Adam Shriver

Consciousness might matter very much

Peter Carruthers argues that phenomenal consciousness might not matter very much either for the purpose of determining which nonhuman animals are appropriate objects of moral sympathy, or for the purpose of explaining for the similarities in behavior of humans and nonhumans. Carruthers bases these claims on his version of a dispositionalist higher-order thought (DHOT) theory of consciousness which allows that much of human behavior is the result of first-order beliefs that need not be conscious, and that prima facie judgments about the importance of consciousness are due to confabulation. We argue briefly against his claim that ‘the moral landscape can remain unchanged’ even if all or nearly all nonhuman animals are taken to be incapable of conscious experience. We then show how a first-order representational (FOR) theory of consciousness might be defended against Carruthers’ criticisms. Finally, we argue that Carruthers’ appeal to confabulation undercuts his own arguments for an evolutionary explanation for consciousness, posing a greater epiphenomenalist threat to his DHOT theory than he concedes.

Broadening the focus.

Over the past dozen or so years neuroethics has become a rich and dynamic field that has brought together individuals from a variety of disciplines and interests to consider issues that lie at the intersection of ethics and neuroscience. During this period there has been a significant amount of important empirical and philosophical work on a range of topics at this intersection; however, there has been comparatively little work on this intersection as it applies to nonhuman animals. In fact, it is fair to say that neuroethics has had a distinct and almost exclusive “humanistic focus.” Our hope with this special section is to broaden this focus and to provoke and encourage discussion of nonhuman animals within neuroethics. There are a number of explanations for neuroethics’ humanistic focus. Disciplines Animal Studies | Bioethics and Medical Ethics | Neuroscience and Neurobiology | Neurosciences Comments Special Section: Neuroethics and Animals This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/neuroethics_pubs/105 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics (2014), 23 , 124–128 .

Environmental Neuroethics: Bridging Environmental Ethics and Mental Health

ISSN: 1526-5161 (Print) 1536-0075 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uajb20 Environmental Neuroethics: Bridging Environmental Ethics and Mental Health Adam J. Shriver, Laura Y. Cabrera & Judy Illes To cite this article: Adam J. Shriver, Laura Y. Cabrera & Judy Illes (2017) Environmental Neuroethics: Bridging Environmental Ethics and Mental Health, The American Journal of Bioethics, 17:9, 26-27, DOI: 10.1080/15265161.2017.1353172 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2017.1353172

Would the elimination of the capacity to suffer solve ethical dilemmas in experimental animal research

The use of genetic engineering to enhance the welfare of laboratory animals can reduce the amount of suffering in current neuroscience research paradigms. In particular, for some forms of basic research, we can use welfare-enhanced animals to reduce harms to animals without sacrificing any of the scientific validity. In another group of experiments, we can use welfare-enhanced animals to dramatically reduce the number of unprotected animals enduring aversive procedures. Many of the objections to using welfare-enhanced animals for food production do not apply to their use in research, since genetic knockout techniques are already used routinely in research for human ends and since there is no risk for human health. Furthermore, examples of recent knockout experiments suggest that we already have, or are very close to having, the capacity to reduce suffering in laboratories via genetic engineering. If we are truly committed to balancing the advancement of science with the welfare of animals, this option should be further explored.

Cognition Doesn't Only Modulate Pain Perception; It's a Central Component of It

for pharmaceutical companies to manufacture pills with physical characteristics that may influence the cognitive modulation of pain? In light of the current opioid overdose epidemic and the challenges of treating acute and chronic pain, there is an ethical imperative to explore safe, effective ways to improve pain management therapies. In this target article, the author reconsiders the use of placebos but fails to provide sufficient evidence to overturn the current consensus that the use of placebos is unethical. Placebos may produce a physiologic effect, but this effect is host driven and does not change the biochemical properties of the inert placebo. This failure does not mean that cognitive modulation of pain does not have a role in clinical medicine. The cognitive modulation of pain as an adjunctive therapy in pain management is a timely topic for further ethical discussion. REFERENCES