Adrianna C. Jenkins

Medial prefrontal cortex subserves diverse forms of self-reflection

The ability to think about oneself—to self-reflect—is one of the defining features of the human mind. Recent research has suggested that this ability may be subserved by a particular brain region: the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC). However, although humans can contemplate a variety of different aspects of themselves, including their stable personality traits, current feelings, and physical attributes, no research has directly examined the extent to which these different forms of self-reflection are subserved by common mechanisms. To address this question, participants were scanned using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while making judgments about their own personality traits, current mental states, and physical attributes as well as those of another person. Whereas some brain regions responded preferentially during only one form of self-reflection, a robust region of MPFC was engaged preferentially during self-reflection across all three types of judgment. These results suggest that—although dissociable—diverse forms of self-referential thought draw on a shared cognitive process subserved by MPFC.

Mentalizing under Uncertainty: Dissociated Neural Responses to Ambiguous and Unambiguous Mental State Inferences

The ability to read the minds of others (i.e., to mentalize) requires that perceivers understand a wide range of different kinds of mental states, including not only others’ beliefs and knowledge but also their feelings, desires, and preferences. Moreover, although such inferences may occasionally rely on observable features of a situation, perceivers more typically mentalize under conditions of “uncertainty,” in which they must generate plausible hypotheses about a targets mental state from ambiguous or otherwise underspecified information. Here, we use functional neuroimaging to dissociate the neural bases of these 2 distinct social–cognitive challenges: 1) mentalizing about different types of mental states (beliefs vs. preferences) and 2) mentalizing under conditions of varying ambiguity. Although these 2 aspects of mentalizing have typically been confounded in earlier research, we observed a double dissociation between the brain regions sensitive to type of mental state and ambiguity. Whereas ventral and dorsal aspects of medial prefrontal cortex responded more during ambiguous than unambiguous inferences regardless of the type of mental state, the right temporoparietal junction was sensitive to the distinction between beliefs and preferences irrespective of certainty. These results underscore the emerging consensus that, rather than comprising a single mental operation, social cognition makes flexible use of different processes as a function of the particular demands of the social context.

Taking Another Person's Perspective Increases Self-Referential Neural Processing

The ability to adopt the perspective of another person has been identified as a critical component of social functioning that predicts level of empathic concern for other individuals (Davis, 1983) and level of category-based responding toward out-groups (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). One explanation for these effects holds that in taking another person’s perspective, one comes to treat that person as more ‘‘selflike’’; indeed, the extent to which perceivers describe another person as sharing their own personality attributes increases after they imagine an event from that person’s perspective (Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996). An alternative explanation, however, is that perspective taking might lead only to a shift in non-self-based social-cognitive processes deployed when considering the minds of others (Mitchell, Heatherton, & Macrae, 2002). How exactly does taking another person’s perspective lead to greater overlap between self and other? Recent neuroimaging findings suggest a novel way to test the proposal that perspective taking increases self-based processing of others. Studies have shown that a region of human ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC) is preferentially engaged by self-referential mentation, such as introspecting about one’s own personality characteristics (Kelley et al., 2002) or one’s attitudes and preferences (Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006). Accordingly, to the extent that perspective taking does lead to greater overlap in the cognitive processes engaged by consideration of self and other, activity in vMPFC should differentiate less between self and a person whose perspective has recently been adopted than between self and a person considered from a more distal vantage.

Distortions of mind perception in psychopathology

It has long been known that psychopathology can influence social perception, but a 2D framework of mind perception provides the opportunity for an integrative understanding of some disorders. We examined the covariation of mind perception with three subclinical syndromes—autism-spectrum disorder, schizotypy, and psychopathy—and found that each presents a unique mind-perception profile. Autism-spectrum disorder involves reduced perception of agency in adult humans. Schizotypy involves increased perception of both agency and experience in entities generally thought to lack minds. Psychopathy involves reduced perception of experience in adult humans, children, and animals. Disorders are differentially linked with the over- or underperception of agency and experience in a way that helps explain their real-world consequences.

Going beyond the evidence: abstract laws and preschoolers' responses to anomalous data.

Given minimal evidence about novel objects, children might learn only relationships among the specific entities, or they might make a more abstract inference, positing classes of entities and the relations that hold among those classes. Here we show that preschoolers (mean: 57 months) can use sparse data about perceptually unique objects to infer abstract physical causal laws. These newly inferred abstract laws were robust to potentially anomalous evidence; in the face of apparent counter-evidence, children (correctly) posited the existence of an unobserved object rather than revise the abstract laws. This suggests that childrens ability to learn robust, abstract principles does not depend on extensive prior experience but can occur rapidly, on-line, and in tandem with inferences about specific relations.

Neural correlates of stereotype application

Recent research has focused on the disparate mechanisms that support the human ability to “mentalize” about the thoughts and feelings of others. One such process may rely on precompiled, semantic beliefs about the characteristics common to members of a social group, that is, on stereotypes; for example, judging that a woman may be more likely than a man to have certain interests or opinions. In the current study, we identified a pattern of neural activity associated with the use of stereotypes to judge another persons psychological characteristics. During fMRI scanning, participants mentalized about the likely responses of a female and male target to a series of questions, some of which were related to gender stereotypes (e.g., “enjoys shopping for new clothes”). Trials on which participants applied a stereotype were segregated from those on which participants avoided stereotype use. The BOLD response in an extensive region of the right frontal cortex differentiated stereotype-applied from -unapplied trials. Moreover, this neural difference was correlated with a behavioral index of gender associations—the Implicit Association Test—administered after scanning. Results suggest that stereotype application may draw on cognitive processes that more generally subserve semantic knowledge about categories.

Damage To Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex Affects Tradeoffs Between Honesty And Self-Interest

Substantial correlational evidence suggests that prefrontal regions are critical to honest and dishonest behavior, but causal evidence specifying the nature of this involvement remains absent. We found that lesions of the human dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) decreased the effect of honesty concerns on behavior in economic games that pit honesty motives against self-interest, but did not affect decisions when honesty concerns were absent. These results point to a causal role for DLPFC in honest behavior.

Dissociable Contributions of Imagination and Willpower to the Malleability of Human Patience

The ability to exercise patience is important for human functioning. Although it is known that patience can be promoted by using top-down control, or willpower, to override impatient impulses, patience is also malleable—in particular, susceptible to framing effects—in ways that are difficult to explain using willpower alone. So far, the mechanisms underlying framing effects on patience have been elusive. We investigated the role of imagination in these effects. In a behavioral experiment (Experiment 1), a classic framing manipulation (sequence framing) increased self-reported and independently coded imagination during intertemporal choice. In an investigation of neural responses during decision making (Experiment 2), sequence framing increased the extent to which patience was related to activation in brain regions associated with imagination, relative to activation in regions associated with willpower, and increased functional connectivity of brain regions associated with imagination, but not willpower, relative to regions associated with valuation. Our results suggest that sequence framing can increase the role of imagination in decision making without increasing the exertion of willpower.

Predicting human behavior toward members of different social groups

Significance Societal disparities appear in domains including education, healthcare, and the labor market, and stereotypes have been widely hypothesized to play a role in these disparities. However, a mechanistic understanding of how stereotypes influence decision making has largely eluded prevailing models. By integrating economic and psychological approaches, we offer a computational framework providing robust explanatory and predictive power for treatment disparities. This framework generates psychological insights into the nature and force of stereotypes’ influence on behavior and generalizes from behavior in the laboratory to successfully predict naturalistic behavior in the field. Together, these findings show how societally shared assumptions about social groups can produce and reinforce societal disparities, opening the door to a common, quantitative framework to advance scientific understanding of discrimination. Disparities in outcomes across social groups pervade human societies and are of central interest to the social sciences. How people treat others is known to depend on a multitude of factors (e.g., others’ gender, ethnicity, appearance) even when these should be irrelevant. However, despite substantial progress, much remains unknown regarding (i) the set of mechanisms shaping people’s behavior toward members of different social groups and (ii) the extent to which these mechanisms can explain the structure of existing societal disparities. Here, we show in a set of experiments the important interplay between social perception and social valuation processes in explaining how people treat members of different social groups. Building on the idea that stereotypes can be organized onto basic, underlying dimensions, we first found using laboratory economic games that quantitative variation in stereotypes about different groups’ warmth and competence translated meaningfully into resource allocation behavior toward those groups. Computational modeling further revealed that these effects operated via the interaction of social perception and social valuation processes, with warmth and competence exerting diverging effects on participants’ preferences for equitable distributions of resources. This framework successfully predicted behavior toward members of a diverse set of social groups across samples and successfully generalized to predict societal disparities documented in labor and education settings with substantial precision and accuracy. Together, these results highlight a common set of mechanisms linking social group information to social treatment and show how preexisting, societally shared assumptions about different social groups can produce and reinforce societal disparities.

Cognitive neuroscience of honesty and deception: a signaling framework

Understanding the neural basis of human honesty and deception has enormous potential scientific and practical value. However, past approaches, largely developed out of studies with forensic applications in mind, are increasingly recognized as having serious methodological and conceptual shortcomings. Here we propose to address these challenges by drawing on so-called signaling games widely used in game theory and ethology to study behavioral and evolutionary consequences of information transmission and distortion. In particular, by separating and capturing distinct adaptive problems facing signal senders and receivers, signaling games provide a framework to organize the complex set of cognitive processes associated with honest and deceptive behavior. Furthermore, this framework provides novel insights into feasibility and practical challenges of neuroimaging-based lie detection.