Adam R. Brown

Twitter: The Electoral Connection?

The rapid rise of Twitter and other social media tools has enticed many members of Congress to personally use these services. Such waves of technological adoption are comparatively rare in Congressional history, leaving us with little knowledge about why some members of Congress adopt new technologies while others do not. We find that Twitter adoption and use are relatively difficult to predict. Members are more likely to use Twitter if they belong to the minority party, if their party leaders urge them to, if they are young, or if they serve in the Senate. Surprisingly, we find that electoral vulnerability has little or no effect on Twitter adoption or use.The rapid rise of Twitter and other social media tools has enticed many members of Congress to personally use these services. Such waves of technological adoption are comparatively rare in Congressional history, leaving us with little knowledge about why some members of Congress adopt new technologies while others do not. We find that Twitter adoption and use are relatively difficult to predict. Members are more likely to use Twitter if they belong to the minority party, if their party leaders urge them to, if they are young, or if they serve in the Senate. Surprisingly, we find that electoral vulnerability has little or no effect on Twitter adoption or use.

Wikipedia as a Data Source for Political Scientists: Accuracy and Completeness of Coverage

In only 10 years, Wikipedia has risen from obscurity to become the dominant information source for an entire generation. However, any visitor can edit any page on Wikipedia, which hardly fosters confidence in its accuracy. In this article, I review thousands of Wikipedia articles about candidates, elections, and officeholders to assess both the accuracy and the thoroughness of Wikipedias coverage. I find that Wikipedia is almost always accurate when a relevant article exists, but errors of omission are extremely frequent. These errors of omission follow a predictable pattern. Wikipedias political coverage is often very good for recent or prominent topics but is lacking on older or more obscure topics.

Are Governors Responsible for the State Economy? Partisanship, Blame, and Divided Federalism

In the United States, voters directly elect dozens of politicians: presidents, governors, legislators, mayors, and so on. How do voters decide which politician to blame for which policy outcomes? Previous research on gubernatorial approval has suggested that voters divide policy blame between governors and the president based on each office’s “functional responsibilities”—requiring that responsibilities are clear cut, which is seldom true. Using data from four surveys, I show that voters actually divide responsibility for economic conditions in a partisan manner, preferring to blame officials from the opposing party when problems arise.

Party, Performance, and Strategic Politicians: The Dynamics of Elections for Senator and Governor in 2006:

In this article, we analyze a unique set of state-level monthly survey data covering the eighteen months preceding the 2006 election to estimate (1) the relative effects of national and local conditions on the strength of challenges to incumbent senators and governors and (2) the effects of these challenges on incumbent popularity and, ultimately, vote shares. The analysis confirms several of the basic components of the theory that the strategic behavior of candidates and campaign contributors amplifies the effects of local and national conditions on election results, thereby enhancing electoral accountability. But it also uncovers a striking difference between the two offices. Even taking the strongly pro-Democratic national climate into account, the election context had a strong tendency to reduce the approval ratings of Senators, while it had an equally strong tendency to increase the approval ratings of governors. We speculate as to what might account for this difference.

The Item Veto’s Sting

Despite lofty expectations from the item veto’s proponents (and fears from its opponents), formal models have suggested that the item veto is unlikely to have much effect beyond what a full veto could render. However, I show that different findings obtain when item vetoes are appreciated more fully as a dimensionality-reducing institution. I begin by developing a package veto model in a generalized multidimensional space. I then show how introducing the item veto changes the outcome by forcing veto bargaining into what is essentially a unidimensional space. As a result, executives with an item veto or other dimensionality-reducing institution (such as a single-subject rule) can be far more powerful in legislative bargaining than executives who lack these tools, other things being equal. I use simulations to demonstrate the model’s main implications.

Losing to nobody? Nevada's “none of these candidates” ballot reform

Abstract Since 1975, Nevada voters have had the option of voting for “none of these candidates” in all statewide elections—a reform that one-third of the American states have since considered copying. It remains unclear, however, what effects this reform has had. By testing several arguments made by proponents and opponents of this reform, I find, first, that voters who actually choose “none of these” are motivated by a mixture of ignorance and protest; second, that most voters who choose “none” would probably have left parts of their ballot blank in the absence of the “none” option; and third, that “none” does not drain votes from third-party candidates, as some have feared.

The Role of Constitutional Features in Judicial Review

American state constitutions vary tremendously in their length, amendment rate, and age. These three variables—especially the first two—strongly influence the rate at which state supreme courts strike down state actions for violating the state constitution. Longer, more detailed constitutions reduce policy flexibility, increasing judicial invalidations; rarely updated constitutions may fail to address modern concerns, increasing invalidations; and recently adopted constitutions may contain fragile logrolls and similar shortcomings, also increasing invalidations. These findings add new considerations to a rich literature on judicial review in state supreme courts.

The challenge of local party brand differentiation

Abstract In the USA, the two major parties put great effort into defining their national brands by publishing platforms, engaging social media, and so on. Given the immense regional differences in American politics and culture, however, these national brands are unsurprisingly more popular in some places than others. Local Republican and Democratic parties therefore have incentives to develop their own local brands, distinct from the national party’s. The best known case of local brand differentiation occurred among Southern Democrats in the late 20th century. As this research shows, however, local party brand differentiation efforts continue today, and under predictable circumstances: Local parties are more likely to pursue brand differentiation efforts the less popular they are locally, assuming they can muster the resources to do so. Unfortunately for local party leaders, though, the incentive to pursue a local brand differentiation strategy rises even as the ability to do so falls.