Afonso Henriques Borges Ferreira

The Brazilian Exchange Rate Crisis of January 1999

From the monetary reform of July 1994 until January 1999 Brazil followed the policy of pegging the new currency (the real ) to the US dollar. The central rate was initially fixed at 1[ratio ]1 to the US dollar, but no fluctuation band was set and the market rate was allowed to fluctuate substantially. After a sharp appreciation of up to 15 per cent the real remained at a premium to the dollar for two years (until June 1996). In March 1995, following the Mexican crisis, the Banco Central do Brasil adopted a crawling band without preannounced depreciations. This change in policy was meant to increase somewhat the flexibility of the exchange rate regime while still maintaining an anchor for inflationary expectations. The market rate depreciated by 13.9 per cent in the course of 1995 (December 1995 on December 1994), 7.1 per cent in 1996, 7.3 per cent in 1997 and 8.3 per cent in 1998. By December 1998 it had reached 1.2054 to the US dollar, a depreciation of only 20 per cent with respect to the central rate fixed at the end of the hyperinflation but about 40 per cent with respect to the rate prevailing in July 1994.

The Feldstein-Horioka puzzle in South American countries:a time-varying approach

Inasmuch as the investment-savings correlation is related to capital immobility and each country has specific and time-varying capital account liberalization and financial deregulation processes, we might not expect a constant and identical correlation for a group of countries. We performed both a constant (OLS) and a time-varying (Kalman filter) estimation of the investment-savings coefficient for Argentina, Brazil and Chile. As expected, the time-varying model presented a better fit, but our findings suggested that the investment-savings correlation is a misleading measure of capital mobility.