second considers the business models used by profit-making firms in the open source industry, and the effects on existing closed source firms. Some possible future research directions are also given.

Forecasting New Zealand's real GDP

Recent time series methods are applied to the problem of forecasting New Zealands real GDP. Model selection is conducted within autoregressive (AR) and vector autoregressive (VAR) classes, allowing for evolution in the form of the models over time. The selections are performed using the Schwarz (1978) BIC and the Phillips‐Ploberger (1996) PIC criteria. The forecasts generated by the data‐determined AR models and an international VAR model are found to be competitive with forecasts from fixed format models and forecasts produced by the NZIER. Two illustrations of the methodology in conditional forecasting settings are performed with the VAR models. The first provides conditional predictions of New Zealands real GDP when there is a future recession in the United States. The second gives conditional predictions of New Zealands real GDP under a variety of profiles that allow for tightening in monetary conditions by the Reserve Bank.

Differentiated Standards and Patent Pools

We consider patent pool formation by owners of essential patents for differentiated standards that may be complements or substitutes in use. Pooling improves coordination in terms of royalty setting within a standard but provokes a strategic response from licensors in the competing standard. We characterise the incentives to form and defect from pools within standards and show how pool formation and stability depend on competition between standards. We also examine strategic patent pool formation by consortium standards and show that policies promoting compatibility of standards may increase or decrease welfare depending on the effects on the incentives to form pools.

Intellectual Property Clearinghouses and Investment in R&D

We examine the effects of third-party clearinghouses that license intellectual property on behalf of inventors when downstream uses of IP require licenses to multiple complementary innovations. We consider different simple clearinghouse royalty redistribution schemes, and different innovation environments. We show that clearinghouses generally increase incentives to invest in R&D as they increase efficiency in licensing. However, they may reduce expected profits of inventors who have the unique ability to develop a crucial component. We also show that clearinghouses also may increase or decrease expected welfare, and are more likely to be beneficial when R&D costs are relatively high, and/or the probability of success for inventors is relatively low.

Basic Pricing Principles in Two-Sided Markets: Some Simple Models

This paper illustrates basic pricing issues in two-sided markets using some simple linear models based on Rochet & Tirole (2006) and Armstrong (2006). Monopoly, first-best and second-best prices when a single platform charges either usage fees or membership fees are examined. Some implications for competition policy and regulation of two-sided markets are are also discussed.

Third-Party Clearinghouses and Intellectual Property Licensing

We analyse the basic economic issues relating to third-party intellectual property clearinghouses that act as licensing intermediaries. We identify economic functions of clearinghouses and discuss ways that they can improve efficiency in licensing through centralisation and independence. We then examine clearinghouse strategy and policy with regard to establishing new clearinghouses, clearinghouse pricing and competition between clearinghouses. We also consider effects on incentives to invest in R&D and anti-trust issues.

Differentiated Standards and Patent Pools: Notes and Comments

We consider patent pool formation by owners of essential patents for differentiated standards that may be complements or substitutes in use. Pooling improves coordination in terms of royalty setting within a standard but provokes a strategic response from licensors in the competing standard. We characterise the incentives to form and defect from pools within standards and show how pool formation and stability depend on competition between standards. We also examine strategic patent pool formation by consortium standards and show that policies promoting compatibility of standards may increase or decrease welfare depending on the effects on the incentives to form pools.