Adam J. Newmark

Collective Action and the Mobilization of Institutions

Bias in the composition of interest communities is often explained by reference to variations in the collective action constraint facing voluntary and nonvoluntary organizations. But with the exception of literature on PAC formation, studies of direct institutional mobilization are rare. More often than not, their mobilization advantages vis-à-vis problems of collective action are simply assumed. This paper fills this gap by testing the collective action hypothesis on direct institutional mobilization. We argue that the PAC studies are flawed as tests of this hypothesis; they study the wrong mode of political activity and use selective samples and limited research designs. We develop a new test using state data on seven types of institutions to solve these problems. We also compare the collective action problem facing institutions to the related problems facing voluntary organizations. We find strong evidence of collective action problems in institutional mobilization, problems that make interest populations of nonvoluntary and voluntary organizations appear far more similar than commonly thought.

Measuring State Legislative Lobbying Regulation, 1990–2003

Since 1990, the American states have adopted a variety of reforms to regulate lobbying in an attempt to address a host of ethical issues. Such regulation can have important impacts on a variety of aspects of the legislative process because it typically impacts the relationships between legislators and lobbyists. How does such lobbying regulation vary across the states and over time? I have developed a measure of state lobbying regulation from 1990–2003. This measure validly captures the laws that limit relationships between lobbyists and legislators and, as such, can be used to help assess a variety of hypotheses about the legislative process.

Mayflies and Old Bulls: Organization Persistence in State Interest Communities

Many conventional accounts of lobbying communities emphasize towering differences in political influence between for-profit and not-for-profit and public organizations and between institutions and membership groups or associations. A central cause of these differences in influence is said to be differences in the persistence of these types of groups in a lobbying system. We test this hypothesis by examining the short-term turnover of organized interests in state interest communities in the 1990s. While we find evidence of substantial year-to-year turnover in lobby registrations, we find little support for the conventional wisdom about the distribution of persistence among types of organizations. Contrary to expectations, institutions are markedly less persistent than membership groups and associations, and for-profit interests are no more persistent, on average, than not-for-profit interests.

A Dynamic Model of U.S. Senator Approval, 1981–2000

Using survey data in the states from 1981 to 2000, we explore the nature of public sentiment toward members of the U.S. Senate, compare aggregate senator approval to congressional approval, and examine the impact of several factors that may influence approval of both senators and their legislative institution. We hypothesize that presidential approval, partisanship, consumer expectations, inter-branch discord, national scandals, and rally-around-the-flag events will influence both senator and congressional approval. We find evidence that supports the conventional argument that constituents “love” their senators but “hate” Congress. Senators appear to be relatively insulated from factors that sway presidential and congressional approval.

When Sex Doesn't Sell - Political Scandals, Culture, and Media Coverage in the States

The determinants of media coverage of political scandals are examined through a content analysis of AP Wire stories in ten states from 1998 to 2005. Tests of the conventional explanations of the amount of media coverage demonstrate that political culture, institutional factors, and the prominence of the officials involved matter, but find only mixed evidence that scandal severity is an important factor. Contrary to assumptions, sexual scandals do not generate more media coverage than other types of exposés.