Aaron Stalnaker

XUNZI'S MORAL ANALYSIS OF WAR AND SOME OF ITS CONTEMPORARY IMPLICATIONS

Abstract The early Ru or ‘Confucian’ figure Xunzi (‘Master Xun,’ c. 310–c. 220 BCE) gives a sophisticated analysis of war, which he develops on the basis of a larger social and political vision that he works out in considerable detail. This larger vision of human society is thoroughly normative in the sense that Xunzi both argues for the value of his ideal conception of society, and relates these moral arguments for the Confucian Dao or Way to what I take to be fairly hardheaded assessments of the dynamics of international relations in his late Warring States historical context. This combination of moral vision and political realism, combined with his advocacy of strong political authorities that nevertheless rule justly in service to the common good, makes his thought arguably more relevant to the contemporary world of contending nation-states, and a rising, undemocratic China, than any other pre-modern Confucian. Xunzis own context, both intellectual and political/military, led him to argue about war in ways that look distinctive to contemporary Western ethicists – and yet his preferred issues are revealing in themselves and are suggestive in relation to current debates in military ethics. In the first part of this paper I analyze Xunzis argumentative strategy in debate about war, where he chooses to attack his adversaries on the question of how to cultivate true loyalty and obedience in subordinates. The second part briefly explores Xunzis vision of the good society and how it fits into a multi-state world, which undergirds his critique of alternate discourses about war and government. The third examines the Xunzian vision of politics and war as a source for a contemporary Confucian theory of civilian-military relations. The fourth section explores some implications of a Xunzian account for international relations, through a brief comparison with the Kantian notion of ‘perpetual peace’ among liberal states, and whether such ‘zones of peace’ might be conceivable on Confucian grounds. The conclusion reflects on the ambiguous legacy of Xunzis moralism in his analysis of war and statecraft, and the possible light this shines on contemporary Chinese political culture.

Xunzi on Self-Cultivation

Xunzi develops an elaborate, systematic, and powerful account of moral self-cultivation, a long-standing Confucian preoccupation. In this chapter I give a rational reconstruction of this account, covering a number of aspects of his presentation. I first survey the historical and cultural context within which Xunzi developed his views, then outline the overall shape and trajectory of his account of moral development, which is correlated closely with his understanding of human nature and psychology. I then analyze his account of how the crucial practices of study, ritual, and music and dance contribute to the transformation of people from our initial pettiness to states of increasing wisdom and goodness, which Xunzi arranges into an explicit hierarchy of ethical achievement. I close with a consideration of notable strengths and weaknesses of Xunzi’s account, considered from a contemporary perspective.

Mastery, Authority, and Hierarchy in the "Inner Chapters" of the Zhuāngzǐ

Modern Western convictions that freedom, equality, and personal autonomy are all crucial human goods structure both our thinking and our practice in deep and pervasive ways. Even when these values do not thoroughly shape our politics, we tend to judge this as a failing. While there is much to celebrate about these ideals and even their imperfect realization in various spheres of modern life, they also cast long shadows that confuse our self-understanding and muddle our interpretation of alien cultures and the possibilities they present. These shadows also obscure crucial ethical and political issues, notably regarding interpersonal authority and hierarchical social relations.1

Introduction: The Third Wave of Comparative Religious Ethics

We all have ideas about what is right and wrong, good and bad, which guide our actions and judgments of others, and thus, all human action implies morality. “Ethics” is intellectual reflection on this morality. At some level, all scholarship touches on ethical issues since the choice of topic, methods, and presentation of findings all reflect the values of the investigator, even if unintentionally. Likewise, comparison is also part of any research, but sometimes only by default. In our contemporary age of globalism, people recognize that constellations of values vary between individuals and between different cultures; that morality is not fixed even in one context, but rather shifts through time and periodic controversy; and that ethical outlooks are not invented in isolation, but rather through interactions with others or practical challenges raised by new situations. Today, most people’s morality and ethics are shaped, often deeply, by religious commitments.1 “Comparative religious ethics” makes reflection on this diversity (whether cultural, geographic, historical, etc.) central to the selection of an ethical topic, the method of analysis, or the purpose of the study.