Adam Przeworski

Democracy, Accountability, and Representation: Democracy, Elections, and Accountability for Economic Outcomes

Our purpose is to examine the empirical validity of two propositions: that democracy is a political regime distinguished by the accountability of rulers to the ruled, and that elections are the mechanism through which this accountability is enforced. These propositions are obviously related: the first follows from the second one by the definition of democracy as a regime in which rulers are selected by elections. Hence, the structure of the argument we intend to examine is that (1) democracy is a system that enforces accountability (empirical hypothesis), because (2) democracy is a regime in which rulers are chosen by elections (definition), and (3) accountability is enforced by elections (empirical hypothesis). If all of this appears pedantic, hold on. We begin by spelling out our criteria for classifying political regimes, distinguishing different types of democracy and dictatorship, and providing some background information about their incidence. After we analyze statistically the impact of economic conditions on the survival of heads of governments, we study how rulers are selected under different forms of democracy and focus on the role of elections as a mechanism of accountability. A brief conclusion, mainly a list of doubts, closes the chapter. Political Regimes We classify as democracies regimes that during a particular year simultaneously satisfy four criteria: (1) the chief executive is elected (directly or indirectly), (2) the legislature is elected, (3) more than one party competes in elections, (4) incumbent parties have in the past or will have in the future lost an election and yielded office.

Democracy and Development: Economic Development and Political Regimes

Introduction Any casual glance at the world will show that poor countries tend to have authoritarian regimes, and wealthy countries democratic ones. The question is why. What are the conditions that determine whether democracy or dictatorship prevails? What causes political regimes to rise, endure, and fall? Can their transformations be explained generally, or are they caused by circumstances idiosyncratic to each country or period? Are they driven by economic development or by other factors, such as the preceding political history, cultural traditions, political institutions, or the international political climate? We begin with the observation that the incidence of democracy is undoubtedly related to the level of economic development. Having established the central importance of development, we distinguish two causal mechanisms that may generate this relationship, asking whether democracies are more likely to emerge as countries develop economically under dictatorships or, having emerged for reasons other than economic development, are only more likely to survive in countries that are already developed. This analysis is extended first to the impact of economic performance and then to a panoply of social and political factors. A separate section is devoted to the impacts of different types of democratic institutions. A summary closes the chapter. The statistical models on which the analysis is based are presented in the appendixes. Development and Democracy First advanced in 1959, S. M. Lipsets observation that democracy is related to economic development has generated the largest body of research on any topic in comparative politics.

Democracy and Development: Democracies and Dictatorships

Introduction To study systematically the origins and the consequences of political regimes, we need first to determine what regime each country has had during each period of its history. This is a complicated and irredeemably controversial undertaking. Although “democracy” and “dictatorship” are concepts of everyday usage, the intuitions we associate with them are not always sufficient to determine that a particular country operated according to one or the other at a given time. Thus we must formalize these concepts in terms of rules that can be decisively and reliably applied to the observable aspects of national histories. And once we have such rules, we must apply them. Any such procedure necessitates going back and forth between conceptual analysis and historical observation. Closure is difficult to reach: In some cases, history simply has not generated the information called for by the rules, and we must accept the fact that there will be systematic errors. Other cases are so idiosyncratic that we must accept the fact that they have to be treated as random errors. Nevertheless, although no classification can be free of errors, the encouraging lesson is that independent endeavors by different researchers have led to very similar results. Although several classifications of regimes, covering different periods and sets of countries, are now available, they can, in our view, be improved by (1) a better grounding in political theory, (2) exclusive reliance on observables, rather than on subjective judgments, (3) an explicit distinction between systematic and random errors, and (4) more extensive coverage.

Democracy and Development: Political Instability and Economic Growth

Introduction Not everyone will be surprised to learn that political regimes have no effect on average rates of economic growth. One generally held view, made influential by Huntington (1968), is that what matters for economic development is political stability, rather than the particular political institutions. Any system of political institutions promotes development as long as it maintains political order. The danger is “political instability.” We put “instability” in quotation marks because the concept is congenitally muddled. The functionalist sociology that dominated thinking about development during most of the post-war era was constitutionally incapable of conceptualizing social change in other than vaguely evolutionary terms. Under the influence of Parsons (1951), its theoretical program was to search for conditions of the “equilibrium,” conceptualized in a sui generis way as “functional balance.” Anything that disturbed this balance, any abrupt change, was seen as a “breakdown,” a limiting category. As such, it could not be conceptualized any further. The conclusion was that things are stable when they do not change: “We may say that the political system is stable when the impact on the system and the environment are neutralized to the extent of keeping them from altering … the structure of the political system” (Ake 1967: 100–1). When combined with an anti-communist ideology, the “structural-functional approach” turned “instability” into the central peril facing the “new nations.” Instability became a specter, a harbinger of revolution.

Democracy and Development: Author Index

Introduction 1. Democracies and dictatorships 2. Dynamic of political regimes 3. Political regimes and economic growth 4. Political instability and economic growth 5. Political regimes and population Conclusion.

Democracy and Development: List of Tables and Figures

Introduction 1. Democracies and dictatorships 2. Dynamic of political regimes 3. Political regimes and economic growth 4. Political instability and economic growth 5. Political regimes and population Conclusion.