Adam Pautz

CAN THE PHYSICALIST EXPLAIN COLOUR STRUCTURE IN TERMS OF COLOUR EXPERIENCE? 1

Physicalism about colour is the thesis that colours are identical with response-independent, physical properties of objects. I endorse the Argument from Structure against Physicalism about colour. The argument states that Physicalism cannot accommodate certain obvious facts about colour structure: for instance, that red is a unitary colour while purple is a binary colour, and that blue resembles purple more than green. I provide a detailed formulation of the argument. According to the most popular response to the argument, the Physicalist can accommodate colour structure by explaining it in terms of colour experience. I argue that this response fails. Along the way, I examine other interesting issues in the philosophy of colour and colour perception, for instance the relational structure of colour experience and the description theory of how colour names refer.

The Real Trouble with Phenomenal Externalism: New Empirical Evidence for a Brain-Based Theory of Consciousness

The traditional view of the sensible qualities locates them in the head. But within philosophy there has recently been a kind of externalist revolution. While most scientists would still locate the sensible qualities in the head, many philosophers now claim that sensible qualities are really “out there” in the mind-independent physical world and that the function of the brain is just to reveal them to us. In favorable conditions sensory character is determined simply by what mind-independent states you are directly conscious of. The result is a kind of phenomenal externalism. Examples include externalist intentionalism, naive realism, and active externalism. The stakes are high, because many think that phenomenal externalism represents our best shot at naturalizing consciousness and its intentionality.

Ignoring the Real Problems for Phenomenal Externalism: A Reply to Hilbert and Klein

I disagree with those who think phenomenal externalism can be refuted very easily on the basis of controversial intuitions about brains in vats (Horgan, Tienson and Graham), inverted spectrum (Shoemaker), actual cases of perceptual variation (Block), and so on. Both sides of the debate have missed the best argument against phenomenal externalism. The real trouble with phenomenal externalism is that it goes against decades of research in psychophysics and neuroscience. This research supports a brain-based theory of phenomenal consciousness.