Adi Ayal

Science, Politics and Transnational Regulation: Regulatory Scientific Institutions and the Dilemmas of Hybrid Authority

The main objective of this article is to develop a better understanding of the structure of transnational regulatory scientific institutions (RSIs). We argue that the hybrid political-legal-epistemic nature of RSIs creates a continual tension between their hierarchical and policy-driven structure and the paradigms of objectivity, parallelism and non-centralism that characterize science. The article examines the way in which RSIs cope with the challenge of maintaining their epistemic/political authority against the tensions generated by their hybrid structure. The article focuses on three institutions: the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection (ICNIRP), and the International Competition Network (ICN) and examines how this challenge manifests itself in the context of these three bodies. The article links the discussion of hybrid authority with the problem of scientific uncertainty. It concludes with a discussion of the optimal design of RSIs.

Voluntary Network Effects

The standard view of network effects and their legal implications relies on models where they are exogenously determined, an unavoidable attribute of the product in question. Here we question that assumption. Two methods of voluntary creation of network effects are studied - technological add-ons and pricing tactics. A firm can introduce one or both as a strategic decision to influence market structure - potentially shifting it from a relatively competitive environment, to monopoly. Models for each are presented, and public policy implications discussed.