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Dive into the research topics where Abraham Othman is active.

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Featured researches published by Abraham Othman.


electronic commerce | 2010

A practical liquidity-sensitive automated market maker

Abraham Othman; David M. Pennock; Daniel M. Reeves; Tuomas Sandholm

Current automated market makers over binary events suffer from two problems that make them impractical. First, they are unable to adapt to liquidity, so trades cause prices to move the same amount in both thick and thin markets. Second, under normal circumstances, the market maker runs at a deficit. In this paper, we construct a market maker that is both sensitive to liquidity and can run at a profit. Our market maker has bounded loss for any initial level of liquidity and, as the initial level of liquidity approaches zero, worst-case loss approaches zero. For any level of initial liquidity we can establish a boundary in market state space such that, if the market terminates within that boundary, the market maker books a profit regardless of the realized outcome. Furthermore, we provide guidance as to how our market maker can be implemented over very large event spaces through a novel cost-function-based sampling method


electronic commerce | 2010

Automated market-making in the large: the gates hillman prediction market

Abraham Othman; Tuomas Sandholm

We designed and built the Gates Hillman Prediction Market (GHPM) to predict the opening day of the Gates and Hillman Centers, the new computer science buildings at Carnegie Mellon University. The market ran for almost a year and attracted 169 active traders who placed almost 40,000 bets with an automated market maker. Ranging over 365 possible opening days, the markets event partition size is the largest ever elicited in any prediction market by an order of magnitude. A market of this size required new advances, including a novel span-based elicitation interface. The results of the GHPM are important for two reasons. First, we uncovered two flaws of current automated market makers: spikiness and liquidity-insensitivity, and we develop the mathematical underpinnings of these flaws. Second, the market provides a valuable corpus of identity-linked trades. We use this data set to explore whether the market reacted to or anticipated official communications, how self-reported trader confidence had little relation to actual performance, and how trade frequencies suggest a power law distribution. Most significantly, the data enabled us to evaluate two competing hypotheses about how markets aggregate information, the Marginal Trader Hypothesis and the Hayek Hypothesis; the data strongly support the former.


Operations Research | 2017

Course Match: A Large-Scale Implementation of Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes for Combinatorial Allocation

Eric Budish; Gérard P. Cachon; Judd B. Kessler; Abraham Othman

Combinatorial allocation involves assigning bundles of items to agents when the use of money is not allowed. Course allocation is one common application of combinatorial allocation, in which the bundles are schedules of courses and the assignees are students. Existing mechanisms used in practice have been shown to have serious flaws, which lead to allocations that are inefficient, unfair, or both. A new mechanism proposed by Budish [2011] is attractive in theory, but has several features that limit its feasibility for practice: reporting complexity, computational complexity, and approximations that can lead to violations of capacity constraints. This paper reports on the design and implementation of a new course allocation mechanism, Course Match, that enhances the Budish [2011] mechanism in various ways to make it suitable for practice. To find allocations, Course Match performs a massive parallel heuristic search that solves billions of Mixed-Integer Programs to output an approximate competitive equilibrium in a fake-money economy for courses. Quantitative summary statistics for two semesters of full-scale use at a large business school (Wharton, which has about 1,700 students and up to 350 courses in each semester) demonstrate that Course Match is both fair and efficient, a finding reinforced by student surveys showing large gains in satisfaction and perceived fairness.


workshop on internet and network economics | 2011

Liquidity-sensitive automated market makers via homogeneous risk measures

Abraham Othman; Tuomas Sandholm

Automated market makers are algorithmic agents that provide liquidity in electronic markets. A recent stream of research in automated market making is the design of liquidity-sensitive automated market makers, which are able to adjust their price response to the level of active interest in the market. In this paper, we introduce homogeneous risk measures, the general class of liquidity-sensitive automated market makers, and show that members of this class are (necessarily and sufficiently) the convex conjugates of compact convex sets in the non-negative orthant. We discuss the relation between features of this convex conjugate set and features of the corresponding automated market maker in detail, and prove that it is the curvature of the convex conjugate set that is responsible for implicitly regularizing the price response of the market maker. We use our insights into the dual space to develop a new family of liquidity-sensitive automated market makers with desirable properties.


electronic commerce | 2014

The complexity of fairness through equilibrium

Abraham Othman; Christos H. Papadimitriou; Aviad Rubinstein

Competitive equilibrium with equal incomes (CEEI) is a well-known fair allocation mechanism [Foley67:Resource, Varian74: Equity, Thomson85:Theories]; however, for indivisible resources a CEEI may not exist. It was shown in Budish [2011] that in the case of indivisible resources there is always an allocation, called A-CEEI, that is approximately fair, approximately truthful, and approximately efficient, for some favorable approximation parameters. This approximation is used in practice to assign business school students to classes. In this paper we show that finding the A-CEEI allocation guaranteed to exist by Budishs theorem is PPAD-complete. We further show that finding an approximate equilibrium with better approximation guarantees is even harder: NP-complete.


auctions market mechanisms and their applications | 2011

Automated Market Makers That Enable New Settings: Extending Constant-Utility Cost Functions

Abraham Othman; Tuomas Sandholm

Automated market makers are algorithmic agents that provide liquidity in electronic markets. We construct two new automated market makers that each solve an open problem of theoretical and practical interest. First, we formulate a market maker that has bounded loss over separable measure spaces. This opens up an exciting new set of domains for prediction markets, including markets on locations and markets where events correspond to the natural numbers. Second, by shifting profits into liquidity, we create a market maker that has bounded loss in addition to a bid/ask spread that gets arbitrarily small with trading volume. This market maker matches important attributes of real human market makers and suggests a path forward for integrating automated market making agents into markets with real money.


Algorithmic Finance | 2012

Inventory-based versus Prior-based Options Trading Agents

Abraham Othman; Tuomas Sandholm

Options are a basic, widely-traded form of financial derivative that offer payouts based on the future price of an underlying asset. The finance literature gives us option-trading algorithms that take into consideration information about how prices move over time but do not explicitly involve the trades the agent made in the past. In contrast, the prediction market literature gives us automated market-making agents (like the popular LMSR) that are event-independent and price trades based only on the inventories the agent holds. We simulate the performance of five trading agents inspired by these literatures on a large database of recent historical option prices. We find that a combination of the two approaches produced the best results in our experiments: a trading agent that keeps track of previously-made trades combined with a good prior distribution on how prices move over time. The experimental success of this synthesized trader has implications for agent design in both financial and prediction markets.


adaptive agents and multi agents systems | 2010

Finding approximate competitive equilibria: efficient and fair course allocation

Abraham Othman; Tuomas Sandholm; Eric Budish


adaptive agents and multi agents systems | 2008

Zero-intelligence agents in prediction markets

Abraham Othman


adaptive agents and multi agents systems | 2010

When do markets with simple agents fail

Abraham Othman; Tuomas Sandholm

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Tuomas Sandholm

Carnegie Mellon University

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Gérard P. Cachon

University of Pennsylvania

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Judd B. Kessler

University of Pennsylvania

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