Adam L. Alter

Uniting the Tribes of Fluency to Form a Metacognitive Nation

Processing fluency, or the subjective experience of ease with which people process information, reliably influences people’s judgments across a broad range of social dimensions. Experimenters have manipulated processing fluency using a vast array of techniques, which, despite their diversity, produce remarkably similar judgmental consequences. For example, people similarly judge stimuli that are semantically primed (conceptual fluency), visually clear (perceptual fluency), and phonologically simple (linguistic fluency) as more true than their less fluent counterparts. The authors offer the first comprehensive review of such mechanisms and their implications for judgment and decision making. Because every cognition falls along a continuum from effortless to demanding and generates a corresponding fluency experience, the authors argue that fluency is a ubiquitous metacognitive cue in reasoning and social judgment.

Overcoming intuition: metacognitive difficulty activates analytic reasoning.

Humans appear to reason using two processing styles: System 1 processes that are quick, intuitive, and effortless and System 2 processes that are slow, analytical, and deliberate that occasionally correct the output of System 1. Four experiments suggest that System 2 processes are activated by metacognitive experiences of difficulty or disfluency during the process of reasoning. Incidental experiences of difficulty or disfluency--receiving information in a degraded font (Experiments 1 and 4), in difficult-to-read lettering (Experiment 2), or while furrowing ones brow (Experiment 3)--reduced the impact of heuristics and defaults in judgment (Experiments 1 and 3), reduced reliance on peripheral cues in persuasion (Experiment 2), and improved syllogistic reasoning (Experiment 4). Metacognitive experiences of difficulty or disfluency appear to serve as an alarm that activates analytic forms of reasoning that assess and sometimes correct the output of more intuitive forms of reasoning.

Missing the Trees for the Forest: A Construal Level Account of the Illusion of Explanatory Depth

An illusion of explanatory depth (IOED) occurs when people believe they understand a concept more deeply than they actually do. To date, IOEDs have been identified only in mechanical and natural domains, occluding why they occur and suggesting that their implications are quite limited. Six studies illustrated that IOEDs occur because people adopt an inappropriately abstract construal style when they assess how well they understand concrete concepts. As this mechanism predicts, participants who naturally adopted concrete construal styles (Study 1) or were induced to adopt a concrete construal style (Studies 2-4 and 6), experienced diminished IOEDs. Two additional studies documented a novel IOED in the social psychological domain of electoral voting (Studies 5 and 6), demonstrating the generality of the construal mechanism, the authors also extended the presumed boundary conditions of the effect beyond mechanical and natural domains. These findings suggest a novel factor that might contribute to such diverse social-cognitive shortcomings as stereotyping, egocentrism, and the planning fallacy, where people adopt abstract representations of concepts that should be represented concretely.

Cultural Sharing in a Global Village: Evidence for Extracultural Cognition in European Americans

The authors examined the effects of exposure to foreign cultural environments and symbols on decision making among European Americans. Although European Americans predicted change less frequently than East Asians did (Pilot Study A), European Americans anticipated greater change when primed with East Asian culturally-laden locations (Pilot Study B and Study 1) and the East Asian yin-yang symbol (Studies 2-7). These effects held in the domains of stock prediction and weather forecasting and were stronger the more familiar European Americans were with the cultural primes, and the longer they had spent overseas. Together, these findings suggest that familiar culturally-laden cues sometimes prime people within one cultural milieu to make so-called extracultural judgments.

Easy on the mind, easy on the wallet: the roles of familiarity and processing fluency in valuation judgments.

Although people routinely estimate the value of items in their environment, from goods and services to natural resources and lost earnings following an accident, the processes that underlie human valuation estimates are not well understood. We show that people use familiarity and fluency—the ease with which they process information—to determine an item’s value. In three experiments, participants believed that familiar forms of currency (e.g., a familiar

Financial Deprivation Prompts Consumers to Seek Scarce Goods

1 bill) had greater purchasing power than their unfamiliar counterparts (e.g., a rare and unfamiliar coin). Mechanistic analyses showed a positive correlation between participants’ familiarity with the unfamiliar currency and their estimates of its value. We conclude by discussing the theoretical and practical implications of our findings for researchers, marketing experts, and policymakers alike.

Suppressing Secrecy Through Metacognitive Ease Cognitive Fluency Encourages Self-Disclosure

Consumers assess their well-being subjectively, largely by comparing the present state of their lives to the state of comparable others and to their own state earlier in time. The authors suggest that consumers similarly assess their financial well-being, and when these evaluations highlight a deficit in their financial position, they pursue strategies that mitigate the associated sense of financial deprivation. Specifically, consumers counteract the relative deficit in their financial resources by acquiring goods that are consequently unavailable to other consumers in their environment. The results from five studies suggest that the inferiority and unpleasant affect associated with financial deprivation motivates consumers to attend to, choose, and consume scarce goods rather than comparable abundant goods. These effects diminish when scarce goods are limited because other people have already obtained them and when consumers attribute their unpleasant feelings to a source unrelated to financial deprivation.

The Exception Is the Rule: Underestimating and Overspending on Exceptional Expenses

Understanding when people reveal unfavorable information about themselves is both practically and theoretically important. Existing research suggests that people tend not to adopt stable disclosure strategies, and consequently disclose too much information in some situations (e.g., embarrassing personal information on Face-book) and too little in other situations (e.g., risky sexual behavior to a physician during diagnosis of a possible sexually transmitted disease). We sought to identify a domain-general cue that predicts self-disclosure patterns. We found that metacognitive ease, or fluency, promoted greater disclosure, both in tightly controlled lab studies (Studies 1a, 1b, and 3) and in an ecologically valid on-line field study (Study 4). Disfluency tended to prime thoughts and emotions associated with risk, which might be one reason why people who experience disfluency are less comfortable with self-disclosure (Studies 2 and 3). We conclude by discussing the implications of these results for theory and clinical practice.

The Benefits of Cognitive Disfluency

Purchases fall along a continuum from ordinary (common or frequent) to exceptional (unusual or infrequent), with many of the largest expenses (e.g., electronics, celebrations) being the most exceptional. Across seven studies, we show that, while people are fairly adept at budgeting and predicting how much they will spend on ordinary items, they both underestimate their spending on exceptional purchases overall and overspend on each individual purchase. Based on the principles of mental accounting and choice bracketing, we show that this discrepancy arises in part because consumers categorize exceptional expenses too narrowly, construing each as a unique occurrence and consequently overspending across a series of discretely exceptional expenses. We conclude by proposing an intervention that diminishes this tendency by helping consumers consider their spending on exceptional items as part of a larger set of purchases.

Easy on the mind, easy on the wrongdoer: Discrepantly fluent violations are deemed less morally wrong

People process new information along a continuum, from very fluently (with great ease) to very disfluently (with great difficulty). Researchers have long recognized that people prefer fluently processed stimuli across a broad range of dimensions. A more recent stream of research suggests that disfluency sometimes produces superior outcomes. In this review, I suggest that disfluency prompts people to process information more carefully, deeply, and abstractly, and mitigates the social problems of overdisclosure and reflexive xenophobia. I conclude by raising several remaining questions that warrant empirical attention.